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A bstract
This work presents three contributions to the study of wage inequality. The first is concerned with 
between-group wage inequality, the second and third with within-group or residual wage inequality. 
Chapter 1 reviews the literature on wage inequality. Chapter 2 explores the possibility that a shift 
in consumer demand might have played a role in the rise of wage inequality. If more skilled workers 
demand more skill-intensive goods, then an exogenous increase in relative skill supplies will also induce 
a shift in relative demand. This channel reduces the need to rely on technology and trade to explain the 
patterns in the data. I illustrate this mechanism with a simple two-sector general equilibrium model. 
The empirical part demonstrates that in the UK more educated and richer workers demand more skill­
intensive goods. Calibration of the model suggests that this induced demand shift can explain 3% of the 
total relative demand shift in the UK between 1981 and 1997. The baseline model only explains between- 
industry shifts in skill upgrading and wage inequality, while empirically, most of these changes took 
place within industries. An extension of the model with different qualities of goods and labor can also 
explain some of the within-industry changes. Chapter 3 provides some empirical evidence and a theory 
of the relationship between within-group wage inequality and the increasing dispersion of capital/labor 
ratios across firms. In the empirical part, I document the increasing variance of capital/labor ratios 
across firms in the US labor market. I also show that the increase in the capital intensity variance across 
firms is associated with the increasing wage variance across workers. To explain this empirical fact, I 
adopt a search model where firms differ in their optimal capital choice. The decline of the relative price 
of equipment makes the firm distribution of capital/labor ratios more dispersed. In a frictional labor 
market this force generates wage dispersion among identical workers. Simple calibration of the model 
indicates that the dispersion of capital/labor ratios can explain up to one third of the total increase in 
residual wage inequality. Chapter 4 presents a study of earnings instability. I use the PSID to decompose 
the rise in wage inequality in a permanent and a transitory component. I consider separately job stayers 
and job changers. I find that the result of increasing earnings instability (increasing variance of the 
transitory component of earnings) holds in a sample of job changers but does not hold in a sample 
of job stayers. I interpret the evidence in a search and matching model with on-the-job search. The 
increasing variance of the transitory component of earnings is modeled as a mean-preserving spread 
of the distribution of productivity shocks. The mean-preserving spread induces on-the-job search on 
a wider range of productivity values and reduces the range of values where workers stay on the same 
job. As a result, the variance in the transitory part of earnings is increased for job changers. The effect 
on the wage variance of job stayers is ambiguous and depends on the composition of stayers between 
non-seekers and seekers who did not find a new job.
Thesis Supervisor: Stephen J. Nickell
Title: External member MPC Unit, Bank of England and Professor of Economics, LSE
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Chapter 1
The Literature on Wage Inequality
After a long period of relative quiet, the last decades have seen important changes in the wage 
structure of many OECD countries. During the 1970s, overall wage dispersion declined in 
most countries. The same thing happened to education and occupation wage differentials. The 
decline of wage inequality stopped in almost all countries during the 1980s and 1990s. Since 
the early 1980s, the US and UK took divergent paths and experienced sharp increases in wage 
inequality, both in terms of widening educational and occupational wage differentials and in 
terms of unexplained residual wage inequality. Other OECD countries witnessed a decrease in 
the employment rates of the less skilled. Both the increase in wage inequality and the decrease 
in employment among the less skilled occurred in the face of an expanding relative supply of 
educated workers. This fact indicates a common shift of labor demand against the less skilled 
while the differences among countries point to the important role of institutions in shaping the 
wage structure. Both theoretical and empirical research has been directed to understanding 
those changes in the labor market. The motivation is that a widening wage distribution causes 
increasing inequalities in income and consumption and is potentially disruptive for society as 
a whole.
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This chapter reviews the existing literature on wage inequality, focusing on both the studies 
that are primarily concerned with the increase in educational and occupational wage differen­
tials (between-group wage inequality) and on those that investigate residual wage inequality 
(within-group wage inequality). The literature review aims to place this thesis in the frame­
work of the existing literature and to provide a quick reference to the main models cited in the 
three papers. There are already many surveys on wage inequality. This first chapter draws 
extensively from Acemoglu (2002) and Katz and Autor (1999).
1.1 B asic Framework and Stylized Facts
The distribution of wages can be decomposed into the difference in wages across education or 
occupation groups (between-group wage inequality) and residual wage inequality. The wage 
and employment changes of different education and occupation groups are due to the market 
forces of supply and demand and to institutions such as the unions and the minimum wage. 
Within-group wage inequality can also be attributed to both market forces that raised the 
returns to unobserved ability and to wage setting institutions.
Katz and Autor (1999) propose a supply, demand and institutions framework to analyze 
changes in the wage structure. The wage of an individual can be decomposed in the competitive 
wage given by the interaction of demand and supply and institutional or non-competitive 
factors that cause the wage to deviate from the competitive level. In the formulation of Katz 
and Autor (1999):
Wk =  Wkc +  rk
3
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Wk is the mean log wage of the demographic group k (education, age, sex). Wk is given by 
the sum of the competitive log wage and the rents. The competitive wage Wkc is determined by 
supply and demand for group k. The rents r* can arise form non-competitive or institutional 
forces. For simplicity’s sake let us consider three of them: interindustry wage differentials, 
union wage effects and the impact of the minimum wage or other non-competitive wage setting 
rules.
The mean log wage for group k can be written:
Wk =  Wkc “I" ^ “I" A/jt/fc “I"
J
N - i .where <f>jk =  -jfc is the share of workers of group k that work in industry j ,  Ijk is the 
interindustry wage differential of group k. Uk is the share of workers of group k that are 
unionized, A* is the union wage premium. Mk is the share of workers of group k that are 
affected by the minimum wage, 6k is the effect of the minimum wage. The wage of each 
group k can change either because of market forces that affect its competitive wage or because 
of changes in average rents. Within-group wage dispersion can change because of supply and 
demand factors that affect the distribution of the competitive wage within the group or because 
of institutional changes that affect the distribution of rents within the group.
The stylized facts about wage inequality in the US and UK are the following:
• Wage inequality declined in most countries during the 70s.
•  Wage inequality increased for both men and women in US and UK during the ‘80s and 
the ‘90s. The 90/10 percentile of weekly earnings rose by over 25% from 1979 to 1995
4
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in the US, and it rose by a similar amount in the UK. In particular, wage returns to 
education, occupation and experience increased during the ‘80s and ‘90s.
•  The same period saw a large increase in the supply of educated workers.
•  Wage differences within groups of workers with the same observable characteristics in­
creased.
•  In the US, higher education workers have had increasing real wages and lower education 
workers stagnant or falling real wages. In continental Europe and the UK all educa­
tion groups experienced increasing wages. The employment/population ratio decreased 
slightly for the higher educated workers and much more for the lower educated ones. 
Most of the decline is due to early retirement of older workers.
•  Year-to-year earnings mobility is stable or slightly decreasing. Increased wage inequality 
is not matched by an increase in year-to-year mobility. The permanent (returns to 
observed and unobserved skills) and transitory component of individual earnings have 
increased by similar amounts.
The evolution of wage inequality in the US raises two important puzzles. The first puzzle 
concerns wage inequality between education groups. Although the relative supply of college 
educated workers has increased noticeably in the past 30 years, in the same period the ratio of 
average wages of college and high school graduates has increased by about 25%. The second 
puzzle concerns wage inequality within education and age groups. The rise of within-group 
wage inequality accounts for more than half of the total rise in wage inequality and occurred 
before the rise of between-group wage inequality. The rise of within-group wage inequality 
affected the temporary component of income, while between-group inequality mainly affected
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the permanent component of income.
While the second puzzle has been barely addressed so far, there is already a considerable 
literature on the rise of between-group wage inequality. The first part of this review discusses 
the theories and the evidence regarding the increase in between-group wage inequality. Two of 
the most popular explanations are based on supply and demand factors: skill-biased technical 
change and increasing trade with developing countries. The third explanation focuses on the 
effect of the change in institutions, in particular, on the decline of the unions. The second part 
of this review looks at some of the possible explanations of within-group wage inequality and 
its relationship with earnings instability.
1.2 T he Theories on B etw een Group W age Inequality
1.2.1 Skill Biased Technical Change
The predominant view is that technological change increases the relative demand of skilled 
workers by making them more productive. As long as the relative demand of skilled workers 
grows faster than the relative supply, technological change will contribute to the increase in 
wage inequality.
In a basic framework of Acemoglu (1998) there are two types of workers, high education H  
and low education L  workers and they are imperfect substitutes in production. The technolo­
gies used by skilled and unskilled workers only improve their productivity, they never replace 
skilled or unskilled labor. The production function is a CES:
Y  = [(A,L)f + (AhHY]h
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The elasticity of substitution is a  =  The workers are gross substitutes when a  > 1
and gross complements when a  <  1. If markets are competitive, relative labor demand is given 
by:
w = *  =  U J U )  (11 )
For given relative productivity the skill premium u  decreases when the relative supply 
of skilled workers §  increases. This is the usual substitution effect: when there axe more skilled 
workers in the market they take over the jobs previously done by the unskilled but get paid 
lower wages. Note that in this model there is no unemployment. Nickell and Layaxd (1999) 
propose a version of this model with unemployment.
Skill-biased technical change increases the relative productivity of skilled workers: The
skill premium u) increases as ^  increases if workers are gross substitutes in production i.e. if 
a  > 1. When workers are substitutes, the demand for the more productive workers rises more 
than demand for the unproductive and relative wages change in favor of the more skilled. The 
opposite is true if cr < 1 and skilled and unskilled workers are complements in production. In 
that case an increase in Ah, the productivity of skilled workers, increases the demand both 
for skilled and unskilled workers. The most reliable estimates of a  indicate that <t > 1 and 
therefore that skilled and unskilled workers are substitutes in production. From now on, I 
consider only the case <r > 1.
From stylized facts two and three in the previous section we know that although in the 
‘80s and ‘90s there was a large increase in the relative supply of educated workers the skill 
premium 2k increased. Taking logs of the relative demand for skilled workers in equation 1.1:
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This equation implies that skill-biased technical change, in the form of a rise in must have 
taken place to increase the relative demand of skilled workers and counterbalance the negative 
effect of the increasing supply ^  on the wage premium.
Assuming different values for the elasticity of substitution a  =  it is possible to
get an idea of the rise in that is necessary to reconcile the pattern of changes of wage 
and employment of different groups. Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) assume an elasticity 
of substitution a — 1.4 and estimate that the relative productivity of college graduates with 
respect to workers with a high school diploma, must have increased at least threefold 
between 1980 and 1990 to accommodate for the changes in ^  and ^  that occurred during 
this period.
Steady Dem and Shifts
Some theories in the literature on skill-biased technical change claim that relative productivity 
^  has been growing at a constant pace over time, some others argue that an acceleration of 
^  in the ‘80s is necessary to explain the data. The first set of theories attributes rising skill 
differentials to a decrease in the growth rate of the supply of skills and the increase in unskilled 
immigration. According to this view, a slowing supply of skills coupled with a steady growth 
in the demand of skilled workers could account for the observed rise in wage inequality. Katz 
and Murphy (1992) develop a simple way to explain relative wage and employment changes 
only on the basis of relative supply and demand shifts. Let the aggregate production function
8
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be:
y =  (aiL? +  a 2L? +  ..anLS)£
Different demographic groups (education, sex, age) are imperfect substitutes in production 
with elasticity of substitution a =  With competitive labor markets, relative labor demand 
is given by:
(1.2)
v ij ctj L j
If we move along a fixed relative demand, factor quantities and wages of the same group 
must be negatively correlated:
n
^ A j » j A L j < 0  (1.3)
t=l
With fixed relative demand, an increase in relative supply of each group must lead to 
a decline in its relative wage. Katz and Murphy (1992) consider 64 demographic groups 
according to age, sex and education and test whether inequality 1.3 is satisfied. The results 
indicate that inequality 1.3 is not satisfied during the ‘80s and demand shifts in favor of college 
graduates and women are necessary to explain the observed wage and employment patterns 
of these groups.
Katz and Murphy then test the hypothesis that the relative wage and employment of
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college graduates are consistent with a stable trend in demand changes in favor of that group. 
They take logs of equation 1.2:
log —  =  log —  +  (a -  1) log ^  (1.4)
W l OLl L l
and substitute a time trend in the relative demand changes:
log —  =  7 0 +  7  itime  (1.5)ai
Such a time trend might represent skill-biased technical changes at a constant pace or 
steady shifts in employment towards more skill-intensive sectors. The empirical estimates 
indicate that a stable trend in demand shifts does much better than the hypothesis of fixed 
demand at fitting the data. They conclude that a slowing supply of college graduates coupled 
with a steady growth in demand can account for most of the changes in the college premium 
during the last 40 years.
Shift Share Analysis
The demand shifts towards skilled labor are usually attributed to skill-biased technical change 
or trade liberalization. Demand shifts can take place within industry or between industry. The 
within-industry and between-industry decomposition of demand shifts (shift share analysis) 
has been extensively used to distinguish between the skill-biased technical change and the trade 
hypothesis (Berman, Bound and Machin 1998 and Machin and van Reenen 1998). Within- 
industry shifts may be due to skill-biased technological change or changes in the relative prices
10
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of non-labor inputs such as capital equipment. Between-industry shifts may be generated by 
shifts in product demand across industries either because of shifts in domestic tastes or because 
of shifts in international trade that reduce the share of output of low-skilled industries produced 
at home.
Over the past 50 years, there has been an important shift of employment from low-skilled 
manufacturing towards high-skilled services. However, between-industry demand shifts are 
not enough to explain the pattern of wage and employment of college graduates. If it were so, 
we would have observed the decline of employment rates of college graduates within industry 
given their increasing wage differential. We observe, instead, strong substitution of poorly 
educated workers with highly educated workers within industry.
Katz and Murphy propose a way to decompose the aggregate changes in labor demand in 
between-industry and within-industry factors. Consider a production function that only uses 
skilled and unskilled labor: yj — (lp +  hp)p. The demand for skilled labor in sector j  is:
hj = Cw(wi,wh)yj
where C  is the cost function. Taking the total differential:
dhj =  yjCww(wi,Wh)dw +  Cw(wi, Wh)dyj
Factor demands are homogeneous of degree zero, therefore w,Cww(wi,Wh) =  0. As a result, 
the percentage change in output is equal to the value weighted percentage change in inputs:
11
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dyj _  w'dhj 
yj ~  w'hj
and
dhj =  hj W + yjCww(wi, Wh)dw (1.6)w'hj
The first term in this expression represents the change in demand when relative wages are 
held fixed. The first term is estimated by using the shift share index:
This index proxies for the percentage change in demand for skilled labor. It is a weighted 
average of percentage employment growth in each sector s and the weights are given by the 
employment distribution of skilled labor in each sector. When the sector s is occupation- 
industry cells, the index measures total change in demand, when s is industry only, the index 
measures between-industry demand shifts only. Within-industry changes are obtained as the 
difference between total demand shifts and between-industry shifts.
Shift share analysis has been used extensively in the wage inequality literature but is 
subject to a criticism. In index 1.7, relative wages are held fixed. Therefore, the index does 
not measure the effect on labor demand of the changing distribution of employment across 
sectors, for that part of the change that is due to the change in relative wages. Some growth 
in low-skilled industries might not reflect the true product demand shifts calculated at fixed
12
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factor prices but factor substitution in response to changing factor prices, i.e. the second term 
in the following equation:
d Y  = dY* +  Ypdp = dY* +  YpCwdw
In this equation dY* is the true product demand shifts computed at fixed factor prices, 
p  is the vector of output prices and dp = Cwdw comes from the constant returns to scale 
assumption. Failing to take factor and product prices into account leads to overestimating 
the growth of low-skilled industries and underestimating the growth of high-skilled industries. 
The index can be written:
dH = Cfwd Y  =  Cfwd Y '  + d wYpCwdw (1.8)
The fact that skilled workers experienced rising relative wages implies a negative second 
term in equation 1.8. The result is that this index will underestimate the between-industry 
demand shift in favor of skilled workers.
Acceleration in Skill Biased Technical Change: The Evidence
There is some evidence that skill-biased technical change accelerated during the ‘80s and ‘90s. 
Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) report employment and wage bill shares of college graduates 
from 1940 to 1990. According to their data, the supply of educated workers increased faster 
from 1970 to 1990 than from 1940 to 1970. Returns to college decreased in the ‘70s while 
they increased between the ‘70s and the ‘90s. A steady increase in the demand for skills is not
13
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consistent with these facts.
Acceleration in skill-biased technical change is usually attributed to the spread of computers 
in the labor market in the last twenty years. Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994), Autor, 
Katz and Krueger (1998) and Machin and van Reenen (1998) used simple shift-share analysis 
and showed that most of the increase in employment of educated workers is accounted by 
within-sector shifts. All industries substituted uneducated workers with college graduates, 
and the substitution was more rapid in those industries that use more computers. Although 
this evidence suggests complementarity between the use of computers and skilled workers, the 
causation is difficult to establish. More computerized industries may demand more skilled 
workers for many other reasons and not because of computers.
Another piece of evidence on the effect of computers on the labor market comes from 
Krueger (1993). He documents that workers that use computers have a substantial wage 
premium. Once again, as pointed out by DiNardo and Pischke (1997), it is difficult to establish 
the causation link between the use of computers and higher wages. The observed wage premium 
could be due to rewards for any unobservable skill and not necessarily for the use of computers.
Acceleration in Skill Biased Technical Change: The Theories
The theories based on accelerated technical change have to deal with two main criticisms. 
First, it is difficult to find direct evidence of faster technical change in the last thirty years. 
Secondly, this period was characterized by slow productivity growth at least until 1995. The 
proponents of acceleration of skill-biased technical change respond with two arguments. The 
first argument claims that measures of productivity growth are deceiving since they do not 
take into account improvements in the quality of products. The second argument claims that 
new technologies imply slower growth at the start since workers have to learn how to use them
14
Chapter 1. The Literature on Wage Inequality
and only later do they improve productivity.
Krusell, Ohanian, Rios Rull and Violante (2000) propose a theory of acceleration in skill- 
biased technical change that builds on the evidence of complementarity between computers 
and skilled workers. Although the relative price of equipment capital has been declining for a 
long time, the rate of decline began to accelerate in the ‘70s with the advent of computers. In 
response to the decline in its price, firms have increased the use of equipment capital. Demand 
for skilled workers increased since skills are complementary to computers. Their theory can 
be summarized in the production function:
Y  =  K fibxIS  + (1 -  +  (i -  h ) H x) $ ] ^
In this production function, equipment capital K e is more complementary to skilled workers 
than unskilled workers as long as /x > A. If /x > A then o\ — > 0 2  = y z j ; is the elasticity
of substitution between unskilled labor and the combination of skilled labor and equipment 
capital. <72 is the elasticity of substitution between skilled workers and equipment capital. The 
relative demand for labor derived from this production function is:
Wh (1 -  k )(  1 -  +  (1 -
wi b\L^~l
This equation implies that the skill premium ^  increases when K e increases. In this 
model, the acceleration in the skill bias is due to the faster decline in the price of equipment 
capital during the past thirty years. The decline of the relative price of equipment capital led
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to higher investment and a higher skill premium.
T h e  M ark et Size Effect Another model of accelerated technical change is proposed by 
Acemoglu (1998). In this model, skill-biased technical change is endogenous. The increase in 
supply of skilled workers lead to the development of skill-biased technologies, in the framework 
of equation 1.9 below, a shift from Ai to Ah- This happens since R&D activity is monopolistic in 
nature and technology producers make more profits the more workers use their new technology. 
The market size effect is captured in the equation:
log =  a  +  (3time +  7 log —•Ai L
Unlike equation 1.5 in the Katz and Murphy framework where skill-biased technical change 
^  follows a constant time trend, here skill-biased technical change accelerates because of an 
increase in the relative supply of skills
A simplified version of the model assumes that aggregate production-consumption requires 
two types of goods, one produced only by unskilled workers, the other only by skilled workers. 
The aggregate production function is:
Y  = [(All / y  + i ( A hH ^ » ] i  (1.9)
the relative prices of intermediate goods are given by:
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and relative wages by :
_ PhAh f  
wi pi A i \ l )
The novelty of this model is that technology is endogenous and it is modelled as:
A h =  I Qh (i) Xh (i)1/3 di and Ai =  I q i{ i)x i(i)l~^ di
Jo Jo
Technology in the skilled sector h uses different machines i with i that goes from 0 to 
1. x  (z) is the quantity of each machine i and q (i) is the top quality of machine i. In this 
framework, only the top quality of each machine i is used.
A new quality (or new technology) q(i) is developed in monopoly regime. Monopolists set 
the price x* of a new technology taking demand x(i) as given. The marginal cost of producing 
a new machine of quality q(i) is increasing linearly in q(i). As a result, technology Ah and Ai 
can be written:
Ah = Ph~0)/f3 f  qh (i) di and Ax =  p[ 1-/3)//3 f  qi (i) di 
Jo Jo
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Denote Qj = /q qj (i) di the aggregate productivity of machines used in sector j  =  h, I. We 
now have to establish only how monopolistic R&D sector decides ^  i.e. how much to develop 
new technologies for the skilled sector rather than for the unskilled one. The value of owning 
the leading vintage of machine i in sector j  — h, I is:
rVj(i) = 7Tj(i) -  zj (i) Vj (i)
where 7Tj(i) is the flow rate of monopoly profit and Zj (i) is the flow rate of new inventions. 
The free entry condition of new R&D firms assumes that the cost of producing a new quality 
qj (i) is B  units of the final good: Vj (i) =  Bqj (i) in both sectors j  =  h, I . Solving the model 
gives the direction of technical change:
^  =  (1.10)zi L pi
The direction of technical change is an increasing function of the relative prices of goods 
and the relative supply of workers. The price effect implies that technologies producing more 
expensive goods will be upgraded faster. The market size effect implies that the more workers 
use the technology, the faster the new technology will be developed. Solving the model in 
steady state implies that the discounted profits of developing a new quality machine in both 
sectors j  =  h, I must be equal, therefore Zh = This, in turn, implies that ^  and ^  
are increasing in ^  and hence that skill bias in technology depends on the supply of skilled 
workers. The acceleration in skill-biased technologies in this model is due to the increase in 
the relative supply of skills
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T h e  D iffusion o f a  G eneral P u rp o se  Technology Another possibility is that skilled 
workers are more flexible and can adapt more easily to new technologies. In this case, periods 
of rapid technical change or technological revolutions favor the more skilled and increase the 
skill premium. Models of this type are Aghion and Howitt (1999), Casefli (1999), Galor and 
Moav (2000). Here I briefly illustrate Aghion and Howitt (1999). Their model focuses on the 
diffusion of General Purpose Technologies (GPT). A GPT is a technological breakthrough that 
affects the entire economy just like the Information Technology revolution. The diffusion of a 
new GPT consists of a wave of secondary innovations, each of which creates a new product or 
process in a particular sector. The crucial features of this type of model are:
•  Experimentation and adoption of a new GPT requires skilled labor.
•  The diffusion of a new GPT over time follows a logistic curve: it is slow at the start, 
then accelerates only to slow down again.
Formally the aggregate production function is:
=  | j f  (AiXi)adi
Ai — 1 in sectors where the old GPT is still used, and Ai =  7  >  1 in sectors where the new 
GPT is used. Xi is the flow of intermediate good i used in production of the final good. As the 
production technology in the intermediate sector is assumed to be one-for-one with labor, Xi 
also denotes labor demand in sector i. Total labor force L  is divided into skilled and unskilled. 
The old sectors with A* =  1 are indifferent between skilled and unskilled labor, while the new 
sectors with Ai =  7  > 1 require skilled labor only. Let us assume that the supply of skilled
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workers La is growing at a constant rate over time:
L .(t) = L  -  (1 -  s)L e-0t
where s is the initial fraction of skilled workers and j3 is a parameter that measures the 
speed of skill acquisition. Denote 722 the current fraction of new sectors. Let us assume that 
new sectors are such when they receive a template of the new GPT. Templates arrive at the 
Poisson rate:
A(n2) =  *  ” 2 <  M\Ao +  A if n 2 >— n j
The threshold effect is due, for example, to strategic complementarities in cross-sector 
imitations or social learning. The evolution over time of the number of new sectors is given 
by a logistic curve, which accelerates at first and then slows down as 722 approaches 1:
^  =  A (n2) (1 -  n2)
The transition process from the old to the new GPT has two phases. In the first phase 
(when t is low) the number of new sectors 722 is too small to absorb the entire skilled labor 
force. This implies that some skilled workers have to work in the old sectors at the same wage 
as the unskilled. In the first phase of transition, the labor market is unsegmented and the 
wage rate is common to the skilled and the unskilled, wa =  wu = w. w is determined by the 
market clearing condition:
L  =  (1 -  722)xg +  U2Xn
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where xQ denotes the demand for labor in old sectors and x n the demand for labor in new 
sectors.
In the second phase, the number of new sectors 722 is sufficiently large to absorb the entire 
skilled labor force. The labor market becomes segmented: skilled workers are employed only 
in the new sectors, unskilled workers only in the old sectors. The skilled wage wa is determined 
by the market clearing condition:
Lg — n>2Xfi
and the unskilled wage wu by the condition:
L — Ls = (1 — 7l2)x0
This model predicts that the skill premium ^  first increases with the spread of the new 
GPT, but then goes down as the entire labor force becomes skilled and everybody ends up 
earning the same skilled wage.
Both the market size (Acemoglu) and the GPT (Aghion and Howitt) explanation of wage 
inequality are consistent with the time pattern of the US skill premium in the last thirty years. 
An increase in the supply of skilled workers is associated with a decrease in the skill premium 
in the early ‘70s, followed by a sharp increase in the ‘80s. This might be explained by a change 
in the direction of technical progress (Acemoglu) and/or an acceleration in the spread of a 
new GPT (Aghion and Howitt).
Both explanations of accelerated technical change have to be reconciled with two other 
pieces of evidence. The first piece of evidence is of historical nature and claims that previous
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increases in the supply of skilled workers (at the beginning of the century) were not followed 
by a widening in the wage distribution (Goldin and Katz 1999). The second piece of evidence 
concerns the productivity slowdown: although over the last thirty years there have been big 
increases in human capital investment and in R&D, the productivity growth rate has decreased 
over time.
The response to the first historical issue is that the first industrial revolution was charac­
terized by skill-replacing technical change, while technological change in the last sixty years 
has been mostly skill-complementary. In the nineteenth century, skilled artisans were replaced 
by unskilled workers in the factory. Today, workers with computer skills substitute unskilled 
workers in production. From the market size point of view, it can be argued that it was the 
differential changes in supply of skilled and unskilled workers which promoted the development 
of skill-replacing rather than skill-complementary techniques. At the start of the century, the 
big increase in the unskilled labor force in the English cities increased the monopoly rents of 
technical innovations targeted at the unskilled and therefore promoted skill-replacing technical 
change (Acemoglu 2 0 0 2 ).
All models of skill-biased technical change are at odds with the evidence of sluggish pro­
ductivity growth during the last thirty years at least until 1995. It is probably true that 
increases in productivity due to the spread of computer technology axe taking place mainly 
in the service sector where output and improvements in the quality of output is difficult to 
measure. However it is also documented that the productivity slowdown is common to all 
sectors, even those where there are very few doubts about measuring output and its quality. 
In response to this last critique, the literature invokes decreasing returns to R&D or the slow 
adjustment of workers and firms to the new technology. However it is certainly true that it is 
difficult to reconcile theories of accelerated technical change with the evidence of thirty years
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of slow productivity growth and stagnant average real wages.
1.2 .2  T h e  E ffect o f  Trade on  W ages 
The Theory
skill-biased technical change and trade are the most popular explanations of the shifts in 
relative labor demand in favor of the skilled. The trade explanation is based on the Heckscher- 
Ohlin theory. Take two countries A  and B  with different endowments of skilled and unskilled 
labor. Developed country A  is endowed with a lot of skilled labor H ,4 while underdeveloped 
country B  is endowed with a lot of unskilled labor L b • Therefore Assume, further­
more, that both goods are tradable and that both countries have access to the same technology 
Ah and Ai.
The utility function is a CES in both countries and is defined over two goods, the skill­
intensive yh =  AhH  and the low skill-intensive yi = AiL:
U = [{AiL)p +  (AhH )p]~p
In a closed autharchic economy, the relative price of skill-intensive goods in the developed 
country A, pc =  ^  is given by:
< u , )
and the wage ratio by:
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In an open economy setting, after trade liberalization, the final product markets are joined 
and there will be a single world relative price:
\  M{La  + L b ) )
(1.13)
and therefore a single relative wage:
ujw > u c (1.14)
The Heckscher-Ohlin theory imphes that in an open economy, each country will export the 
good whose factor of production is abundant. The developed country will specialize in skill­
intensive products since skilled labor is relatively cheap. TVade will have a negative effect on 
unskilled labor in the developed country as long as imported goods are produced by employing 
unskilled workers and exported goods are very skill intensive. The assumption is that imported 
goods could have been produced at home using domestic unskilled labor.
The Evidence
The trade explanation of wage inequality runs counter to several empirical problems:
•  Trade with developing countries is too small to explain such big changes in the wage 
structure.
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• Trade would imply, according to equation 1.13, that the relative price of skill-intensive 
goods should rise in developed countries. But according to the empirical evidence, this 
does not seem to be true.
• An implication of trade is that labor in developed countries should be reallocated from 
low-skill to high-skill industries. However, many empirical studies have established that 
most of the demand shift from uneducated to educated workers occurred within-industry 
rather than between-industry. Furthermore, there has also been a rise in relative em­
ployment of skilled workers in the non-traded sectors.
•  Finally, equation 1.14 implies that wage inequality should increase in developed countries 
and decrease in underdeveloped ones. This, again, does not seem to be the case.
I shall now briefly review the empirical methods used in the literature to evaluate the trade 
hypothesis. A common way of estimating the impact of trade as a source of relative demand 
shifts is factor content analysis. It consists in estimating the content of domestic unskilled 
labor embedded in imports and exports. The difference between the supplies of unskilled 
labor used in export and imports gives an estimate of the impact of trade on relative labor 
demand. Using the same notation of the shift share analysis of equation 1.7, the factor content 
of trade in year t  can be written as the sum over all industries of unskilled labor embedded in 
net imports of each industry i:
where la  is net imports in industry i in year t. Ya is domestic output of industry i in year 
t. Ea is the share of total employment of industry i in year t. e* is the proportion of workers
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of group k in industry i. To build a measure of relative demand shift simply take:
where the factor content of workers of group k in year t, Lk, is divided by the average share 
in employment of workers of group k in the base year, E k. The second term is added so that 
the demand shift is expressed in relative terms and T kE k =  0.
Studies of this kind such as those by Katz and Murphy (1992) and Berman, Bound and 
Griliches (1994) usually conclude that trade-induced changes in relative demand of educated 
workers are too small with respect to the big increase in the supply of educated workers of the 
past thirty years. The effect of increased trade is big only for female high-school dropouts who 
were traditionally employed in import competing industries such as textiles. And in this case, 
as Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1997) point out, immigration of unskilled workers from abroad 
also played a significant role in increasing the relative supply of the unskilled.
A second way of estimating the effect of trade on wages looks at the changes in the prices 
of final products. Trade with developing countries has the effect of depressing prices of the 
goods produced by unskilled workers and thus increasing wage inequality. The link between 
product prices and wages is given by the zero profit condition that equates prices to average 
costs:
p = B  x p  + A x w  (1-15)
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where p  is a N  x 1 vector of output and intermediate inputs prices, B  is a N  x N  matrix 
of intermediate inputs requirements whose elements b{j indicate the number of units of inter­
mediate input i necessary to produce one unit of output j. w is a M  x 1 vector of factor prices 
and A  is a N  x M  matrix of factor requirements. Differentiating this equation we obtain:
dp =  d x dw
where d is a N  x M  matrix whose elements dij indicate the share of factor i in the average 
cost paid to produce one unit of j. This equation relates changes in product prices to changes 
in factor prices and is called a mandated-wage equation. In regression form, this equation 
looks like:
dpj =  a  +  dijPi +  £j
where dpj is the change of product prices over some period of time for industry j .  The 
estimates of Pi are interpreted as the mandated factor price changes i.e. the changes in factor 
costs that are necessary to keep the zero-profit condition 1.15 valid when product prices dpj 
change.
Product price studies include those by Lawrence and Slaughter (1993), Sachs and Shatz 
(1994) and Krueger (1997). They first estimate whether relative prices of skill-intensive goods 
increased over time and then calculate the mandated wage change. The results vary according 
to the study. Most studies find no significant increase in the prices of skill-intensive goods over
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time. Only Krueger finds that relative prices of skill-intensive goods increased over time and 
calculates that mandated wage changes are roughly of the same magnitude. He concludes, 
however, that the increase in product prices is small and not sufficient to explain the large 
increase in the wage skill premium. A serious problem with the interpretation of product price 
studies is that the causation from international trade to domestic product prices is difficult to 
establish. Domestic product prices clearly depend on many different factors and it is difficult to 
directly relate changes in product prices to either changes in barriers to trade or transportation 
costs or changes in foreign tastes/technologies or endowments.
Another piece of evidence that runs counter to a trade-based explanation of the increase 
in wage inequality relies on the shift-share analysis of between- and within-industry shifts. 
The trade hypothesis implies a shift in relative demand between industries, from low skill 
intensive goods to high skill-intensive ones. Berman Bound and Griliches (1994), Autor, Katz 
and Krueger (1998) and Berman, Bound and Machin (1998) document that most of the rise in 
wage inequality can be accounted for by within-industry shifts of employment from uneducated 
to educated workers. All industries, even those in non-tradable sectors and those with very 
low skill intensity increased their demand of educated workers.
Although trade is unlikely to be the cause of the changes in the wage structure, it may 
have had an important role interacting with technical change. Acemoglu (2003) claims that 
trade induces skill-biased technical change. Trade liberalization increases the prices of skill­
intensive goods as in equation 1.13, according to the usual Hecksher-Ohlin effect. In a model of 
endogenous technical change, development of skill-biased technologies depends on the relative 
prices of goods and the relative labor supplies as in equation 1.10. The price effect implies that 
developing technologies that produce more expensive goods is more profitable. Trade raises 
the prices of skill-intensive goods and in this way leads to skill-biased technical change.
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This theory implies that the effect of trade in shaping the wage distribution may be much 
bigger than what is captured by factor content analysis. The second implication is that, if the 
major effect of trade is to promote skill-biased technical change, then within-industry shifts 
in relative labor demand are consistent with the trade explanation. The third implication 
concerns the prices of skill-intensive goods. Trade liberalization leads to an initial rise in the 
relative prices of skill-intensive goods, but, in the long run, prices must go back to their original 
equilibrium given by equation 1.11. This happens because technology ^  adjusts according 
to relative prices ^  and relative supply of labor The relative supply of labor relevant for 
the market of new technologies has not changed since technologies are produced only for the 
internal market and other countries can make free use of them without paying intellectual 
property rights. The last implication of this theory is therefore that trade-induced skill-biased 
technical change is consistent with stable prices of skill-intensive goods.
1 .2 .3  Labor M arket In stitu tio n s and  W age Inequality  
The Evidence
Labor market institutions, such as the degree of centralization in wage setting, minimum wage 
laws or union density and coverage have an important effect on the distribution of wages. 
Institutions are more likely to affect the bottom of the wage distribution since unions and the 
minimum wage tend to compress wages at the bottom. One stream of the literature has linked 
differences in wage inequality across countries to differences in institutions. Another approach 
has related changes in wage inequality within countries to changes in institutions.
Blau and Kahn (1996 and 1999) have investigated the effect of labor market institutions 
on wage inequality across countries decomposing the wage variance in the following way:
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V% —  duiVui  " I "  ( 1  Q>ui)Vni “ 1“  Qui(Wui ^ i )  “ I "  ( 1
is the overall variance of wages for country i\ au is the fraction of unionized workers; 
vu and vn are the variance of union and non-union wages; wu and wn are average union and 
non-union wages and W{ is the country average log wage level.
The last two terms of this expression indicate that the gap between union and non-union 
wages is important in accounting for the overall variance of wages. The other factors are the 
wage variance in the unionized and non-unionized sector, vui and un*, and union density au{. 
Since the wage variance in the unionized sector is typically lower, a higher union density in 
a country would contribute to a lower overall variance of wages. Collective wage bargaining 
lowers the wage variance in the unionized sector thus reducing intra-industry and intra-firm 
wage differentials. Collective bargaining is likely to affect also the wage variance in the non- 
unionized sector, as long as there are agreements to extend contracts to non-union workers. 
The US, relative to other countries, has a higher union premium but lower density and coverage 
and a much higher wage variance in both the unionized and non-unionized sectors.
Using the above framework, Blau and Kahn find that differences in union density account 
for 12 % of the difference in wage inequality between the US and other countries. The difference 
in the union premium explains only 2 % and the difference in the union and non-union wage 
variance explains 8 6 % of the difference.
Several studies across countries and within countries have used changes in wage setting 
agreements to show that the degree of centralization of wage setting is related to a lower wage 
variance in both the unionized and non-unionized sectors. Many other studies have related
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institutional change in the labor market to changes in wage inequality within the US. The 
two major changes in institutions in the recent period are the decline of the unions and the 
reduced real value of the minimum wage.
Union members have a wage premium that can vary between 10 and 20% relative to non 
union members. Given that unionization rates are higher for the less skilled, strong unions 
are likely to reduce educational wage differentials. Unions tend to reduce wage dispersion 
within the union sector by compressing wages between establishments and jobs. This suggests 
that the decline of the unions may have had an important effect on the changes in wage 
inequality. Union membership declined from 30% in 1973 to 18% in 1993. Most of the decline 
is concentrated among the low educated whose unionization rates declined by 2 0 % points 
during the same period while unionization rates for college graduates were basically stable.
Adopting the framework of equation 1.16, Freeman (1993) estimates that the decline in 
union density can explain about 20% of the rise in male wage inequality from 1978 to 1988. 
He also claims that in the same period deunionization can account for a 1.5 log point increase 
in the male college premium and almost a 4 log point increase in the college premium among 
those aged 25 to 34.
DiNardo et al.(1996) use a non-parametric technique to study the effects of union density 
changes on the wage distribution between 1979 to 1988. They simulate the wage distribution 
in 1988 as if the unionization rate were the same as in 1979. They then attribute the differ­
ence between the real and the simulated distribution in 1988 to the effect of the changes in 
unionization. Their method is a generalization of equation 1.16: the overall wage distribution 
is the sum of the wage distribution of union and non-union workers. The wage distribution 
of union workers is typically more compressed. Reweighting the 1988 wage distribution, using 
the 1979 union density rate, amounts to giving more importance to the more compressed dis­
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tribution of union workers. Their results suggest that deunionization can account for up to one 
third of the total increase in the 90-50 wage differential. The problem with this approach is 
the assumption that unions have an effect only on the wage distribution of unionized workers 
while wages of non-union workers are considered independent of the unions. In the plausible 
case that unions have spillover effects on wages of non-unionized workers, the estimates of the 
effect of unionization changes will be downward biased. On the other hand, deunionization 
might be the endogenous response to other market forces like trade and technology. In this 
latter case, the effect of deunionization may be overestimated.
The other big institutional change that affected the US labor market in the last 20 years 
is the decline in the real value of the minimum wage. The Federal minimum wage in the US 
was constant in nominal terms for ten years, from 1981 to 1990. As a result, the real value 
of the minimum wage declined dramatically. In the early eighties many more workers had a 
relatively high minimum with respect to the early nineties when the value of the minimum 
wage declined dramatically relative to average wages. The fact that the minimum wage ceased 
to be binding for many workers in the early ‘90s is suggestive that such big changes may have 
had an effect on the widening of the wage distribution at the bottom.
DiNardo et al. (1996) simulate the wage distribution in 1988 had the real value of the 
minimum wage stayed the same as in 1979. The approach is the same as before: the total 
wage distribution is the sum of the distribution below the minimum wage and above the 
minimum wage. Reweighting the 1988 distribution using the real value of the minimum wage 
in 1979 means giving more weight to the more compressed distribution below the minimum 
wage. The difference between the observed and the simulated distribution in 1988 is attributed 
to the effect of the declining value of the minimum wage. Their results indicate that the decline 
in the real value of the minimum wage can account for most of the increase in the 50-10 log
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wage differential. The critical hypothesis here is that the minimum wage affects only the 
distribution of wages below the minimum wage itself and has no spillover effect on those above 
the minimum wage. Moreover, the minimum wage is assumed to have no effect on employment 
levels.
Lee (1999) identifies the effect of the Federal minimum wage on the changes in wage 
inequality looking at the differences across states in the US. He takes a difference-in-difference 
approach. The minimum wage is more ’’biting” in low wage states rather than in high wage 
states. Low wage states are therefore considered the treatment group and high wage states 
the control group. The identifying assumption is that the only difference in the trends in the 
50-10 wage differential across states is due to the different ’’bite” of the minimum wage. He 
finds that most of the widening 50-10 wage differential is accounted for by the decline in the 
real value of the minimum wage.
The empirical literature on the effects of institutions on wage inequality tends to conclude 
that deunionization and the decline in the real value of the minimum wage play an important 
role in explaining the increase in within-group wage inequality and a less relevant role in 
explaining the increase in the college wage premium. This interpretation is subject to two 
caveats. The first of an empirical nature, the second of a theoretical nature.
Although both the decline of the minimum wage and deunionization may have played a 
role in the changing wage distribution, they are unlikely to have played a major role. First, 
due to their ’’timing”. In the US the decline in the value of the minimum wage began only in 
the ‘80s while within-group wage inequality started to increase in the ‘70s. In the UK, there 
was never an effective minimum wage before the late ‘90s. Deunionization in the US started in 
the ‘50s, much before the rise in wage inequality. In the UK, union density started declining 
in the ‘80s after the rise in wage inequality. Moreover, workers paid the minimum wage are
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only a small fraction (less than 8 %) of the total; it is very unlikely that the minimum wage 
can explain the changes that affected the entire wage distribution. Wage inequality increased 
in the public sector when the unions were still very strong and in many occupations where 
wages were never much affected by the presence of the unions.
The Interaction Between Institutions and Technology
Prom the theoretical point of view, it seems implausible to consider institutions as completely 
immune from market forces. The effects that we attribute to changes in institutions may be 
due to the response of institutions to changes in supply and demand factors like technology and 
trade. Acemoglu, Aghion and Violante (2001) suggest that technical change may have caused 
deunionization and the overall changes in wage inequality. In their model, unions compress 
the wage structure but give a benefit to workers because they either capture rents or increase 
productivity. The outside option of skilled workers is to work in the non-union sector paid 
at their full marginal product. Skill-biased technological change increases the productivity 
difference between the skilled and the unskilled and destroys the coalition between the skilled 
and the unskilled that supports the union. In formulas, the skill-unskilled wage ratio in the 
non-union sector is equal to the productivity ratio ^  In the union sector, the wage
structure is compressed, ^  =  4 with <f> < 1 , but unions provide a benefit of /? to all workers. 
Therefore, the zero profit condition for a unionized firm is: (wh~(3)H+(wi~(3)L = AhH + A iL . 
The resulting wage for the skilled in the union sector is:
(Ah +  (3)H +  (Ai +  (3)L 
Wh = AhH  + <j>~1AiL Ah
Since ^  increases because of technical change, Wh will eventually become smaller than Ah
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and skilled workers will prefer the non-union sector. On the other hand unskilled workers will 
experience a decline in their wage since the coalition that supports the union will break down.
1.3 T he Theories o f R esidual W age Inequality
1.3 .1  T h e  Ju h n , M urphy and  P ierce  D eco m p o sitio n
Changes in wage inequality reflect changes in both price and quantities of workers’ observable 
characteristics and changes in residual wage inequality. To quantify the role played by observ­
ables and unobservables in rising wage inequality Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) adopted a 
simple variance decomposition framework. Let us start from the simple wage regression:
Wit =  XitPt +  uit (1.17)
where tu# is log wage of individual i in period t. X u  is a vector of observable characteristics 
and (3t is the vector of OLS estimated returns, uu is the residual which reflects price and 
quantities of unobserved skills. The wage variance can be written:
var(wu) =  var(Xit/3t) +  var(uu)
the first term is between-group wage inequality and the second one is within-group or 
residual wage inequality. Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) report that the growth in residual 
wage inequality accounts for roughly 60% of the total increase in the variance of male and 
female log wages in the U.S. during the period 1963-1995. The rise in within-group wage
35
Chapter 1. The Literature on Wage Inequality
inequality started earlier than the rise in between-group inequality. During the ‘70s, while 
returns to education were declining, residual wage inequality was already rising. During the 
‘80s and ‘90s, returns to education and experience increased but the gender pay gap decreased 
with the result that the contribution of between-group wage inequality to the total rise in wage 
inequality remained constant.
The decomposition can be improved to analyze other measures of wage dispersion apart 
from the variance and to separately assess the role played by the rise in the returns to observ­
ables (3t and the changes in the distribution of individual characteristics Xa- From estimation 
of equation 1.17, the estimated OLS residuals ua for each individual i in each year t are ob­
tained. ua can be written as ua = where da is the percentile in the distribution
function of the residuals in year t. The decomposition can be rewritten:
W i t  =  X « P  +  X i t ( D t  - 0 )  +  +  [ F - \ 4 U )  -
where (3 is the average return to observables in the period under study, -F_1(*) is the 
average inverse cumulative distribution of residuals. In this decomposition, the first term 
captures the changes in the distribution of observable characteristics Xu. The second term 
measures the contribution of the changing prices of observables and the last term the changes 
in the distribution of residuals. This decomposition makes it possible to simulate the wage 
distribution that would prevail if one of the components were to be held fixed at the base 
year. Keeping observable skill returns (3 and the residual distribution F(da) fixed, wages are 
determined only by the changing composition of workers’ observable characteristics:
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w1it = X i +
Keeping the residual distribution fixed, wages are determined by the changing prices and 
quantities in observable characteristics:
w l = X it/3t + F - i(0 it)
Calculating the distributions wa,w}ti and wft for each year in the sample, the changes 
in wlt can be attributed to changes in observable characteristics; the changes in wft — w\t to 
changes in the prices of observable characteristics and the changes in wu — w \  to changes in 
the distribution of residuals.
Applying this method Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) claim that roughly 60% of the 
increase in the 90-10 log wage differential can be accounted for by changes in the residual 
distribution. Of the 40% accounted for by changes in observable characteristics and prices, 
most of it (80%) is due to changes in the returns to education. Any explanation of the 
increase in wage inequality should therefore account not only for the rising returns to observable 
characteristics but also for the rise in within-group wage inequality.
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1.3 .2  T h e  T heories  
The Single Index M odel
The theories of within-group wage inequality are far less developed than those of between-group 
inequality reviewed in the previous sections. The simplest model of residual wage inequality 
is a single index model as in Card and Lemieux (1996). In a single index model there is only 
one type of skill which is correlated with education. A college graduate has probability (f>c of 
being high skilled while a high school graduate has a lower probability <f>n < <f>c of being high 
skilled. If the skill premium is w = then in this simple model the college premium is:
c _ w c _  <f>cwh +  (1  -  <f>c)wi _  <f>cu) +  (1  -  0 C)c _  c _  'rc'Mn ' y* *rc/w * "rtr 1 V* 'ret /-j -j o\
Wn  ~  <f>n W h  +  (1 -  (f>n ) w i  ~  <f)n U  +  (1 ~  <j>n )
An explanation of within-group and between-group wage inequality based on this model 
would claim that either the true returns to skills u; have increased over time or the dispersion 
of unobserved skills has increased over time, i.e. that <f>c has increased relative to <f>n. The 
first possibility is that u) has increased while <f>c and <f>n are constant. However if <f>c and 
<f>n are constant over time, then the single index model of residual wage inequality runs up 
against the difficulty of explaining the different evolution of between-group and within-group 
wage inequality in the ‘70s. Since equation 1.18 clearly shows that the skill premium u) and 
the college premium u c always move together, therefore this model cannot account for the 
simultaneous rise in residual wage inequality and decline in returns to college during the ‘70s. 
The second possibility is that (f)c has increased relative to (j>n. The idea is that within-group 
wage inequality may arise from increased dispersion of unobserved skills in the new cohorts
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of labor market entrants. Increased dispersion of unobserved ability could affect the returns 
to education as education and unobserved ability are positively correlated. The reason for 
an increase in the dispersion of unobserved ability in the new cohorts is blamed on increased 
differences in school quality or in social conditions across neighborhoods within cities. If this 
were the explanation and the distribution of skills were more dispersed in the younger cohorts, 
then we would observe a different college premium for different cohorts. Juhn, Murphy and 
Pierce (1993) compare the changes in wage inequality and residual wage inequality in the 
70s for the cohort aged 25-29 in 1970 with changes in the wage inequality in the 80s for the 
cohort aged 25-29 in 1980. They find that changes in wage inequality within cohorts are very 
similar to the general pattern of increasing wage inequality. This suggests that the rise in wage 
inequality is due to changes in the true returns to skills rather than to the different dispersion 
of unobserved skills within different cohorts.
The Two Index M odel
Another possible model is a two-index model of residual wage inequality as proposed by Ace- 
moglu (1998). In this model there are four types of workers that are differentiated by education 
and unobserved skills. The aggregate production function is:
Y  = [(AluL uY  +  (.A u L .Y  + (A ^ H u Y  +  (A h sH ,f] i
where Lu is the supply of low-skilled, low-education workers. The fraction of high skill 
workers is higher among the educated workers: c()h = In this setup within-group
wage inequality is given by:
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5 - ( £ ) > - ' ’ -  £ - ( £ ) ' « «
and the college premium is given by:
„ _  4&AL + A L / 1 + A V  ( H \ - ^
U -  <%Al +  A l  U + U;
In this model, the direction of technical change is endogenous and depends on the relative 
supply The market size effect encourages the development of skill-complementary tech­
nologies. When ^  rises, the college premium declines as in the ‘70s while within-group wage 
inequality is not affected. As new skill-complementary technologies are developed, within- 
group wage inequality and the college premium both start to rise. This model provides a 
better explanation of the differential behavior of residual wage inequality and the returns to 
college during the ‘70s. In this model, within-group wage inequality rises as a result of directed 
technical change.
The V intage M odel
The theories of within-group wage inequality are faced with an empirical puzzle: Bludell and 
Preston (1999) and Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) have documented the transitory nature 
of within-group wage inequality. According to the evidence, the rise in within-group wage 
inequality affected the temporary component of income while between-group wage inequal­
ity mainly affected the permanent component of income. The ’’vintage” model proposed by 
Aghion, Howitt and Violante (2002) tackles this problem. In each period a new technology
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embodied in new machines spreads to a new sector. Workers are ex-ante identical and only 
a random fraction of them has the opportunity to adapt to the new vintage of machines. 
Furthermore the workers who can adapt to the new technology several periods in a row can 
more easily transfer to the new machines the skills acquired through learning by doing on their 
previous job. Within-group wage inequality rises because there is a premium to the workers 
that can adapt to the new technologies and because those that can adapt more times can also 
transfer their skills.
Each period t a new vintage of machines A  is introduced, the machines last only two 
periods. At time t there are only two technologies to consider:
Vot =  A tx f c a
where xot is the labor input working with the new technology, and
yu  =  A t- i[(l +  ri)x\t]l~a
where x\t is the labor input working with the old technology at time t and rj is a learning- 
by-doing parameter. Each new technology is (1 +  7 ) more productive than the previous one: 
At =  (1 +  7 )At_i. In steady state, the productivity adjusted production in the two sectors 
can be written:
2/0 =  xl~a and yi =  — [(1 +  f7)xi]1-a
1 + 7
Only a random fraction a  of workers can adapt immediately to the new technology. The 
workers that move from the leading technology to the next leading one can transfer r  part of
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their 77 learning-by-doing to the new machines. In formulas, one unit of labor services generate 
one unit of labor input except for the workers that move from a leading technology to the next 
leading one. One unit of their labor service generates (1 +  r)  units of labor input:
xo =  (1 +  T)noo +  nio 
x i  =  noo +  mo
where is the labor flow from technology i =  0 , 1  last period to technology j  = 0 , 1  this 
period. The labor flows must satisfy the following conditions:
noo +  nio +  noi +  n n  =  1
t i o o  <  =  or (noo +  n i o )
nio < = <r(noi + nn)
noi = nio
The first is a market clearing condition. The second and third are the adaptability condi­
tions and the fourth is the stationarity condition.
Now the model can be solved. The labor demand schedule will be equal to the ratio of the 
marginal products in sector 0 and 1. Firms take the wage as given:
wp _  I +  7  ( £ 0  \
W\ ( l +  77)1-a \ x i /
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It must also be true that woo =  (1 +  t)w o , w\o = wq, and wq\ — w\\ = w\ where wij 
denotes the wage of a worker that moves from sector i to sector j .
The equilibrium wage ratio between sector 0 and 1, J-J, will be determined at the intersec­
tion of supply and demand. To determine the labor supply, assume that each worker supplies 1 
unit of work inelastically and has logaritmic utility in consumption. The workers’ only choice 
is whether to move into the new technology sector (when given the chance with probability a) 
or to stay in the old sector. Denoting with Vio the present discounted value of moving from 
sector i  =  0 , 1  to sector 0 , and with v\  the present discounted value of staying in sector 1 , the 
relevant Bellman equations are:
v*o = «>i0 + P{<7 maxfcoo, vi] + (1 -  a)vi] 
vi =  w\ +  (3{cr max[uio, ui] +  (1 -  o )v \}
There axe three possible solutions:
•  v\ =  vio which is equivalent to ^  =  Q = 1+^gT • In this case, the workers who worked 
in sector 1 last period are indifferent between the two sectors this period. Workers who 
worked in sector 0  last period will prefer to move to the new leading edge this period 
because they have a transferability premium. The first adaptability constraint is binding 
but nio can take any value between 0 and <r(noi+nn). Therefore the relative labor supply 
jfP- is indeterminate.XI
•  > vi or ^  > Q. In this case, the adaptability constraints are binding for both types
of workers as all those who are given the chance will move to the new technology. This
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leads to the relative labor supply ^
• vu > ViQ. In this case, workers of type i prefer to stay in the old sector, therefore nio =  0 
and xq =  0 .
The equilibrium Jj-J- is given by the intersection of the relative demand and supply curves.
<t(!+<7t ) ] i® Poi11^  where the relative demand schedule meets the vertical 
supply curve -J =  The equilibrium wage rate is therefore given by ^  = max(f2, 4>).
Within-group wage inequality can be written in this model as the ratio between the max­
imum and the minimum wage: Rw- The maximum wage woo is earned by workers that adapt 
to the new technology for two periods in a row:
.woo woo woo wq . .
R w  =  m a x (  , - - - - - = - - - - - - - - - - - )  =  m a x l l  +  t ,  ( 1  +  r ) $ l
W q W \ Wo W \
This measure of within-group wage inequality increases with the rate of technical progress 7  
and with trasferability of knowledge by adaptable workers r .  In this model, within-group wage 
inequality corresponds to individual variability of earnings. This model is therefore consistent 
with the evidence in Blundell and Preston (1999) and in Gottshalk and Moffitt (1994) about 
the transitory nature of within-group wage inequality.
1 .3 .3  O rganizational C hange
I have put organizational change in the section devoted to within-group wage inequality since 
most of the theories regarding organizational change are concerned with unobservable individ­
ual skills.
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The Evidence
There is evidence that considerable organizational changes have been taking place at the firm 
level over the past decades. Cappelli and Wilk (1997) show that there have been big changes 
in recruitment practices of firms. There is evidence of more selective practices and more 
accurate screening at recruitment level. Sicherman (1991) finds evidence of better matching 
between firms and workers. Using PSID data, he shows that more workers have the exact 
amount of education required for their job. According to the answers to the question ”do you 
think you have more/exact/less education than necessary to do your job”, fewer workers are 
overeducated or undereducated in recent years.
Acemoglu (1999) documents changes in the distribution of jobs. Building industry-occupation 
cells and ranking them according to their average wage, there is a shift of employment towards 
the lower and higher ranking cells. This is interpreted as changing composition of jobs towards 
both higher and lower quality jobs. Constantine and Neumark (1994) show that the distri­
bution of on-the-job training has become more unequal across jobs. As on-the-job training is 
correlated with high wages and capital investment in the job, this evidence is interpreted as 
a more unequal distribution of jobs. Similarly, Caselli (1999) reports a sharp increase in the 
capital/labor ratio difference between the 90th percentile of most capital-intensive industries 
and the 1 0 th  percentile. A more unequal distribution of capital/labor ratios across industries 
is evidence in favor of a changing composition of jobs.
Finally, Caroli and van Reenen (1999) provide evidence suggesting that changes in organi­
zational form are related to changes in wages in a sample of English and French firms.
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The Theories
The idea behind models of organizational change and wage inequality is simple: as the relative 
productivity of skilled workers increases, it becomes more profitable for them to work by 
themselves rather than working together with the unskilled. Kremer and Maskin (2000) build 
a model with two types of workers and two types of production. In the first type of firm, 
skilled and unskilled workers work together, in the second type skilled workers work alone. In 
the first type of firm the productivity of low skilled workers affects the productivity of high 
skilled workers, in the second type of firm it does not. An increase in the variance of skills or 
skill-biased technical change increases the productivity difference between high and low skilled 
workers. This may increase wage inequality as high skilled workers separate from low skilled 
workers. Kremer and Maskin also provide some evidence of the increased segregation of high 
skilled and low skilled workers in specific plants.
Acemoglu (1999) builds a model where the increase in the relative supply of skills and 
in the relative productivity changes firms’ investment decisions. When there are few skilled 
workers and the productivity gap between the skilled and unskilled is limited, firms create one 
type of job (one single level of k) and pool across all types of workers. When the supply of 
skilled workers or their relative productivity increases, firms tend to differentiate the types of 
jobs they offer. Some firms invest in more capital and target skilled workers only. Some other 
firms target low skilled workers only.
The simple static version of this model has <j> skilled workers with productivity rj >  1 and 
1 — <j> unskilled workers with productivity normalized to 1. Firms sink their capital before 
searching for workers. When the match occurs and is not turned down by either the firm or 
the worker, firms produce y =  k l~aha where /i =  77 or 1 and spend ck to install their capital.
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Wages are set by Nash bargaining therefore w = (3y. Expected profits of the firm before the 
match are:
E tt =  0 3^  [(1 — p )k l~a7]a — ck)] +  (1 — <f>)xL[(l — (5)kl~a — ck)]
where x H and x L are the probabilities that the skilled and unskilled workers accept the job 
once the match occurs. The first order condition w.r.t. to the capital choice k, given x H and 
x L, gives two types of equilibria. One pooling equilibrium where both skilled and unskilled 
workers accept the job, i.e. x H =  1 and x L =  1 , and one separating equilibrium where only 
skilled workers accept, i.e. x H =  1 and x L =  0. Substituting in E tt the values for the pooling 
equilibrium capital choice kp  and the separating equilibrium choice ks, we obtain the value of 
a job in the two cases: Vp and Vs- The pooling equilibrium will be preferred to the separating 
one if:
v P > V s ^ n < { ^ y
This means that when the supply of skilled workers 0 is low or the productivity difference 
between skilled and unskilled workers rj is low, all firms will tend to choose one single level 
of capital kp  and hire both skilled and unskilled workers in the same job. When either 
the supply of skilled workers 0  or the productivity difference rj rises, then the separating 
equilibrium will prevail and some firms will invest ks  and produce using only skilled workers. 
In the transition from the pooling to the separating equilibrium wage inequality increases.
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In the pooling equilibrium, both skilled and unskilled workers work with the same level of 
physical capital kp. Therefore, the unskilled end up working with a higher physical/human 
capital ratio and the wage skill premium is compressed i.e. it is lower than the productivity 
difference ^  =  rf* < rj. In the separating equilibrium, firms produce only with the skilled and 
the unskilled get wi — 0 .
1.4 Perm anent and Transitory C om ponents o f Earnings
The growing literature on the permanent and transitory components of income is closely linked 
to the literature on wage inequality. The rising variance in the transitory component of income 
is also known as the growth of earnings instability.
The literature on earnings instability starts from the decomposition of the series of indi­
vidual wages in a permanent and transitory part. Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) decompose 
log earnings in a simple way. They subdivide the PSID data in two 9-year periods. The per­
manent component of earnings is the mean over 9 years of annual earnings and the transitory 
part is the deviation of the current annual earnings from the mean. The permanent variance 
is the variance of the individuals’ permanent means. The transitory variance is obtained cal­
culating the variance of the transitory deviations for each individual and then averaging the 
variances across individuals. An individual is affected by an increase in earnings instability if 
the variance of his transitory earnings increases over the two nine-year periods.
Baker and Solon (2003), Gottschalk and Moffitt (1995), and Dickens (2000) model earnings 
in a more formal way. The simplest model looks like:
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2lit =  Pt^u +  hv it (1.19)
where yu is log annual earnings, pit =  Pn-i +Va is the permanent random walk component 
(permanent observed and unobserved skills) and pt is the time varying price of those skills, va 
is the transitory part and At its time varying price. pit and va axe orthogonal.
The link between the decomposition of individual earnings in their permanent and tran­
sitory part and cross-sectional wage inequality is simply expressed by taking the variance of 
equation 1.19. The variance of cross-sectional earnings is:
var(yit) = v \ ^ t  +
The nice feature of this model is that it provides a clear distinction between inequality in 
current and permanent earnings. An increase in either pt or A* over the two periods generates 
increased dispersion of current earnings. The feature of the increase in inequality is, however, 
very different depending on which one of pt or At increases. A rise in pt increases inequality 
in permanent earnings as well as in current earnings. A rise in At increases cross-section 
inequality as individuals make larger jumps in the earnings distribution. In other words, a 
rise in pt maintains the order of individuals in the earnings distribution but spreads them out 
further apart and decreases mobility rates. A rise in At increases mobility.
Many studies in the US and UK have focused on disentangling the permanent and tran­
sitory part of earnings and evaluating the relative contribution of these two components to
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the increase in the total variance. The literature has followed two complementary approaches. 
Gottschalk and Moffitt (1995) for the US, Baker and Solon (2003) for Canada, and Dickens 
(2000) for the UK have modelled the persistent and transitory components of earnings. Buchin- 
sky and Hunt (1996) and Gittleman and Joyce (1995) have looked at year-to-year mobility 
rates across quantiles of the earnings distribution. A rise in the variance of the permanent 
component of earnings implies declining mobility rates as individuals’ earnings will be more 
autocorrelated over time. A rise in the variance of the transitory component implies increasing 
mobility of individuals across the distribution.
The results of the literature for the US indicate an equal increase in the variance of the 
permanent (observed and unobserved skills) and transitory components (Gottschalk and Mof­
fitt 1995; Katz and Autor 1999). Consistent with that, mobility rates are stable or slightly 
declining over time. Results on the UK indicate a more pronounced increase in the variance 
of the permanent component and declining mobility rates (Dickens, 2000). In both the US 
and the UK the rise in earnings instability is still quantitatively important. The estimates of 
Gottschalk and Moffitt (1995) for the US and Dickens (2000) for the UK indicate an increase 
of 40% of A* over time and therefore an increase in transitory inequality.
The rise in cross-sectional wage inequality reflects a rise in both the permanent and tran­
sitory components of earnings. The rise of between-group wage inequality (returns to educa­
tion, age, occupation) must reflect the increase in the variance of the permanent component of 
earnings. The sharp increase in within-group wage inequality could be due to either increased 
returns to unobserved persistent abilities or a rise in the transitory (year-to-year) earnings 
variance. An increase in the returns to unobserved ability implies a  permanent effect on earn­
ings inequality while an increase in year-to-year earnings mobility has only temporary welfare 
consequences.
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Finally, from the theoretical point of view, the rise in the transitory component is not well 
explained by models of skill-biased technical change. Models of skill-biased technical change 
focus on the rising returns to observed and unobserved workers’ characteristics which are 
both reflected in the rise of the permanent component of earnings. The rise in the transitory 
component of earnings is still a bit of a puzzle in terms of the theory. Violante (2002) proposes 
a model of within-group wage inequality with the intent of reconciling the theory with the 
empirical evidence of rising earnings instability.
1.5 Conclusions
In the first chapter of this thesis, I reviewed the literature on wage inequality. I presented 
the most popular theories that try to explain both between and within-group wage inequality. 
The literature faces two puzzles.
The first puzzle concerns wage inequality between education groups. Over the past 30 years 
both the relative supply of college educated workers and the college premium have increased 
noticeably in the US and in the UK. Among the theories that try to account for the relative 
demand shifts in favor of educated workers, I focused on skill-biased technical change, trade 
liberalization, organizational change and the changes in institutions. The first chapter also 
includes the evidence in favor and against each of them. The consensus seems to give a 
predominant role to skill-biased technical change.
The second puzzle concerns wage inequality within education and age groups. Within- 
group wage inequality accounts for more than half of the total rise in wage inequality. The rise 
in within-group wage inequality occurred before the rise in between-group wage inequality and 
affected the temporary component of income, while between-group inequality affected mainly
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the permanent component of income. The first chapter contains a review of the theories and 
the evidence on within-group wage inequality. The theories on within-group wage inequality 
are far less developed than those on between-group wage inequality.
Chapter 2  explores a new mechanism that could contribute to explaining the rise in 
between-group wage inequality. Chapter 3 is concerned with within-group wage inequality 
and chapter 4 presents a study of earnings instability.
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Chapter 2
Product Demand Shifts and Wage 
Inequality
2.1 Introduction
Wage inequality increased substantially in the US and UK during the 1980s. The 90-10 log 
wage differential for male workers increased from 0.9 to 1.17 from 1979 to 1994 in the UK 
and from 1.16 to 1.45 in the US (Katz and Autor, 1999). Wage differentials by education 
also increased sharply. College graduates in the US earned 41 percent more than high-school 
graduates in 1980; by 1995 they earned 62 percent more (Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1998). In 
1978, median wages of UK workers who left full-time education after age 18 were 40 percent 
higher than those who left full-time education at or before 16. By 1995, this differential had 
increased to over 60 percent (Machin, 1999). At the same time, the employment share of US 
college graduates rose from 19.2% in 1980 to 26.7% in 1996. In the UK, it rose from 8 % in 
1980 to 13% in 1997.
Although the pattern of the increase in wage inequality and the skill premium in the US
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and UK during the 1980s has been well documented, there is still much disagreement about 
the causes of the changes. All the theories face the challenge of explaining why the demand for 
skills accelerated and the college premium increased soon after an unprecedented increase in 
the supply of skills during the 1970s and 1980s. Several reasons have been proposed to explain 
the shift in demand against low skilled workers, in particular skill-biased technical change, 
trade liberalization and deunionization.
In the skill-biased technical change literature, Katz and Murphy (1992) claim that a steady 
growth in the relative demand for skilled workers combined with a slowing supply is the reason 
for the rise in wage inequality in the ‘80s and ‘90s. Other studies argue that there has been an 
acceleration in the relative demand for skills in the 1980s. The most popular studies are based 
on skill-biased technical change associated with changes in production techniques (Acemoglu, 
1998), organizational change (Acemoglu, 1999), the reduction of the relative price of computers 
(Krusell et al., 1999) or the diffusion of ’’technological revolutions” (Aghion and Howitt, 1998).
The trade literature has instead focused on increased competition from developing coun­
tries. Increased trade will have an adverse effect on the demand for less skilled workers as 
long as import-competing industries are low skill-intensive and exporting industries are high 
skill-intensive (Wood, 1996). The trade explanation, however, is not supported by the evi­
dence. First, trade with developing countries is only a very small proportion of the GDP of 
most industrialized countries and therefore is unlikely to have a big effect on wage inequality 
(Krugman, 1995). Second, although the trade explanation implies a rise in the relative prices 
of skill-intensive goods in developed countries, empirical studies find little evidence of this 
(Sachs and Shatz, 1994; Krueger, 1997). Third, the trade explanation is based on the relo­
cation of labor from low skill-intensive to high skill-intensive sectors. However, the empirical 
evidence indicates that most of the shift away from the low skilled took place as a result of
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within-industry changes (60% to 80%) rather than between-industry changes (Berman, Bound 
and Griliches, 1994; Katz and Murphy, 1992).
Other studies argue that the change in wage setting institutions, such as the decline of 
the unions and of the real value of the minimum wage, can be associated with the increase in 
wage inequality (DiNardo et al., 1996; Lee, 1999). The main problem with this explanation is 
that, in the US, deunionization began much before wage inequality started to rise. In the UK, 
deunionization began later than the rise in wage inequality.
In this paper, I investigate another mechanism that can generate wage inequality. If more 
skilled workers demand more skill-intensive goods, then an exogenous increase in relative 
skill supply will also induce a shift in relative demand. With non-homothetic preferences, 
an increase in the relative supply of skilled workers can shift demand for final products in 
favor of skill-intensive goods and contribute to explaining the rise in the relative demand for 
skills. Sectors whose technology requires a large proportion of skilled workers are becoming 
increasingly important in the economy. Skill-intensive industries such as financial services, 
health services, education, pharmaceuticals, computers, and legal services have an increasing 
weight both in terms of wage bill share and share of total employment. If workers who enter 
those sectors tend to consume more of the goods produced by the same sectors, then an increase 
in their supply may help create additional demand for their own labor services. Part of the 
outward shift in the relative demand for skills can be explained by the shift in expenditure 
from low skill-intensive goods to high skill-intensive goods caused by the increase in the relative 
supply of skilled workers. This mechanism reduces the need to rely on trade and technology 
to explain the rise in wage inequality.
This paper is related to recent literature which claims that changes in skill supply may 
induce changes in skill demand. Acemoglu (1998) gives an explanation in terms of directed
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technical change. In that model an increase in the supply of college graduates increases the size 
of the market for skill-complementary technologies. This induces a change in the direction of 
technical change towards skill-complementary technologies and a shift in the relative demand 
for skills. In another paper, Acemoglu (1999) gives an interpretation in terms of organizational 
change. He suggests that when the fraction of skilled workers increases, profit maximizing 
firms tend to create more jobs for the skilled. When there are few skilled workers and the 
productivity gap between the skilled and unskilled is limited, firms create one type of job (one 
single level of capital) and pool across all types of workers. When the supply of skilled workers 
rises or their relative productivity increases, firms tend to differentiate the types of jobs they 
offer. Some firms invest in more capital than others and target skilled workers only. As a 
result, skilled workers work with a higher level of capital and wage inequality increases. In 
an expanding varieties model, Kiley (1997) shows that an increase in the supply of skills can 
induce skill-biased technical change and wage inequality. In Kiley’s model, as in Acemoglu’s 
(1998), the attractiveness of investing in skill-biased technology depends on the supply of the 
factor that complements that technology.
My paper differs from this literature in that the fink between skill supply and skill demand 
is due to consumption elasticities. The mechanism at work is the following: an increase in the 
supply of skilled workers moves the economy down the relative labor demand curve; at the 
same time, higher education elasticities of skill-intensive goods raise the relative demand for 
skill-intensive goods and the relative demand of skilled labor. Two questions are addressed in 
this paper. First, is it true that more educated workers tend to consume more skill-intensive 
goods? Second, how much can such a mechanism contribute to explaining the outward shift 
in the relative demand for skilled labor?
The demand for skill-intensive goods may respond to the increase in the supply of education
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but may also depend from a pure income effect. To isolate the effect of education, I estimate 
education elasticities controlling for income. I also look at the income effect on product demand 
estimating income elasticities controlling for education. Income elasticities are allowed to vary 
according to the level of income, to capture the effects of rising income inequality at different 
levels of income. Keeping education constant, an increase in income inequality may also shift 
product demands towards skill-intensive products increasing income inequality further.
In section 2, the theoretical part of this paper, I build a simple two-sector general equilib­
rium model using non-homothetic preferences and derive the condition that links the exogenous 
rise in the supply of skilled workers with the rise of wage inequality. In section 3, the empirical 
part of this paper, I aim to establish whether educated consumers consume more skill-intensive 
goods. To do so, I adopt a three-step procedure. First, I match micro data on consumption 
from the UK Family Expenditure Survey (FES) to industry data from the UK Labour Force 
Survey (LFS). 46 consumption goods, representing 98% of non-durable household expenditure, 
are matched to 46 manufacturing industries. I then estimate education elasticities for each 
consumption good using the Almost Ideal System proposed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). 
Finally, to establish whether educated consumers tend to consume more skill-intensive goods, I 
regress education elasticities on the industry skill intensity. I also show the results of a  regres­
sion of income elasticities, keeping education constant, on industry skill intensity. The results 
show that both education and income elasticities are positively related to the industry skill 
intensity. The demand for products seems to be endogenous to both an increase in education, 
keeping income constant and to rising income inequality, keeping education constant.
In the course of the empirical exercise, I address the issue of intermediate inputs and import 
penetration. While the 46 consumption goods represent 98% of non-durable consumption, the 
46 industries matched to the consumption goods represent only 25% of the total wage bill
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and 28% of employment in the economy. I use Input-Output tables to take into account the 
contribution of the industries that produce intermediate inputs and all those industries that 
do not have a direct match with any consumption good. Input-Output tables are also used 
to correct the skill intensity of those goods that are mostly imported, since imports do not 
contribute to the domestic relative demand of skills. Even after controlling for intermediate 
inputs and import penetration, the results indicate a positive relationship between education 
and income elasticities of consumption goods and the skill intensity of the producing industries.
Although the regression results demonstrate that skilled workers tend to consume more 
skill-intensive goods, they are not informative regarding the quantitative importance of educa­
tion and income elasticities in increasing relative labor demand. To estimate the quantitative 
importance of this mechanism, I calibrate the theoretical model using UK data between 1982 
and 1998. In section 4, I give an estimate of the relationship between wage inequality and 
the relative supply of skills implied by the model. The result indicates that an education 
and income effect that favors skill-intensive goods can explain about 3 % of the total shift in 
relative labor demand.
The basic model explains labor demand shifts between sectors and considers wage inequal­
ity between different education groups. However, the empirical evidence indicates that 50% to 
70% of the rise in wage inequality took place within groups with the same education (Juhn, 
Murphy and Pierce, 1993). Moreover, most of the shifts in relative labor demand occurred 
within industries rather than between different industries (Berman, Bound and Griliches, 1994; 
Katz and Murphy, 1992). In section 5, the model is extended to explain the increase in wage 
inequality within education group and labor demand shifts within industries. The extension 
considers production of goods of different qualities within industries and workers of different 
skills within the same education group. Unfortunately, the empirical exercise cannot inves­
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tigate this extension of the model due to lack of data regarding consumption of goods of 
different qualities within industries. However, the theory can be tested indirectly by establish­
ing whether income elasticities have risen over time.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 analyses 
the empirical evidence. Section 4 calibrates the model and gives an estimate of the contribution 
of education and income elasticities in explaining the shift in relative labor demand. Section 
5 extends the model to explain wage inequality within education groups and labor demand 
shifts within industries. Section 6  provides a conclusion.
2.2 T he M odel
In this section, I formalize the basic idea of the paper. If preferences are non-homothetic and 
skilled workers tend to consume more skill-intensive goods, then an increase in the supply 
of skilled workers increases the final demand for skill-intensive goods and shifts the relative 
demand for skilled labor.
The formal model builds on 2x2 production-consumption models used in the early trade 
and public finance theory. The economy consists of H  skilled workers and L  unskilled workers. 
In this model skill coincides with education. Skilled workers are workers with a university 
degree, unskilled workers are workers without a university degree. Labor supply is assumed 
to be exogenous and inelastic. There are two types of goods: Yh, the high skill-intensive 
commodity and Y/, the low skill-intensive commodity. Production of high skill-intensive goods 
employs a high percentage of skilled workers; production of low skill-intensive goods employs 
mostly unskilled workers. Production functions are assumed to be CES. Labor markets are 
competitive. Demands for goods have a generic form that allows for non-homotheticity, and
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are different for skilled and unskilled workers.
The aim of this model is to explain the concurrent increase in the relative supply and 
relative demand of skilled workers (college graduates). The mechanism that shifts demand in 
response to an increase in supply acts through education and income elasticities. This model 
links the relative supply of skills to the skill premium through education and income elasticities 
of consumption.
The basic structure of the economy is:
Production:
Yh =  (2.1)
Vi =  F2(L i ,H 2) (2 .2 )
Demand:
Yh = H y t ^ w r i  + Ly1^ ,  w,) (2.3)
Pi Pi
Yi = / / y f ( - . ^ )  +  i y , ' ( - , ^ )  (2.4)
Pi Pi
Factor supplies:
L  — L\ +  L  2 
H  =  H i + H 2
(2.5)
(2.6)
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Factor returns:
=  V h F \ H ( L \ H \ )  = P iF 2 h (L 2 ,H 2 )  (2.7)
Wl = PhFlL(LlHi) = PiF2l (L2,H2) (2.8)
Equation 2.3 is the total demand for the skill-intensive commodity Yh- The first term of the 
RHS of equation 2.3 represents demand by the H  skilled workers, the second term is demand 
by the L  unskilled workers. Skilled and unskilled workers may have different price and income 
elasticities for skill-intensive goods. Equation 2.4 has the same interpretation for the low 
skill-intensive commodity Y\.
The unskilled wage is normalized to unity, wi = 1 . The system is completely described by 
the following five equations:
PhF ^ H u L i ) =  L \ + v>kH i (2.9)
piF2{ H - H u L - L { )  =  L — L \+  Wh(H — Hi) (2.10)
d lo g (^ -) =  -a \d \o g w h (2 .1 1 )
dlog(-| _  - f t) =  - ( j2d\ogWh (2 .1 2 )
H y i ( ^ ,w h) + Lylh( ^ , l )  =  FX(H iM )  (2.13)
Pi Pi
The first two equations, 2.9 and 2.10, restate the constant returns assumption. Equations 2.11 
and 2 .1 2  are definitions of substitution elasticities in a CES technology. The last equation 2.13 
is the market equilibrium condition for commodity Yh- According to Walras’ law, equilibrium
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in the market for factors and for commodity Yh implies that the market for commodity Yj 
clears.
Taking the total differential and logs:
d logPh =  aid log wh
d log pi =  a,2d log Wh
dlogHi — dlogLi =  — a\d\ogWh
(1 +  An)d  log H -  Xjjd log Hi +  (1 +  A^)d log H — Ai,d log L\ =  -<72d log Wh
1j
R \ [£hpd log(— ) +  Shmd log W h  + d log H] +
Pi
+  (1 -  R\)[d\ogL + elh dlog(— )] =  aidlogH i -  (1 -  a i)d log Ia  
y Pi
The parameter a i =  denotes the wage bill share of skilled labor in the high skill-intensive 
sector h, 0,2  is the wage bill share of skilled labor in the low skill-intensive sector I. Ah  — 
and \ l = L - h  are respectively the ratio of skilled labor used in sector h and I and the ratio
H y h (  )of unskilled labor used in sector h and I. R \ = IT l. ; 1 / x is the share of total expenditure ontfyjj (•)+£%(•)
the skill-intensive commodity h by skilled workers. exhp is the price elasticity of demand for the 
skill-intensive commodity h. The index i =  h, I indicates that the elasticity may be different 
for skilled and unskilled workers. ej|m is the income elasticity of demand for the skill-intensive 
commodity h.
The system is solved for dwh as a function of dH. Assume that dH  =  —dL, i.e. the total
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labor supply is fixed. The result is:
dlogWh _  (Ah  +  Al )[R\ ~  (1  ~  R \)t \ ~  (2 ui -  1 )[1  +  Xh  +  tC 1 +  ^ ) 1  (o ia \ 
d log I f  -(A j/ +  AL) r - ( 2 a i - l ) ( A L<7i - < 72) }
where T  =  {Ri[e%p(ai -  a2) +  e£m] +  (1 -  Ri)elhp(ai -  a2) +  (1 -  ai)<ri}. Equation 2.14 
establishes the condition that links wage inequality ^  to  a rise in the skill ratio The 
sign and the magnitude of the numerator will depend crucially on the value of R \ and of
jj. .hf \
a i . R \ = *+Lyi  ^j is the share of total expenditure on skill-intensive goods by skilled 
workers. a\ = is the wage bill share of skilled labor in the skill-intensive sector. Given
PhVh °
that a\ — a2 > 0, because sector Yh is skill-intensive, the sign and the magnitude of the 
denominator will depend on ej[m, the income elasticity of demand for skill-intensive goods by 
skilled workers.
An increase in the supply of college graduates has two effects. The standard substitution 
effect moves the economy along a downward sloping relative demand curve and decreases the 
skill premium. The effect through income elasticities may raise the demand of skill-intensive 
goods and therefore the relative demand of skilled labor. As average income increases over 
time, this model implies a rising demand of consumption items with large income elasticities.
This model can offer an explanation of the increase in the relative labor demand for skilled 
labor in its between-industry component, but it does not explain labor demand shifts within 
industries nor does it explain the rise of wage inequality within educational groups. In section 5, 
I extend the model to explain within-group wage inequality and within-industry labor demand 
shifts and provide a test of the theory.
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2.3 T he Em pirical Evidence
Figure 2-1 documents the concurrent rise of the relative employment and the relative wage of 
workers who left full-time education at 21 or later in the UK from 1978 to 1998. The data are 
drawn from the UK Family Expenditure Survey (FES). In the FES there is no information 
on the educational degree obtained. I consider that those who left full-time education at or 
after 21  have had some form of college education. All heads of household in the sample who 
worked at least one hour in the past week and have a positive weekly wage are included. The 
percentage of heads of household who left full-time education at or after 21  rose from 6 % in 
1978 to 13% in 1998. During the same period, the ratio of the average weekly wage of heads 
of household who left full-time education at or after 21  over the average weekly wage of head 
of households who left full-time education before 21 rose from 1.32 to 1.75.
The model in section 2 shows that an increase in the supply of college-educated workers can 
generate an increase in the demand for skills if skilled workers prefer consuming skill-intensive 
goods. The hypothesis that education elasticities for high-skill-intensive goods are higher than 
for low-skill-intensive goods is crucial in deriving this result. In this section, I relate education 
elasticities of consumption goods to the skill intensity of the producing industry using UK 
data. A related question is whether product demand is endogenous to increases in income 
inequality, keeping education constant. Therefore I also estimate income elasticities allowing 
the income effect to vary according to the level of income itself. I proceed in two steps. I 
first match two datasets: the UK Family Expenditure Survey (FES) which contains data on 
consumption, and the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) which contains data on industry skill 
intensity. I then estimate education and income elasticities for each consumption item and 
regress the estimates on the skill intensity of the manufacturing industry.
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Figure 2-1: Percentage of heads of household who left full-time education at 21 or later. Ratio 
of average weekly wage of workers who left full-time education at 21 over average weekly wage 
of workers who left full-time education before 21. Source: FES data.
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2.3 .1  T h e  M atch  In d u stry-C on su m p tion  Item
The data on consumption are drawn from the Family Expenditure Survey, 1982 to 1998. The 
survey contains information on a detailed set of goods recorded in a two-week diary and on 
household composition. I use data on all the goods whose consumption has been consistently 
recorded from 1982 to 1998. I exclude expenditure on housing and purchase of motor vehicles. 
I also exclude expenditure on TV licence and car tax and insurance because they do not 
have an obvious industry match. I consider consumption of 46 goods as shown in Table 2.4 
in the Appendix. They represent 98% of total non-durable household expenditure and 85% 
of total expenditure including durables. The 46 goods are divided in thirteen main groups: 
food, food eaten out, alcohol, tobacco, home energy, household goods, household services, 
clothing, private transport, fares, personal goods and services, leisure goods and leisure and 
other services. In Table 2.4 in the Appendix, I match all 46 consumption goods to their 
manufacturing industry using the 1992 Standard Industrial Classification code.
Table 2.5 ranks the industries according to their skill intensity shown in the first column. 
The data on industry skill intensity are taken form the Labour Force Survey from 1982 to 1997 
using information on the highest qualification obtained. The industry skill intensity is calcu­
lated as the share of workers who obtained a degree-level qualification. The least skill-intensive 
industries are hairdressing, footwear manufacturing and soft furnishing manufacturing. Less 
than 2% of workers in these industries hold a degree-level qualification. The most skill-intensive 
industries are professional services, pharmaceuticals and education. More than 50% of workers 
in the education industry hold a degree-level qualification.
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2 .3 .2  T h e  E d u cation  and  Incom e E lastic ities  
A lm ost Ideal Demand System
The estimation method for education and income elasticities is the Almost Ideal Demand 
System proposed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and Anderson and Blundell (1983). The 
expenditure decision is modelled following the two-stage budgeting approach (Blundell et al., 
1993). At each period t, each household h makes a decision on how much to consume con­
ditional on various household characteristics and conditional on the consumption level of a 
second group of other demands. This latter group includes housing and durables such as cars 
that are not considered in the estimation. The two groups are assumed to be weakly separable 
in utility and therefore prices of housing and durables do not affect consumption of the goods 
under consideration. Preferences are also assumed to be weakly separable over time, there­
fore incomes and prices outside the period have no effect on the current period consumption 
decision.
Let yt be expenditure allocated by a household to these goods in period t. Given yt, the 
household decides how much to spend on individual goods according to the following share 
equation (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980, time subscripts omitted):
n
u}i = OL + 6iX  + 7 ied +  /3U lo g ( p  +  /?2*(log(p ) ) 2 +  Cij logPj +  £i (2.15)
i=l
where u;* =  is the expenditure share of item i. log y is log total expenditure. P  =  Y lj wj  l°g
Pj is the Stone price index where Wj is the monthly average share of commodity j  in the data, 
log pj are the consumption items’ price series. X  contains a quadratic in age, sex and regional
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dummies, the total number of components and the number of children in the household, ed is 
an education dummy which is equal to one if the head of household left full-time education at 
age 21 or later. The education elasticity will be equal to:
7 « * ed 
Vi Z5i
where is the average budget share of item i and ed is the percentage of head of households 
who left full-time education at 21 or later. In the estimation sample 1982-1998 ed= 0.086. The 
budget elasticity will be equal to:
■^budget _  (01i+ 2/?2jlog(j£)fc) ( t
^  “  w, + 1
Unlike the education elasticity, the budget elasticity will exhibit substantial variation across 
households h because it depends on the level of the budget itself. The quadratic specification 
in income allows to account for the differential effect of income on product demand at low and 
high levels of income. In the course of the paper I will loosely refer to budget elasticities as to 
income elasticities.
The system estimation is carried out by using a two-step procedure. In the first stage, each 
equation is estimated separately by instrumenting total expenditure. The need to consider 
total expenditure as an endogenous variable comes from the occurrence of zero expenditures 
in the diary records. Many of the commodity groups considered are purchased infrequently. 
Since the zero expenditures affect both the dependent variable and the total real expenditure 
log(-j^), ordinary least square OLS will be biased. Instrumental variable estimation, permitting
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all terms in log(j^) to be endogenous, removes this measurement error problem. Total net 
income is used as an instrument. In the first stage, single equation restrictions, such as zero- 
degree homogeneity in prices, are also imposed. The system 2.15 exhibits homogeneity if 
Y!j=i Cij =  0  for all i.
Given the first-step estimates, the symmetry cross-equation restrictions are imposed by 
means of a minimum distance estimator. The symmetry cross-equation restrictions are N  * 
(N  — l) /2  symmetry restrictions on the price coefficients: =  (jj for i ^  j .  Denoting 0 the
vector of unrestricted parameters and <f>* the restricted parameters, the symmetry restrictions 
can be expressed as:
<f> = R<f>*
To impose the symmetry restrictions the minimum distance estimator chooses <j>* to minimize:
m  =  (? -  R<t>*)'Y l^ Q> -  Rxf>*) (2.16)
where 0  are the first-step estimates and S ^ 1 is an estimate of the variance-covariance matrix. 
The minimized value of the quadratic form in 2.16 is an optimal x 2 lest of the restrictions.
The symmetry-constrained system of 46 share equations cannot be estimated because of 
multicollinearity in the price series. Although we have price series for each commodity, using 
46 price series in the system estimation results in a singular matrix of the regressors. The 
symmetry-constrained system is estimated only on the main thirteen consumption groups:
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food, food eaten out, alcohol, tobacco, home energy, household goods, household services, 
clothing, private transport, fares, personal goods and services, leisure goods and leisure and 
other services. The education and budget elasticities for each of the 46 goods are estimated in 
the following section using an unconstrained system of equations and only the thirteen price 
series of the main groups.
Table 2.6 in the Appendix shows the means of the variables used in the estimation and the 
expenditure shares of the thirteen main consumption groups. The second and third columns 
of Table 2.6 show the means of the data within the households at the top and at the bottom 
quintile of the net income distribution. These two columns show that rich and poor families 
have very different expenditure patterns. Poor families tend to spend relatively more on food 
and home energy, rich families allocate a relatively larger proportion of their total expenditure 
in food eaten out, clothing, private transport and leisure goods and services.
I now turn to the estimated parameters and the implied elasticities of the individual- 
household expenditure allocations. Table 2.1 shows the unconstrained and symmetry-constrained 
estimates of the budget elasticities for each consumption group. Food and home energy are 
necessities, tobacco is an inferior good, all other items are luxuries. A comparison of the 
unrestricted and restricted estimates of the budget elasticities in Table 2.1 indicates that the 
budget elasticities are only marginally affected by the imposition of the restrictions. In fact, 
the imposition of the symmetry constrains affects mostly the estimates of the price elasticities 
which are not relevant for the purpose of this paper. The third column of Table 2.1 shows 
the education elasticities. Keeping income constant, educated workers tend to consume less 
alcohol, tobacco and clothing and more personal and leisure goods and services.
Table 2.7 in the Appendix reports the symmetry-constrained estimates of the thirteen- 
equation system. The table documents that household characteristics have an effect on ex-
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Table 2.1: Education and Income Elasticities of the Main Consumption Groups
Unconstrained Constrained Education
budget elasticity budget elasticity elasticities
Food 0.54 (0 .0 1 ) 0.55 (0 .0 1 ) 0 .0 0 (0 .0 1 )
Food eaten out 1.50 (0 .0 0 ) 1.48 (0 .0 0 ) -0.01 (0 .0 0 )
Alcohol 1.08 (0 .00 ) 1.08 (0 .0 0 ) -0.03 (0 .0 0 )
Tobacco -0.17 (0 .0 0 ) -0.16 (0 .0 0 ) -0.05 (0 .0 0 )
Home energy 0.46 (0 .0 0 ) 0.46 (0 .0 0 ) 0 .00 (0 .0 0 )
Household goods 1.24 (0 .0 0 ) 1.24 (0 .0 0 ) -0.01 (0 .0 0 )
Household services 1.31 (0 .0 0 ) 1.29 (0 .0 0 ) 0 .02 (0 .0 0)
Clothing 1.42 (0 .0 0 ) 1.46 (0 .0 0 ) -0 .02 (0 .0 0 )
Private transport 1.43 (0 .0 0 ) 1.44 (0 .0 0 ) 0 .00 (0 .0 0 )
Fares 1.23 (0 .0 0 ) 1.21 (0 .0 0 ) -0 .0 0 (0 .0 0 )
Personal goods and services 1.21 (0 .0 0 ) 1.21 (0 .0 0 ) 0.03 (0 .0 0)
Leisure goods 1.27 (0 .0 0 ) 1.29 (0 .0 0 ) 0.01 (0 .0 0 )
Leisure and other services 1.48 (0 .0 0 ) 1.46 (0 .0 0 ) 0.03 (0 .0 0 )
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are calculated using the Delta method.
penditure shares. For example the estimated coefficients indicate that the presence of an 
additional child under 18 in the household will, other things equal, increase the expenditure 
share on food by 0.033. The head of household who left full-time education at 21 or later will 
have, ceteris paribus, a lower expenditure share on alcohol and on tobacco, respectively by 
-0.015 and -0.014. The homogeneity restrictions are tested equation by equation by means of 
a simple T-ratio test. The tests reported in Table 2.7 indicate that I am unable to reject the 
homogeneity restrictions implied by the theory in six equations out of thirteen. The x 2 test 
reported at the bottom of Table 2.7 is the minimized value of the quadratic form 2.16 and 
refers to the joint test of zero-degree homogeneity in prices and cross-equation price symmetry. 
The high value of the test indicates that the constrained estimates are statistically rejected.
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T he Results on the Com plete Set o f Goods
Table 2.8 in the Appendix shows the education and the budget elasticities for each one of the 46 
goods. Each row shows the results of a single share equation 2.15. The unconstrained system 
of equations is estimated using the thirteen price series of the main consumption groups and 
the same regressors as above. The terms in total expenditure are instrumented using total net 
income. The standard errors in parenthesis indicate that both the education and the budget 
elasticities are always estimated with extreme precision.
The 46 goods in Table 2.8 in the Appendix are ranked according to the skill intensity 
of their manufacturing industries. The education elasticities indicate that, keeping income 
constant, more educated workers tend to consume less tobacco and beer but spend more on 
education and on transport fares such as rail and airplane fares. The table also indicates 
that high skill-intensive products have in general a higher income elasticity than low skill­
intensive products. In particular, expenditure on skill-intensive services such as education and 
professional services have a budget elasticity much higher than one. However, expenditures on 
some skill-intensive products like drugs and household consumables have an income elasticity 
lower than one. Most low skill-intensive products have an income elasticity lower or just over 
one except for domestic help which is a luxury service.
I run two regressions. First I regress the estimated education elasticities on the correspond­
ing industry’s skill intensity, then I regress the estimated income elasticities on the industry’s 
skill intensity. The two regressions indicate whether more educated and richer consumers tend 
to consume more skill-intensive goods. I estimate:
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rji =  a  +  yzi +  £i (2.17)
where rji is in turn the estimate of education and of budget elasticity for commodity i and z* 
is industry’s i skill intensity. Skill intensity z\ is reported in Table 2.4 in the Appendix and 
is defined as the percentage of workers with a degree-level qualification that work in industry 
i. The regressions are weighted by the inverse of the estimates’ variance. The results of the 
estimation are given in the first column of Table 2.2. The regression of education elasticities 
on skill intensity gives a coefficient 7  =0.149(0.037). This result indicates that, keeping income 
constant, more educated workers tend to consume more skill-intensive goods. The regression of 
income elasticities on skill intensity gives a coefficient 7  =1.858(0.821). A positive relationship 
between income elasticities and skill intensities indicates that richer consumers indeed consume 
more skill-intensive goods.
Input-O utput Table
In the previous section I considered the matching between 46 consumption items and their 
manufacturing industries. However, the industries which have a direct match to the consump­
tion items represent only a minor part in the total economy. I divide the 46 consumption 
goods in 23 low skill-intensive goods and 23 high skill-intensive goods according to the ranking 
in Table 2.5. Figure 2-2 shows the wage bill share of the 23 least skill-intensive industries 
compared to the 23 most skill-intensive. Since the LFS does not contain wage information 
prior to 1992, the wage bill share in Figure 2-2 is calculated on New Earnings Survey data. 
The wage bill share of the 23 most skill-intensive industries rose from 20% in 1982 to 23.7% in
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1995. The wage bill share of the 23 least skill-intensive declined from 5.5% to 4.6%. In total, 
the 46 industries which have a direct match to a consumption item represent only about 25% 
of the total wage bill and 28% of total employment.
When matching consumption items directly to their manufacturing industries, I disregard 
the retail sector and all other sectors that do not have a direct match to a consumption item. 
Furthermore, I do not consider either intermediate inputs or the import penetration in the 
different sectors. Intermediate goods may be important because the industries that produce 
inputs may have a different skill intensity than those that produce the final output. Import 
penetration in the different industries is relevant because consumption goods with very high 
income elasticities may be mainly produced abroad and therefore contribute nothing to the 
increase in the domestic demand for skilled labor.
To account for the skill intensity of the input-producing industries, I use the UK industry- 
by-industry Input-Output tables in year 1995. The Input-Output tables provide information 
on the input contribution of 123 industries. The industries are classified according to the same 
1992 Standard Industry Classification code which I used to match the consumption items to 
their manufacturing industries, except for very few cases. 1 In the second column of Table
2.5 in the Appendix I calculate the skill intensity of each of the 46 original industries as the 
weighted average of the skill intensity of their inputs. In formulas, the skill intensity of final 
product j , z£, is calculated as ^  The weights indicate industry’s i input
contribution to produce one unit of product in industry j  and are provided by the Input-
1The only discrepancies between the coding used to calculate skill intensity in the first column of Table 2.5 in 
the Appendix, and the coding of the Input-Output table used to calculate skill intensity in the second and third 
column of the same Table, are the following: SIC 1992 codes 93.02 hairdressing and 93.05 domestic help are 
joint in 93 other service activities. SIC codes 15.91+15.92 alcoholic drinks distilling, 15.93 wine production and 
15.96+15.97 beer production are joint in 15.91 to 15.97 alcoholic beverages. SIC codes 22.1+22.2 printing and 
publishing and 22.3 reproduction of recorded media are joint in 22 printing and publishing and reproduction of 
recorded media.
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Figure 2-2: Wage bill share of the 23 most skill intensive and 23 least skill intensive industries 
1982-1995. Source: NES data
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Output table. Zi is the skill intensity of intermediate industry i. An eye-ball comparison 
of the first and second column of Table 2.5 in the Appendix shows that taking into account 
intermediate inputs increases the skill intensity of the low skill-intensive goods and reduces 
the skill intensity of the high skill-intensive goods. Low skill-intensive intermediate inputs, like 
the retail sector, are expected to reduce the skill intensity of all final products. For the low 
skill-intensive final goods the effect of the retail sector is offset by the contribution of other 
intermediate inputs which are relatively more skill-intensive.
To take into account import penetration, I multiply skill intensity by the import pen­
etration of the final industry. The import penetration of industry j ,  N X j ,  is calculated as 
N X j  =  1 4 - ( E j  — I j ) / Y j .  In this expression E j ,  I j  and Yj  are exports of goods and services, 
imports of goods and services and total final demand of industry j .  E j ,  I j  and Yj  are ob­
tained from the Input-Output tables. The resulting measure of skill intensity, z?  =  z^*  N X j , 
increases the skill intensity of the exporting sectors and reduces the skill intensity of the im­
porting sectors. A comparison of the second and third column of Table 2.5 shows that the UK 
tends to export most finite goods and services, in particular some of the most skill-intensive 
ones such as drugs, oil and financial services.
Table 2.2 compares the results of regression 2.17 in three cases. In the first row, skill in­
tensity zj is the skill intensity of the manufacturing industry; in the second row, skill intensity 
z f  is corrected for the contribution of intermediate inputs; in the third row, skill intensity 
z f  = z£ * N X j  takes into account both the contribution of intermediate inputs and importJ J J
penetration. The results in the second and third row of Table 2.2 answer two different ques­
tions. The first question asks whether skilled (or richer) workers consume more skill-intensive 
goods. In this case we do not need to consider the import penetration of each industry. The 
relevant results are those of the second row of Table 2.2, where skill intensity is corrected for
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Figure 2-3: OLS regression of education elasticities on industry skill intensity.
the contribution of intermediate inputs. The second row gives a result of 7  =0.324 (0.105) 
for education elasticities and 7  =5.968 (2.390) for income elasticities. Figure 2-3 plots the 
estimated education elasticities in Table 2.8 in the Appendix against the skill intensities in the 
second column of Table 2.5 in the Appendix. Figure 2-4 does the same with income elasticities. 
The second question asks how relevant are the education and income elasticities in increasing 
the domestic demand for skilled labor. In this case we should weigh the skill intensity of the 
manufacturing industry for imports since imported goods are not going to increase domestic 
labor demand. The relevant results are shown in the third row of Table 2.2. When the industry 
skill intensity is weighted by import penetration, the regression in equation 2.17 gives a result 
of 7  =0.188(0.099) for education elasticities and 7  =3.773(2.187) for income elasticities.
The coefficient 7 , which indicates the association between education and income elasticities
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Figure 2-4: OLS regression of income elasticities on industry skill intensity.
and skill intensity, is always positive and significative in Table 2 .2 . A positive value of 7  
indicates that more educated and richer consumers tend to consume more skill-intensive goods. 
However, this coefficient does not tell us the extent to which an increase in education or income 
raises the demand for skilled labor. To answer this question, in the next section, I calibrate 
the model using the data of the UK economy.
2.4 M odel C alibration
This section describes a calibrated version of the model, choosing parameters in line with the 
UK economy. I quantify the increase in the relative demand of skilled labor in response to 
an increase in the relative supply of skills making use of the relationship between the skill 
premium and the skill ratio implied by the model in section 2 . Calibration of equation 2.14,
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Table 2.2: OLS Regression of Education and Income Elasticities on Various Measures of Skill 
Intensity_______________________________________________________________
Dependent variable
education elasticities income elasticities
(1) (2) (3) (i) (2) (3)
Skill intensity=Zj 0.149 1.858
(0.037) (0.821)
Skill intensity=z^ 0.324 5.968
(0.105) (2.390)
Skill intensity=2 ^ * N X j 0.188 3.773
(0.099) (2.187)
R square 0.26 0.17 0.07 0 .10 0 .12 0.06
Sample size 46 46 46 46 46 46
Notes: In the first row, skill intensity of the manufacturing industry. In the second row, skill intensity 
is corrected for intermediate inputs. In the third row, skill intensity is corrected for intermediate inputs 
and import penetration. OLS regressions wieghted by the inverse of the dependent variable variance.
obtained from the model in section 2, will quantify the importance of income elasticities in 
explaining the rise of wage inequality. I repeat equation 2.14:
d logWh _  (Xh -f A/,)[.Ri — (1 — Ri)j;\  ~  (2ai — 1)[1 +  Ajy +  ^(1 +  A^ ,)] 
dlogH  — (A/f +  Al)T — (2ai — l)(Ax,ai — <72)
where T  =  {Ri[e%p(ai -  o2) +  e j j  +  (1 -  R\)elhp(a\ -  a2) +  (1 -  ai)<7i}.
The calibration of the model is conducted using data on the 46 consumption items and 
on the 46 corresponding industries listed in Table 2.4 in the Appendix. The 46 commodities 
and the corresponding industries are divided into 23 low skill-intensive goods and 23 high 
skill-intensive goods to match the characteristics of the model in section 2. I calibrate Xh, 
Alj 77 > 01 a 2 using Labour Force Survey data from 1993 to 1997; e([p, elhp and
using Family Expenditure Survey data from 1982 to 1997. <r\ and <r2 are taken from Katz and
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Murphy (1992).
The ratio of the number of college-educated workers who work in the 23 most skill-intensive 
industries over those who work in the 23 least skill-intensive industries is calculated at Ah  —
= 23.1. The ratio of the number of workers without a college education who work in the 
23 most skill-intensive industries over those who work in the 23 least skill-intensive industries 
is calculated at Ax, =  =  1.98. The total skill ratio in the economy is ^  =  0.11. The value
of the wage bill share of college-educated workers in the 23 most skill-intensive industries is
a \  =  =  0.48; in the 23 least skill-intensive industries it is <22 — =  0.1.1 PhVh ’ * p m
An estimate of the income elasticity is obtained from a simple OLS estimate of regression 
2.15 with fixed effects for each commodity. The standard errors of this regression are clustered 
at the household level. In this regression, I consider only the 23 most skill-intensive goods and 
college-educated workers, i.e. those who left full-time education at 21 or later. The average 
expenditure share on skilled goods by college-educated workers is calculated at uJ =  0.015. This 
implies an income elasticity of =1.28. The price elasticities £^p and elhp are estimated 
from two separate OLS regressions 2.15 with fixed effects for each of the 23 skill-intensive 
goods considered. To estimate e£p, I consider only college-educated workers and construct 
an aggregate price index of the 23 skill-intensive goods using as weights their shares in total 
expenditure. To estimate £lhp, I adopt the same procedure considering only workers without a 
college education and an aggregate price index of the 23 low skill-intensive goods. e([p and elhp 
are estimated at =-0.7(0.2) and £lhp =-0.6(0.1). The share of expenditure on the 23 most
H yh(.)skill-intensive goods by college-educated workers is calculated at R \ =  )+Ly* () =  0.12.
The value of the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers <t\ =  <72 =  1.4 
is taken from Katz and Murphy (1992). Plugging the values of all parameters in equation 2.14, 
the final result is =  —0.10.
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The interpretation of this number makes sense with respect to what would have happened 
without the income effect in favor of skill-intensive goods. The same model, solved with 
homothetic preferences (ej[m =  1 ) that disregard the income effect in favor of skill-intensive 
goods, implies an even bigger fall of =  —0 .1 1 . As a matter of fact, according to
the FES data plotted in Figure 2 -1 , ^  increased by 8 8 % between 1982 and 1997 in the UK 
and ^  increased by 13%. The model with the income effect in favor of skill-intensive goods 
implies that ^  should have fallen by 8 .8 % as a result of an increase in ^  of 8 8 %. The model 
with homothetic preferences implies a fall of ^  by 9.6%. With respect to the model with 
homothetic preferences, the total shift in relative labor demand is of 22.6% (the actual 13% 
plus the counterfactual 9.6% along a fixed relative demand curve). These calculations imply 
that the income effect in favor of skill-intensive goods can explain only around 3% of the total 
shift in the relative demand of labor. The effect of non-homothetic preferences reduces by 
0.8% the fall of the relative wage (8 .8 % instead of 9.6%). These 0.8% points constitute only 
3% of the 22.6% total shift in the relative labor demand.
2.5 W ithin-G roup W age Inequality
The baseline model can explain only between-industry skill upgrading and wage inequality 
between workers with college education and without college education. However, the empirical 
literature has shown that most of the shifts in relative labor demand occurs within detailed 
industries. Katz and Murphy (1992) show that between-industry shifts in the composition of 
employment are not enough to account for the total shift in the relative skill demand in the 
US. Machin and van Reenen (1998) show that within-industry shifts in relative labor demand 
are predominant across a sample of OECD countries. Furthermore, Juhn, Murphy and Pierce
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(1993) attribute from one half to two thirds of the total increase in wage inequality in the US 
to wage differentials within observable individual characteristics.
In this section, the model in section 2 is extended to account for within-industry labor 
demand shifts and for wage inequality within workers with the same education. To explain 
within-educational group wage inequality and within-industry relative labor demand shifts, it 
is necessary to introduce goods of different qualities within sectors and workers of different 
skills within educational group. I introduce goods of high and low quality within both the 
high skill-intensive and the low skill-intensive sectors and high-skilled and low-skilled workers 
within both the college-educated and the non-college educated workers. I assume that only 
college graduates work in the skill-intensive sector. Furthermore I assume that within the 
college graduates only those who are skilled produce high-quality goods, the unskilled produce 
low-quality goods. The same applies to the low skill-intensive sector where only non-college 
educated workers work.
In formal terms, the model can be specified as follows. There are four types of workers 
differentiated by education and unobserved skills. There are four sectors in the economy 
and each of them produces using only one type of worker. The production functions in the 
skill-intensive sector are of the type:
yhj = Hj where j  = s ,u
Ha skilled college-educated workers produce high-quality goods yhs in the skill-intensive sector 
of the economy. Hu unskilled college-educated workers produce low-quality goods yhu- By the 
same token, the production functions in the low skill-intensive sector are of the type:
82
Chapter 2. Product Demand Shifts and Wage Inequality
yij  — L j  where j  =  s, u
I assume that the fraction of skilled workers in each education group is constant with 
= 13^  > $1 = The proportion of skilled workers among the college-educated is bigger 
than among the non-college educated. In this model, within-group wage inequality is given 
by:
Whs   Phs i
Whu Phu
and
—  = — (f>l 
Win Plu
The equilibrium in the model is given by four zero-profit conditions and three market- 
clearing conditions of the type:
Vh») +  1) =  Vij
where ->wij) for i =  h, I and j ' =  s ,u  is the demand for each of the four types of goods
by each of the four types of workers. Total demand is equal to production yij. The last 
market-clearing condition is satisfied by Walras’ law.
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Normalize total labor supply H  +  L  =  1 . Consider an increase in the supply of college- 
educated workers H  (in this case an increase in Hu and a proportional increase in Ha =  (f>hHu) 
and the corresponding decrease of the non-college educated L. The condition that ensures an 
increase in within-group wage inequality in the skill-intensive sector is:
6 log wh8 <51ogw/m 8 u
6 log Hu S\ogHu ihm ihm
To generate wage inequality within the college-educated in the skill-intensive sector, the 
model requires the income elasticity of the high-quality goods to be greater than the income 
elasticity of the low-quality ones. This means that preferences are non-homothetic in favor 
of skill-intensive goods and non-homothetic in the quality of goods. As consumers become 
richer, they want to consume more high skill-intensive goods and also want to consume more 
high-quality goods within the high-skill intensive. The result is that an income effect increases 
the demand of high-quality goods and the wage of the skilled workers who produce them. 
Since we can observe workers’ education but cannot observe their skills, we can say that this 
model can account for an increase in residual wage inequality.
The empirical test of this extension of the model is not straightforward because consump­
tion surveys do not contain information on the quality of the goods purchased. The estimated 
income elasticities will be averages of the income elasticities of high-quality and low-quality 
goods:
^hm —
yfch m  +  y M r  
Vh + Vh
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The demands for high-quality and low-quality goods within the high skill-intensive sector, 
yj and y% , are unobservable. We have only total demand of skill-intensive goods, 2/J +  yj, 
and the corresponding income elasticity The hypothesis that high-quality goods have 
a higher income elasticity than low-quality goods can be tested looking at the evolution of 
income elasticities over time. If the hypothesis e8hm > e£m is correct, then over time, we should 
observe a higher relative demand of high-quality goods y j and a rise in the estimated elasticity 
thm• In fact > 0 if ejm > ejm. For the low skill-intensive sector we should observe a 
shift in demand from y“ to yf, but also a decline in total demand for low skill-intensive goods,
y? +  y“
To test this implication of the model I estimate a fixed effect model where I regress in­
come elasticities estimates in each year of the sample on a time trend and a dummy for each 
commodity i :
Wit — a  +  +  £it (2.18)
where rjit is the estimated income elasticity of commodity i in year t, t is a time trend and ^  
is a dummy for each commodity. Each observation is weighted by the inverse of its variance. 
The estimates rjit are obtained with a simple OLS regression of equation 2.15 in each year 
from 1982 to 1997. The first two columns of Table 2.3 present the results of equation 2.18 
estimated separately on the sample of the 23 most skill-intensive goods and on the sample of 
the 23 less skill-intensive goods. The results for both the skilled and unskilled sectors show 
a rising trend in the estimated income elasticities. The last column of Table 2.3 shows the 
results of equation rjit =  a  +  7 (t * Z{) +  ^  +  £»*• This equation is estimated using the whole
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Table 2.3; Fixed Effect Regression of Income Elasticities on Time Trend
Dependent Variable 
Income elasticities Income elasticities Income elasticities
High skill-intensive Low skill-intensive Full sample 
goods goods
Trend 0.017 0.004 0.006
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Trend*Skill intensity 0.02
(0.005)
R square 0.96 0.94 0.97
Sample size 276 276 552
Notes: Weighted regression.
sample of 46 goods, t * Z{ indicates the interaction between skill intensity and a time trend. 
The results in the last column of Table 2.3 indicate that there is a steeper upward trend in 
income elasticities for the more skill-intensive goods.
2.6 C onclusions
In this paper I have claimed that the shift in relative skill demand does not need to be 
attributed exclusively to skill-biased technical change or trade. The shift in relative skill 
demand can be at least partially explained by an education effect that increases the demand 
of skill-intensive products. If more skilled workers spend a higher percentage of their income on 
skill-intensive goods, then an exogenous increase in the relative skill supply can induce a shift 
in relative skill demand. A related mechanism predicts that product demand is endogenous 
to an increase in income inequality. If richer consumers, keeping education constant, tend to 
consume more skill-intensive goods, then an increase in income inequality will shift product 
demand towards skill-intensive products and this will increase income inequality further.
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I have built a simple general equilibrium model to explore the relationship between wage 
inequality and the skill ratio when preferences are non-homothetic. In the empirical part of this 
paper, I have matched data on consumption to data on industry skill intensity. I have shown 
th a t college graduates, keeping income constant, tend to spend a larger proportion of their 
income on skill-intensive goods. But also richer consumers, keeping education constant, tend to 
consume more skill-intensive goods. Both these results are robust to different measures of skill 
intensity. I have used Input-Output tables to take into account the contribution of intermediate 
inputs and import penetration in the skill intensity of final goods. A simple calibration of the 
model has suggested that the estimated income elasticities can explain around 3% of the total 
increase in relative skill demand in the UK from 1982 to 1997. Finally, I have extended the 
model to explain wage inequality within educational groups and labor demand shifts within 
industries. I have also offered an indirect empirical test of this extension of the model which 
indicates that income elasticities of the consumption goods have increased over time.
2.7 A ppendix: D ata  and Tables
The data used in this paper come from the Family Expenditure Survey 1982-1997 for con­
sumption data and from the Labour Force Survey 1993-1997 for industry skill intensity data. 
The main aim is to consider the relationship between income elasticities of consumption goods 
and the skill intensity of their manufacturing industry. This requires matching the FES data 
to the LFS data.
The aggregation of FES data into the 46 consumption items considered in this paper 
follows a rather obvious procedure. For reasons of space, the exact procedure can be provided 
upon request. The only items not considered in the aggregation are cars and housing and
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other very minor expenditures such as TV licence and car tax and insurance which did not 
have any obvious industry match. Total expenditure is calculated as the sum of the 46 items 
considered, excluding cars and housing. The price series were provided by the Office of National 
Statistics. The level of aggregation was kept at the most disaggregated level possible. When 
the consumption items were aggregated at a higher level, the corresponding price series were 
constructed as a weighted average of their basic components.
The skill intensity of the 46 industries considered is calculated on pooled LFS data 1993- 
1997. The industry skill intensity is defined as the ratio of workers with a degree-level qualifi­
cation over the total number of workers. The Input-Output tables used to account for inter­
mediate inputs and import penetration are the industry-by-industry domestic use matrices at 
basic prices for the UK in 1995. The tables are available at www.statistics.gov.uk.
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Table 2.4: The Consumption Item-Industry Match
Consumption Item SIC 1992 code Industry name
Food
Bread and biscuit
Meat
Fish
Edible oils and fats 
Milk products 
Soft drinks 
Sugar and sweets 
Fruit and vegetables
15.81+15.82 Bread and biscuit manufacture
15.1 Meat production
15.2 Fish processing
15.4 Oils and fats manufacture
15.5 Dairy products
15.98 Soft drinks production
15.83+15.84 Sugar and sweets manufacture
15.3 Fruit and vegetables
Food eaten out 55 Restaurants and take-away
Alcohol
Beer
Wine
Spirits
15.96+15.97 Beer production
15.93 Wine production
15.91+15.92 Alcoholic drinks distilling
Tobacco 16 Tobacco products
Home energy
Electricity bill 
Gas bill
40.10
40.2
Electricity generation 
Gas production supply
Household goods
Furniture 36.1
Home furnishings 36.15
Domestic electrical appliances 29.71 
Other domestic appliances 29.72
Household consumables 24.1+24.2
Wood furniture
Soft furnishings manufacture
Domestic electrical appliances manufacture
Domestic non electrical appliances manufacture
Pesticides and detergents manufacture
Household services 
Postage 64.1
Phone bill 64.2
Domestic help 93.05
Repairs 52.7
Post services
Telecommunications
Domestic service activities
Repairs to personal and household goods
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Table 2.4: continued
Consumption Item SIC 1992 code Industry name
C lo th ing
Men’s and women’s clothing 17+18 Textile manufacturing
Footwear 19.3 Footwear
P riv a te  tra n s p o r t
Petrol 23.2 Mineral oil refining
Motor vehicle maintenance 50.2+50.4 Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles
Fares
Bus faxes 60.2 Road passenger transport
Rail faxes 60.1 Transport via railways
Other fares 62.1+62.2 Air transport
P ersona l goods an d  services
Personal articles 19.1+19.2, 36.2+36.3 Luggage, jewellery and musical instruments
Soap and toiletries 24.5 Soap and toilet preparations
Drugs 24.4 Pharmaceuticals
Hairdressing 93.02 Hairdressing
Leisure goods
Records 22.3 Reproduction of recorded media
Books 2 2 .1+ 22 .2 Printing and publishing
Toys 36.5 Toys production
Domestic electronic appliances 32 Electronic equipment manufacture
Leisure an d  o th e r  services
Holidays in UK 55.1+55.2 Hotels and provision of lodgings
Entertainment 92.1 to 92.7 Recreational activities
Subscriptions to organisations 91.1 to 91.3 Membership organisations
Professional services fees 74.1 to 74.8 Professional services
Bank charges 65.1+65.2 Financial intermediation
Health expenditure 85.1 Human health activities
Education expenditure 80 Education
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Table 2.5: Industry Skill Intensity
SIC 1992 code Industry name Skill 1 Skill 2 Skill 3
93.02 Hairdressing 0 .010 0.188 0.170
19.3 Footwear 0.019 0.123 0.172
36.15 Soft furnishing manufacturing 0 .020 0.086 0.081
93.05 Domestic help 0 .022 0.188 0.170
50.2+50.4 Maintenance of motor vehicles 0.023 0.126 0.119
15.1 Meat production 0.025 0.062 0.065
15.2 Fish processing 0.029 0.084 0.084
55 Restaurants and take-away 0.031 0.135 0.154
60.2 Road passenger transport 0.032 0.142 0.141
64.1 Post services 0.035 0.169 0.165
36.1 Wood furniture 0.042 0.086 0.081
17+18 Textile manufacturing 0.043 0.105 0.124
15.81+15.82 Bread and biscuits manufacturing 0.044 0.107 0.104
55.1+55.2 Hotels and lodgings 0.047 0.135 0.154
29.71 Domestic electrical appliances manuf 0.050 0 .121 0.134
29.72 Domestic non electrical appliances manuf 0.051 0 .121 0.134
52.7 Repairs of personal and household goods 0.053 0.151 0.147
15.98 Soft drinks production 0.064 0.117 0.113
16 Tobacco production 0.071 0.140 0.199
15.5 Dairy products 0.072 0.075 0.073
15.3 Fruit and vegetables 0.082 0.084 0.084
15.83+15.84 Sugar and sweets 0.084 0.092 0.097
19.1+19.2, 36.2+36.3 Luggage, jewellery and musical instruments 0.092 0.091 0.164
60.1 Railways 0.092 0.105 0.106
15.4 Oils and fats manufacture 0 .1 0 0 0.075 0.070
15.96+15.97 Beer production 0.113 0.124 0.173
36.5 Toys production 0.119 0 .1 2 0 0.175
24.5 Soap and toiletries 0.133 0.144 0.182
2 2 .1+ 2 2 .2 Printing and publishing 0.139 0.134 0.133
32 Domestic electronic appliances 0.143 0.127 0.180
40.2 Gas supply 0.147 0.196 0.174
64.2 Telecomunications 0.156 0.161 0.159
40.10 Electricity generation 0.159 0.150 0.144
15.93 Wine production 0.166 0.124 0.173
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Table 2.5: continued
SIC 1992 code Industry name Skill 1 Skill 2 Skill 3
65.1+65.2 Financial intermediation 0.167 0.189 0.197
62.1+62.2 Air transport 0.168 0.194 0.232
85.1 Human health activities 0.175 0.184 0.177
15.91+15.92 Alcoholic drinks distilling 0.189 0.124 0.173
92.1 to 92.7 Entertainment 0 .202 0 .202 0.206
24.1+24.2 Pesticides and detergents 0.206 0.149 0.150
22.3 Reproduction of recorded media 0.235 0.134 0.133
23.2 Mineral oil refining 0.238 0.207 0.235
91.1 to 91.3 Membership organisations 0.267 0.213 0.190
74.1 to 74.8 Professional services 0.294 0.228 0.230
24.4 Pharmaceuticals 0.301 0.195 0.289
80 Education 0.538 0.232 0.233
degree-level qualification. Skill 2 is calculated using the 1995 industry-by-industry Input-Output table. 
Skill 3 is calculated using the Input-Output tables weighted for import penetration. See the text for 
more details.
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Table 2.6: Sample Means. FES 1982-1998.
Full Sample 20th percentile of 80th percentile of
net income distrib. net income distrib.
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Number of families 107856 21577 21577
Age of head 50.2 61.9 44.7
Years of education of head 9.8 8.4 11.4
Number of persons 2.5 1.4 3.2
Number of children under 18 0 .6 0 .2 0 .8
Number of retired 0.4 0.7 0.1
Income after tax 197.6 (166.2) 61.7 (15.8) 414.2 (243.6)
Average expenditure 145.5 (139.6) 53.3 (41.9) 244.7 (201.3)
Expenditure shares
Food 0.23 (0 .12) 0.31 (0.13) 0.16 (0.08)
Food eaten out 0.05 (0.05) 0.03 (0.05) 0.07 (0.05)
Alcohol 0.05 (0.07) 0.03 (0.07) 0.06 (0.06)
Tobacco 0.03 (0.06) 0.04 (0.07) 0 .02 (0.03)
Home energy 0.09 (0.07) 0.16 (0 .10) 0.05 (0.04)
Household goods 0.08 (0 .10) 0.07 (0.09) 0.09 (0 .11)
Household services 0.05 (0.06) 0.07 (0.06) 0.06 (0.06)
Clothing 0.07 (0.08) 0.05 (0.08) 0.09 (0.09)
Private transport 0 .12 (0.14) 0.03 (0.08) 0.11 (0.09)
Fares 0 .02 (0.05) 0 .02 (0.05) 0.03 (0.06)
Personal goods and services 0.04 (0.05) 0.04 (0.05) 0.05 (0.06)
Leisure goods 0.05 (0.06) 0.04 (0.05) 0.06 (0.07)
Leisure and other services 0.05 (0.06) 0.05 (0.06) 0.06 (0.08)
Notes: Income after tax and average expenditure are expressed in weekly equivalents in 1987 pounds.
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Table 2.7: The Almost Ideal Demand System
Share Equations
(1)
Food
(2 ) 
Food out
(3)
Alcohol
(4)
Tobacco
(5)
Energy
(6 )
Household
goods
(7)
Household
services
Constant 0.611 0.031 0.198 0.248 0.323 -0.049 -0.123
(0.047) (0.016) (0 .01 0 ) (0.017) (0.025) (0.017) (0.014)
Sex of head -0.006 -0.009 -0.040 -0.014 0.014 0.015 0.017
(0.009) (0.003) (0 .00 1 ) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0 .0 0 2 )
Age of head 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0 .001 0 .001 -0.000 0 .001
(0 .00 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 )
Education dummy 0.001 -0.005 -0.015 -0.014 0 .002 -0.007 0.017
(0 .01 1 ) (0.003) (0 .0 0 1) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
N of adults 0.033 -0.008 0.003 0.015 0 .002 -0.009 -0.019
(0.008) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 1 ) (0.003) (0.004) (0 .0 0 2) (0 .0 0 2 )
N of children under 18 0.033 -0.009 -0.016 0.000 0.007 -0 .002 -0 .0 0 2
(0.004) (0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 1) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 1 )
Total expenditure -0.107 0.029 0.005 -0.038 -0.058 0 .022 0 .022
(0 .0 1 1 ) (0.003) (0 .00 2) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Own price -0.086 -0.075 -0 .002 0.013 0.115 0.037 0.059
(0.143) (0.064) (0.043) (0 .0 2 2 ) (0.043) (0.074) (0.043)
Homogeneity t value 0.592 7.327 10.551 0.454 0.154 4.591 5.976
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Table 2.7: continued
Share equations
(8 )
Clothing
(9)
Personal 
goods and 
services
(10)
Private
transport
(11)
Fares
(12)
Leisure
goods
(13)
Leisure
services
Constant -0.066 -0.097 0.047 0.042 -0.014 -0.153
(0.016) (0.015) (0 .0 1 2) (0 .0 1 1) (0.014) (0.018)
Sex of head 0.024 0 .020 -0.030 0.008 -0.005 0.006
(0.003) (0 .0 0 2) (0 .0 0 2) (0 .0 0 1) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0.003)
Age of head -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0 .001
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0) (0 .0 0 0) (0 .0 0 0) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 )
Education dummy -0.014 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.005 0 .021
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .00 2) (0.003)
N of adults 0 .002 -0.006 0 .011 0.000 -0.007 -0.016
(0 .0 0 2) (0 .00 2) (0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .00 1 ) (0 .00 1) (0 .0 0 2 )
N of children under 18 0 .002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 0.004
(0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 1) (0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .00 1) (0 .0 0 1 )
Total expenditure 0.033 0.025 0.013 0.006 0.018 0.031
(0.004) (0.003) (0 .0 0 2) (0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .00 2) (0.004)
Own price 0.121 0.009 0.123 0.170 0.015 0.036
(0.034) (0.078) (0.039) (0.063) (0.073) (0.067)
Homogeneity t value 6.637 0.162 11.315 0.279 11.720 1.286
Symmetry: Cy =  Cji, xf78] =  634.92
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Cross-equation price symmetry constrained the estimates. Total 
expenditure is treated as endogenous and is instrumented using total net income. The other variables 
included in the estimation are age, age square, sex and years of education of the head of household, 
the total number of children under 18 years of age, the total number of adults, the price series of all 
thirdteen commodity groups and regional dummies. The coefficients on the price series (except for 
the own price) and the regional dummies are not reported for reasons of space. The homogeneity t 
value is a t ratio test of zero-degree price homogeneity equation-by-equation. The symmetry test is a 
joint x 2 test of cross-equation price symmetry and price homogeneity. Estimation Sample: January 
1987-December 1997, number of observations 107856.
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Table 2.8: Instrumental Variable Estimates of Education and Income Elasticities
Consumption Item Education
elasticity
S. E. Income
elasticity
S.E. Expenditure
share
Hairdressing -0.003 (0 .00 0) 1.433 (0 .0 0 0) 0 .012
Footwear -0.007 (0 .000) 1.136 (0 .0 0 0) 0.017
House furnishing -0 .012 (0 .000) 1.557 (0 .0 0 0) 0 .012
Domestic help 0.040 (0 .000) 2.891 (0 .0 0 0 ) 0 .011
Maintenance 0 .022 (0 .000) 1.792 (0 .0 0 0) 0 .0 2 0
Meat -0.007 (0 .000) 0.480 (0 .0 0 0 ) 0.076
Fish 0.004 (0 .000) 0.551 (0 .0 0 0) 0 .011
Food eaten out -0.006 (0 .000) 1.672 (0 .0 0 0 ) 0.059
Bus fares 0.018 (0 .000) 0.146 (0 .0 0 0 ) 0.013
Postage 0.039 (0 .000) 0.813 (0 .0 0 0) 0.004
Furniture -0.007 (0 .000) 1.894 (0 .0 0 0 ) 0 .011
Men’s and women’s clothing -0.011 (0 .001) 1.550 (0 .0 0 0 ) 0.064
Bread and biscuits 0.001 (0 .00 0) 0.394 (0 .0 0 0) 0.041
Holidays -0.001 (0 .001) 2.593 (0 .00 0 ) 0.023
Domestic electrical appliances -0.009 (0 .00 0) 1.254 (0 .0 0 0 ) 0 .012
Domestic non electrical appliances 0.011 (0 .00 0) 1.661 (0 .0 0 0) 0.013
Repairs 0.018 (0 .00 0) 1.633 (0 .0 0 0) 0.005
Soft drinks 0.004 (0 .0 0 0) 0.542 (0 .0 0 0) 0 .021
Tobacco -0.029 (0 .001) -0 .222 (0 .0 0 0 ) 0.045
Milk products 0.006 (0 .001) 0.452 (0 .0 0 0 ) 0.037
Fruit and vegetables 0 .010 (0 .00 0) 0.529 (0 .0 0 0 ) 0.047
Sugar and sweets -0.003 (0 .000) 0.551 (0 .00 0) 0.014
Personal articles 0.008 (0 .00 0) 1.870 (0 .00 0) 0.009
Rail fares 0.083 (0 .0 0 0) 1.690 (0 .00 0) 0.005
Edible oils and fats 0.005 (0 .000) 0.343 (0 .0 0 0 ) 0.008
Beer -0.027 (0 .0 0 0) 0.792 (0 .00 0) 0.039
Toys 0.000 (0 .0 0 0) 1.116 (0 .00 0) 0.006
Soap and toiletries -0 .010 (0 .0 0 0) 1.061 (0 .0 0 0 ) 0.016
Books 0.017 (0 .0 0 0) 0.931 (0 .00 0) 0.038
Domestic electronic appliances -0.009 (0 .0 0 0) 1.742 (0 .00 0) 0.007
Gas bUl 0.000 (0 .0 0 0) 0.541 (0 .00 0) 0.042
Phone bill 0.013 (0 .0 0 1) 0.730 (0 .00 0) 0.034
Electricity bill -0 .002 (0 .0 0 0) 0.218 (0 .00 0) 0.055
Wine 0.033 (0 .0 0 0) 2.329 (0 .0 0 0 ) 0 .0 1 0
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Table 2.8: continued
Consumption Item Education
elasticity
S. E. Income
elasticity
S.E. Expenditure
share
Bank charges 0.013 (0 .00 0) 1.621 (0 .00 0) 0 .001
Other fares 0 .112 (0 .00 0) 2.792 (0 .00 0) 0.001
Health expenditure -0.003 (0 .000) 2.151 (0 .0 0 0) 0.005
Spirits -0.019 (0 .00 0) 1.428 (0 .00 0 ) 0 .010
Entertainment -0.018 (0 .000) 1.281 (0 .00 0 ) 0.025
Household consumables -0.005 (0 .000) 0.710 (0 .0 0 0 ) 0.018
Records 0.008 (0 .000) 1.512 (0 .0 0 0 ) 0.006
Petrol 0.000 (0 .00 0 ) 1.376 (0 .00 0 ) 0.054
Subscriptions to organisations 0.045 (0 .000) 2.638 (0 .00 0 ) 0.003
Professional sevices fees -0 .020 (0 .00 0 ) 2.430 (0 .0 0 0 ) 0.001
Drugs 0.013 (0 .00 0 ) 0.655 (0 .0 0 0) 0.008
Education 0.108 (0 .00 1 ) 2.953 (0 .0 0 0) 0.007
Notes: Unconstrained estimates of system 2.15 in the text. Terms in total expenditure instrumented 
by total net income.
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Chapter 3
Firm Heterogeneity in 
Capital/Labor Ratios and Wage 
Inequality
3.1 Introduction
Changes in wage inequality reflect changes in both price and quantities of workers’ observable 
characteristics and changes in residual wage inequality. Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) claim 
that roughly 60% of the increase in the 90-10 log wage differential can be accounted for by 
changes in the residuals’ distribution, i.e. in unobserved attributes of workers belonging to the 
same demographic or educational group.
While there are already many studies on increasing wage dispersion, much less research 
has been devoted to the increasing dispersion of capital intensity across firms. This paper 
is divided into three parts. The first part is an analysis of dispersion of equipment/labor
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ratios across firms. The second part provides some empirical evidence of the link between the 
dispersion of wages across workers and the dispersion of capital intensity across firms. In the 
third part of the paper, I propose a theory of residual wage inequality based on the increased 
dispersion of capital intensities across firms.
In the first part of this paper I use panel data on individual firms (Compustat) from 1970 
to 1992 to document the increase in the variance of equipment/labor ratios over time. I focus 
on equipment capital since equipment is complementary to skills and differential stocks of 
equipment capital across firms may be correlated with the demand for skills. The results show 
that the log standard deviation across firms of equipment/labor ratios increased by about 1 2 % 
from 1970 to 1992. The rise in dispersion of equipment/capital occurred both between and 
within industry and is concentrated in the mid-late eighties.
In the second part of the paper, I study the correlation between the increasing dispersion of 
wages across workers and the increasing dispersion of capital intensities across firms. The data 
on wages are from March CPS and five waves of the Displaced Workers Survey (DWS). The 
reason to study displaced workers is twofold. First, in the DWS there is a panel dimension that 
allows one to control for unobserved heterogeneity, secondly displaced workers are less likely to 
select themselves in the best paying industries or firms. This implies that the capital intensity 
premium is more likely to reflect ’’true” firms’ effects rather than sorting. I match Compustat 
data on firms’ capital intensity to CPS and DWS data on wages at the industry-year level. 
The results indicate that a 1% increase in the average industry capital intensity is associated 
with a 0.11% increase in the average weekly wage in the CPS and with a 0.13% increase in 
the DWS. Consistently with the literature on inter-industry wage differentials, there is no 
increase in the cross-industry effect of capital intensity on wages over time. More importantly 
for the purpose of this paper, within-industry dispersion of equipment/labor ratios appears to
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be related to within-industry dispersion of wages both in the CPS and in the DWS. Both the 
variance of equipment/labor ratios across firms and the variance of wages across workers have 
increased over time. The association between the dispersion of equipment/labor ratios across 
firms and the dispersion of wages across workers holds within industry even after controlling 
for time dummies.
In the theoretical part I build a model that explains the rise in the variance of wages in 
view of the evidence on the increasing variance across firms of the equipment/labor ratios. 
The intuitive idea is simple. The two main ingredients of the model are non-competitive labor 
market and random matching of identical workers to two types of firms. In a non-competitive 
labor market, workers’ wages are linked to their individual output and therefore to the capital 
they are matched with. Identical workers are matched randomly to two types of firms that 
co-exist in equilibrium. ’’Good” firms have high job creation costs and are more productive, 
’’bad” firms have low job creation costs but are less productive. ’’Good” firms invest more in 
equipment capital, ’’bad” invest less. As the relative price of equipment capital falls, ’’good” 
firms with high equipment invest more and increase their productivity relative to ’’bad” firms. 
Wages for identical workers are more dispersed as a consequence of a higher dispersion of 
capital intensities. This feature of the model that explains the increase in wage inequality 
with increasing dispersion of capital intensities across firms is consistent with recent evidence 
that indicates that the bulk of the increase in wage inequality took place between plants rather 
than within plants (Dunne et al., 2002).
3 .1 .1  A  B r ie f  O verview  o f  th e  R ela ted  L iterature
Work on dispersion of capital/labor ratios is fairly rare in the literature. Caselli (1999) uses 
industry-level data to document the increase in the 90-10 log differential of capital intensities
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across four-digit manufacturing industries. In this paper, I use data on individual firms to 
study the increasing dispersion of equipment/labor ratios across firms.
The empirical part of this paper is connected to the literature that uses establishment-level 
data to study the dispersion of wages and productivity across plants. Davis and Haltiwanger 
(1991) and Dunne et al. (2 0 0 2 ) show that the increase in wage dispersion is mainly a between- 
plant phenomenon. Using both individual wage data and establishment-level data they decom­
pose the total variance of wages in three components: between-industry, between-plant and 
within-plant. The results show that most of the increase in wage dispersion is due to between- 
plant dispersion within the same industries. Related work by Dorns et al. (1997) finds that 
an important factor in explaining wage dispersion across plants is the differential adoption of 
technologies. Dunne et al. (2002) find that between-plant measures of wage and productivity 
dispersion have increased over time and are strongly positively correlated. They also find 
that a significant fraction of the rising dispersion of wages and productivity is associated with 
changes in the distribution of computer investment across plants.
Unlike the case of wages and computers, however, there has been little analysis of the 
changes in the distribution of capital intensity over time and of the association between wages 
and capital intensity. 1 All previously cited papers use establishment-level data limited to 
manufacturing. In this paper, I use Compustat data to study the evolution of the distribution 
of capital intensity over time across firms in all industries.
In the theoretical part, I propose a model of residual wage inequality based on the increased 
dispersion of capital intensities across firms. There are many theories of within-group wage 
inequality built on the complementarity between unobservable skills and new technologies.
1 Although in the published version, Dunne at al. (2002) focus on the relationship between wage and computer 
investment across plants, in the Working Paper version, they also study the relationship between capital intensity 
and wages.
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Most models, however, interpret unobservable skills as ex-ante differences in ability across 
individuals. The model of residual wage inequality presented here is not based on ex-ante 
differences in unobservable ability. In this model, identical workers are matched to different 
firms.
The mainstream view in the literature is that within-group wage inequality is the result 
of the increase in the price of unobserved ability. Acemoglu (1999) builds a model where 
identical firms search for workers with different abilities. Skill-biased technical change induces 
firms to switch from a pooling equilibrium where one job fits everyone, to a separating equi­
librium where different jobs for different abilities are created. Caselli (1999) suggests that 
a technological revolution occurs when a new type of machine is introduced. Operating the 
new machine requires a new type of skill. Workers have different costs of learning the new 
skill and those with lower learning costs can get a higher wage premium. Galor and Maov 
(2 0 0 0 ) claim that ability helps workers to adapt to the new work organization, therefore big 
organizational changes raise the return to ability. Kremer and Maskin (2000) build a model 
where production requires many complementary tasks. Wage inequality increases as workers 
with different skills are increasingly segregated across plants. Segregation occurs because of 
the complementarity of tasks and the exogenous force that sets the mechanism in motion is 
the increasingly dispersed distribution of skills across workers.
Although these models provide explanations through which technology might affect in­
equality, they are all based on ex-ante differences in ability. Models based on fixed ex-ante 
differences in ability come under severe criticism. Unobserved ability is a permanent char­
acteristic of the individual, therefore, all models based on differences in innate ability imply 
that the rise in residual wage inequality should be accounted for by the rise in the variance 
of the persistent component of individual earnings. Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) and the
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subsequent literature show that this is not the case and earnings instability (the variance of 
the transitory component) explains much of the total increase.
On the basis of this criticism, Violante (2002) and Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2002) 
propose a model based on ex-ante identical workers where wage inequality is due to an acceler­
ation of technical change. In each period, a new vintage technology embodied in new machines 
spreads in the economy. Workers are ex-ante identical and have vintage specific skills. The 
degree of transferability of these skills between different vintages is proportional to the pro­
ductivity difference between the machines. An acceleration in technical change increases the 
productivity differences across successive vintages and decreases the degree of transferability 
of skills. As a result, wage inequality across identical workers matched to different vintages of 
machines increases.
The models of Acemoglu (1999), Caselli (1999), Violante (2002) and Hornstein, Krusell 
and Violante (2002) are all consistent with an increasingly dispersed distribution of capital 
intensity. My model is built around an increasingly dispersed distribution of capital inten­
sity. Like Violante (2002), my model does not rely on ex-ante differences in abilities. Unlike 
Violante (2002), my model is not based on a technological acceleration and the reduction in 
the transferability of skills. In my model, a decline in the relative price of equipment capital 
increases the dispersion of capital intensities across firms, thus raising wage inequality.
The model presented in this paper is related to the literature that explains wage dis­
persion among equivalent workers within a search framework. Some of these models such 
as Montgomery (1991), Acemoglu (2001) and Pissarides (1994) consider firms with different 
job-creation costs and derive wage dispersion as a consequence of cost dispersion. My model 
is closest to Acemoglu (2001). He also considers a search model with different job-creation 
costs across firms but he focuses on the effect of more generous unemployment insurance and
103
Chapter 3. Firm Heterogeneity in Capital/Labor Ratios and Wage Inequality
minimum wage on the composition of jobs.
Finally, an increasingly dispersed distribution of equipment/labor ratios can have an effect 
on wage differentials across identical workers as long as the market is not competitive and firm 
effects are important in determining the wage. This paper is therefore related to the literature 
on inter-industry wage differentials. There is a controversy on the importance of unobserved 
person or firm effects in explaining inter-industry wage differentials. Krueger and Summers 
(1988) and Gibbons and Katz (1992) claim that the differentials cannot be explained by person 
effects. Murphy and Topel (1990) claim that person effects are the primary explanation. Using 
employer-employee matched data, Abowd, Kramarz and Creecy (2003) estimate that person 
and firm effects can each account for approximately 50% of the inter-industry wage differentials 
in the US.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section I document the increase in the 
variance of capital/labor ratios between and within industry over time. In section 3, I relate 
the variance of wages to the variance of capital/labor ratios. In section 4 ,1 present the model 
that interprets the evidence. Section 5 presents the conclusions.
3.2 Firm  E quipm ent/L abor R atios
In this section I examine changes over time in the cross-firm distribution of capital/labor ratios. 
I use Compustat data from 1970 to 1992. Compustat is a dataset of US companies listed on 
the stock market. They represent less than 1% of the total number of companies in the US 
but more than 50% of total employment. Figure 3-1 plots the employment-weighted standard 
deviation of log equipment/labor across firms in each year. To build the equipment/labor 
ratio, I use information on equipment (COMPUSTAT 156) and on the number of employees
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Figure 3-1: Employment weighted log standard deviation of equipment/labor ratios. Source: 
Compustat Industrial Data.
Chapter 3. Firm Heterogeneity in Capital/Labor Ratios and Wage Inequality
(COMPUSTAT 129). Equipment represents the capitalized cost of machinery and equipment 
used to generate revenue minus accumulated depreciation. Equipment is deflated using the 
1-digit industry specific deflators form the Bureau of Economic Analysis and is expressed at 
the real value in 1992.
Figure 3-1 shows an increase in the employment-weighted standard deviation of log equip­
ment/labor ratios across firms of 12.3% between 1970 and 1992.2 The increase in dispersion of 
equipment/labor ratios starts in 1980 and continues through the ‘80s. This paper is concerned 
with the increasing dispersion of equipment/labor ratios facing workers, hence the log standard 
deviation of equipment/labor ratios is employment-weighted.
Figure 3-2 shows that the divergence in equipment/labor ratios is pervasive and not limited 
to part of the distribution. Figure 3-2 plots the change in log equipment/labor ratios from 
1970-73 to 1989-92. The changes are calculated for each fifth percentile of the cross-sectional 
distribution of firms in 1989-92 and in 1970-73. Each point in Figure 3-2 is calculated as 
[P89—92(log f ) —P7o-73(log f )] where p is each fifth percentile of the employment-weighted cross- 
sectional distribution in years 1989-92 and years 1970-73. The change in real equipment/labor 
ratios at the bottom 10th percentile of the distribution is 55%, at the top 90th percentile of 
the distribution is 103%. The picture exhibits a concave shape with inequality rising more at 
the bottom 50% of the distribution.
The four charts in Figure 3-3 decompose the rise in equipment/labor dispersion in four 
periods. I look at changes between each five-year period. The first chart compares log equip­
ment/labor ratios by percentile between the periods 1970-74 and 1975-79. The changes at each 
percentile are normalized by comparing the change at each percentile with the change in mean
2 The results do not change if I exclude from the sample the new firms that are included in the sample after 
1974.
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Log equipm ent/labor ch a n g es by percentile from 1970-73  to 1989-92
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Figure 3-2: Log equipment/labor ratio changes by percentile between 1970-1973 and 1989- 
1992.
107
ch
an
ge
 
in 
log
 
re
la
tiv
e 
eq
ui
pm
en
t 
ch
an
ge
 
in 
lo
g
Chapter 3. Firm Heterogeneity in Capital/Labor Ratios and Wage Inequality
changes from 1 9 7 0 -74  to 1 9 7 5 -79
50
percentile
changes from 19 8 0 -8 3  to 1 9 8 4 -88
J2L
50
percentile
100
100
changes from 1 9 7 5 -7 9  to 1 9 8 0 -83
.1
.1
50
percentile
100
changes from 19 8 4 -8 8  to 1 9 8 9 -92
Figure 3-3: Changes in the log equipment/labor ratio by percentile. Changes relative to the 
period mean. Four periods.
50
percentile
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log equipment/labor ratios. Each point in Figure 3-3 is calculated as [p*(log | )  — p*_i(log j)] 
—[E<(log f) — E t - i(log f )] where p is each fifth percentile of the employment-weighted log dis­
tribution in period t. E  is the employment-weighted average. The four charts show that from 
1970-74 to 1975-79 and from 1980-83 to 1984-88 equipment/labor ratios at each percentile 
moved more or less in line with the mean. The top right and bottom right charts in Figure 
3-3 show that the increase in dispersion of equipment/labor ratios across firms took place in 
the early and late eighties. The increase in dispersion is concentrated at the bottom of the 
distribution in the early eighties (top right chart) with the bottom percentiles left much behind 
relative to the mean. The increase in dispersion slowed down somewhat in the mid-eighties 
(bottom left chart) but continued from the mid-eighties to the nineties (bottom right chart). 
In the late eighties (bottom right chart) the bottom percentiles grew about 10% less than the 
overall mean, the top percentiles grew about 1 0 % more than the mean.
3 .2 .1  B etw een  and  W ith in  In d u stry  D isp ersion
In this subsection I look at the increase in the dispersion of equipment/labor ratios between 
and within industry and size groups.
Table 3.1 and 3.2 report log equipment/labor differentials across industry and across size 
class. Table 3.1 and 3.2 report the mean capital intensity (column one), the within-group 
standard deviation (column two) and the frequency in the sample (column three). The mean 
log equipment/labor differentials by industry and size group (first column Table 3.1 and 3.2) 
are defined as the difference between the average log equipment/labor ratio within the group 
and the overall average log equipment/labor ratio. Table 3.1 reports time series averages and 
Table 3.2 reports time series changes between 1970-73 and 1989-92. I consider four-year groups 
at the beginning and at the end of the sample to minimize measurement error.
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Agriculture and construction are dropped due to their small sample size. The sectors with 
the highest average equipment/labor ratios (Table 3.1, column one) are mining and transporta­
tion and utilities. These two sectors have much higher equipment/labor ratios than the overall 
mean. The lowest capital-intensive industries are wholesale and retail trade. The heterogene­
ity of log equipment/labor ratios across firms of the same industry (Table 3.1, column two) 
is higher within mining, transportation and utilities, and finance. Equipment/labor ratios are 
higher in small companies with less than 1 0 0  workers and in very large companies with more 
than 4000 workers. The differences across size groups are less impressive than the differences 
across industry groups. Differences are larger between small and medium-sized firms. Small 
firms have more heterogeneous equipment /labor ratios than large firms. The heterogeneity of 
equipment/labor ratios within size classes decreases with size.
Looking at the time series changes in Table 3.2, the average equipment/labor ratio (Ta­
ble 3.2, column one) in mining, transportation, retail and business and professional services 
increased less than the overall average between 1970 and 1992. Wholesale and finance gained 
ground relative to the mean. Between-firm equipment/labor dispersion (Table 3.2, column 
two) rose in all sectors except for mining, transportation and personal and business services. 
The highest increases occurred in manufacturing, wholesale trade and finance. The differentials 
in equipment/labor ratios across size classes increased dramatically over time. The difference 
between firms with less than 100 workers and firms with more than 4000 workers increased 
by 50 log points between 1970 and 1992. Between-firm dispersion in equipment/labor ratios 
increased within all size classes except for companies with less than 1 0 0  workers which became 
relatively less capital intensive over time and much more homogenous.
Finally, the last column of Table 3.2 indicates a sizeable shift from manufacturing to 
business and professional services and a shift from large firms of more than 1 0 0 0  workers to
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Mean log 
equipment/labor 
differential
Between-firm
standard
deviation
Frequency
Industry
Mining 1.07 1.26 1.45
Durable manufacturing 0 .00 0.87 40.07
Non durable manufacturing 0.30 0.97 21.82
Transportation/utilities 1.16 1.32 5.12
Wholesale -0.49 0.97 4.89
Retail -0.84 0 .66 10.79
Finance -0.26 1.33 3.15
Other Services -0.13 1.28 12.69
Size Class
1-100  employees 0.11 1.30 14.31
100-500 -0.03 1.12 23.32
500-1000 -0.01 1.09 13.12
1000-4000 -0.07 1.07 24.93
4000+ 0.04 1.03 24.32
Notes: Time series averages. Mean log equipment/labor differentials and between firm dispersion by 
industry and size groups.
Table 3.1: Time series averages. Log equipment/labor ratios
smaller firms.
To characterize the contribution of observable and unobservable characteristics to the 
changes in the equipment/labor distribution over time, I use the distribution accounting 
methodology of Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (JMP).3 The observable characteristics considered 
are industry and size. The JMP decomposition can be used to quantify the effects of changes 
in the observables and unobservables in all parts of the distribution. Table 3.3 reports the
3 The JMP decomposition decomposes the regression log ku  = X u P t+ u u , where log ku  is log equipment/labor 
ratio in firm i in period t and uu  can be written as uu  = into logA:^  = X u fi + and
log kit = X itflt + F-1(t?it). We can attribute the changes in log k}t to changes in industry and size composition, 
the changes in log k% — log k\t to changes in inter-industry and size specific equipment/labor differentials and 
the changes in log ku  — log ku  to changes in the distribution of residuals.
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Mean log 
equipment /labor 
differential
Between-firm
standard
deviation
Frequency
Industry
Mining -0.28 -0.13 -0.14
Durable manufacturing 0.02 0.08 -6.05
Non durable manufacturing 0 .00 0.07 -4.95
Transportation /  utilities -0.27 -0.07 3.45
Wholesale 0.48 0.21 -2 .20
Retail -0.32 0.01 1.30
Finance 0.30 0.40 0.90
Other Services -0.07 -0.11 9.70
Size Class
1-100  employees -0.49 -0.22 15.40
100-500 -0.08 0.09 5.36
500-1000 0.04 0.22 -5.56
1000-4000 0.05 0.29 -10.11
4000-1- 0.01 0.25 -5.09
Notes: Time series changes between 1970-73 and 1989-92. Changes in log equipment/labor relative to 
the mean log change and changes in between- firm dispersion by industry and size groups.
Table 3.2: Time series changes. Log equipment/labor ratio
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Inequality measure Total Observable Observable Unobservable
change quantities betas
Standard deviation 0.12 0.08 0.00 0.04
90-10 differential 0.32 0.09 0.02 0.21
90-50 differential 0.13 0.08 0.01 0.04
50-10 differential 0.19 0.09 0.00 0.10
Notes: The regression specification underlying the decomposition contains 2-digit industry effects and 
a quartic in size.
Table 3.3: Juhn, Murphy and Pierce decomposition.
results of the decomposition for various inequality measures.
The 90-10 log differential rose from 2.46 in 1970 to 2.78 in 1992 (or 13%). Changes in 
industrial and size composition over twenty years (holding fixed the equipment/labor differen­
tial associated with industry and size) contributed to 28% (0.09/0.32) of the total increase in 
the 90-10 log differential. Changes in the industry and size differentials alone (holding fixed 
the industry and size composition) contributed to 6 % (0.02/0.32) of the total increase of the 
90-10 log differential. Changes in composition and differentials together account for 34% of 
the total increase of the 90-10 differential. The remaining 6 6 % of the total increase of the 
90-10 differential is explained by unobservables, i.e. by the rise in within industry-size groups 
dispersion. The JMP results indicate that most of equipment/labor ratio dispersion is not due 
to composition changes.
Table 3.3 also reports the decomposition of time series changes in the 90-50 and 50-10 log 
equipment/labor differentials. Two important results stand out from the table. First, most 
of the increase in equipment/labor dispersion occurred in the bottom half of the distribution. 
Secondly, the contribution of observables to the increase in equipment/labor ratios across firms 
varies according to the inequality measure reported. The increase in between-size and between- 
industry inequality (changes in observable quantities and betas) accounts for approximately
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two thirds of the total increase in the standard deviation of equipment/labor ratios. The 
increase in between-group inequality accounts for less than half of the increase in the 50-10 
ratio and explains more than two thirds of the increase in the 90-50 ratio. Apparently, the 
capital intensity gap between the 90th percentile of the distribution and the 50th percentile 
is much more understandable in terms of changes in industrial and size composition and their 
OLS coefficients than the gap between the 90th and the 50th percentile.
3.3 T he Variance o f C apital/L abor R atios and W age Inequal­
ity
In this section, I document the cross-industry correlation between firms equipment/labor ratios 
and wages from 1970 to 1992. First, I study the correlation between wages and average industry 
capital intensity, second, I look at the correlation between within-industry dispersion of wages 
and within-industry dispersion of capital/labor ratios.
The tendency of capital-intensive industries to pay higher wages has been documented by 
Katz and Summers (1989) in the context of inter-industry wage differentials. The correlation 
between within-industry dispersion of wages and within-industry dispersion of capital intensi­
ties is a novel point.4 Unlike previous work, I study the relationship between individual wages 
and industry capital intensity over time. I match individual wages drawn from March CPS to 
average capital intensity at the industry-year level drawn from Compustat. I also extend the 
analysis to displaced workers. Displaced workers have been extensively used in the literature 
on inter-industry wage differentials.5 The idea is that an exogenous displacement reduces the
4The working paper version of Dunne et al.(2002) contains some analysis of the correlation between wages 
and capital intensities over time in a panel of manufacturing firms.
5Krueger and Summers (1988), Gibbons and Katz (1992) and Neal (1995) have used the Displaced Workers 
Survey to study inter-industry wage differentials.
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problem of sorting better workers into better paying industries and gives a better measure of 
the pure industry effect. Following the same reasoning, I investigate whether an increasing 
dispersion of wages for displaced workers is associated with an increasing dispersion of capital 
intensity across firms.
Figure 3-4 shows the log standard deviation of weekly wages and the employment-weighted 
log standard deviation of equipment/labor ratios. Log equipment/labor ratios are drawn from 
Compustat, log weekly wages are from March CPS. Wage and capital intensity dispersion 
have three characteristics in common. First the timing of the increase (Figure 3-1). Second 
the pervasiveness of the increase in dispersion (Figure 3-2). Third the fact that most of the 
increase is not due to composition changes but to within-group changes (Figure ??). In the 
following section, I formally investigate the relationship between wage and capital intensity 
dispersion.
3 .3 .1  T h e  ’’C apita l In ten sity ” P rem iu m
I regress log weekly wages from March CPS on industry employment-weighted average log 
equipment/labor ratios from Compustat. The two datasets are matched at the one-digit 
industry-year level.
I restrict the March CPS sample to full-year, full-time workers (those working 35 or more 
horns per week and at least 40 weeks in the previous year) between the age of 20 and 60 at the 
time of the survey. I use March CPS data from 1971 to 1993 therefore covering earnings from 
1970 to 1992. The sample is restricted to workers without allocated earnings, who earned at 
least $67 per week in 1982 dollars.6
6 This selection of the March CPS is used in Katz and Autor (1999).
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Figure 3-4: Log standard deviation of real weekly wages from March CPS. Employment- 
weighted log standard deviation of equipment/labor ratios from Compustat.
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The regression is of the form:
klog wijt =  a  +  Xu/3 +  7  log(y)jt +  Eijt (3.1)
where log w^t  is the wage of individual i at time t in industry j. X u  includes year and 
industry effects, a quadratic in age, years of education, sex, race and marital status dummies. 
l°g(f )jt Is the employment-weighted average equipment/labor ratio in industry j  at time t. 
Standard errors axe clustered at the industry-year level. I consider the following industries: 
mining, durable manufacturing, non-durable manufacturing, transport and utilities, wholesale 
trade, retail trade, finance, other services. Agriculture and construction are dropped because 
of the low sample size of the year cells in Compustat. Workers in public administration are 
dropped as Compustat data on capital intensity cover only the private sector. Wages are 
deflated by the CPI, equipment is deflated using ldigit industry-specific deflators from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Table 3.4 shows the results of OLS estimation of equation 3.1 separately for the CPS and the 
DWS. The results show a positive relationship between industry capital intensity and weekly 
wages. The first row of Table 3.4 shows that a 1% increase in the industry capital intensity is 
associated with a 0.11% increase in the average weekly wage. The relationship between wages 
and capital intensity, controlling for year effects, is always positive and significant. This is the 
well-known result that more capital-intensive industries tend to pay higher wages. Equipment 
capital intensity and average wages are slightly negatively correlated within industry (Table 
3.4, first and second row and third column), and their correlation is insignificant when I control 
for both industry and time effects (Table 3.4, fourth column). This result is consistent with 
the view that inter-industry wage differentials have not increased over time. The same results
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are obtained in the second row of Table 3.4 considering the years 1984-1992 of the CPS. This 
cut of the sample is used to compare the results with the Displaced Workers Survey.
3 .3 .2  T h e  D isp laced  W orkers Survey
In this section, I estimate equation 3.1 by using the Displaced Workers Surveys in years 1984, 
1986, 1988, 1990 and 1992. The Displaced Workers Survey is a supplement to the January 
CPS in years 1984, 1986,1988, 1990, 1992. The DWS asks whether the workers were displaced 
in the five years prior to the survey. It contains information about the previous and current 
wage, industry and occupation and information about a respondent’s employment history in 
the previous 5 years.
There are two advantages to using the DWS: First, the DWS has a panel dimension that 
allows one to control for unobserved heterogeneity; secondly, displaced workers are less likely 
to select themselves in the most capital-intensive industries and within industry in the most 
capital-intensive firms. As a result, the coefficient on industry capital intensity is more likely 
to reflect the true firm effect rather than sorting. The thought experiment that motivates 
this analysis is the following: imagine a group of workers is exogenously displaced and then 
randomly assigned to a new firm, either within the same industry or in a different industry. 
Given the big increase in the dispersion of capital/labor ratios across firms, we expect to see 
a positive relationship between the variance of the wages and the variance of capital intensity 
within and between industry.
I restrict the sample to workers who are employed full time in both the pre-displacement 
and the current job. This restriction is necessary as the wage information is in terms of weekly 
wages. The sample is further restricted to workers aged 20-60 at the time of the survey. There 
can be various reasons for displacement and in the following tables I present the results on the
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whole sample of displaced workers. The results obtained on the subsample of the displaced 
because of establishment closings are qualitatively similar.
The results of estimation of equation 3.1 on DWS data are shown in Table 3.4 row three. 
The results are similar to those obtained on CPS data. In the pooled sample (row three, first 
column), a 1% increase in equipment capital intensity implies a 0.13% increase in the average 
post-displacement wage. Wages and capital intensity are positively associated across industries 
(row three, second column), but are not associated within industry (row three, third column). 
Controlling for both industry and year effects, (row three, fourth column), capital intensity 
and wages are not significantly associated.
The same pattern holds when the regressions are run using fixed effect estimates. In 
this case, both the information on pre- and post-displacement wages is used and the average 
industry capital intensity in the pre-displacement job is matched according to the relevant year 
and industry. Table 3.4, fourth row, reports the results of the fixed effect estimation. A 1% 
increase in the change in capital intensity is associated with a 0.06% increase in the weekly wage 
change (the difference between the post-displacement and the pre-displacement wage). The 
correlation between capital intensity changes and wage changes disappears when we control 
for both industry and time effects. All the regressions run with fixed effects include dummies 
to control for years since displacement (25 dummies: years since displacement go from one to 
five in each survey wave). The regressions also control for pre- and post-displacement industry 
change (64 dummies: eight pre-displacement industries combined with eight post-displacement 
industries).
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Sample Coefficient on average industry N obs.
equipment/labor ratio
CPS 1970-1992 0 .112*
(0.007)
0.154*
(0.005)
-0.052*
(0 .01 1)
0 .021
(0 .0 2 2 )
603483
CPS 1984-1992 0.168*
(0.008)
0.168*
(0.007)
-0.019
(0.050)
-0.037
(0.040)
226497
DWS 1984-1992 0.131*
(0 .012)
0.130*
(0 .0 1 1 )
0.090
(0.074)
-0.070
(0.067)
8629
DWS 1984-1992 FE 0.060*
(0.013)
0.092*
(0.013)
-0.322*
(0.059)
0.041
(0.082)
8029
Time effects No Yes No Yes
Industry effects No No Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered. Additional controls include a quartic in age, marital status, non- 
white and sex dummies, years of education. Industries considered are mining, durable, non-durable 
manufacturing, transport and utilities, wholesale trade, retail trade, finance, other services.
Table 3.4: OLS regression of log earnings on average industry equipment/labor ratio
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3 .3 .3  W ith in -in d u stry  D isp ersion  o f  W ages and  C apita l In ten sities
Regression 3.1 looks at the effect of average industry capital intensity on average wages but 
does not take into account within-industry dispersion in capital/labor ratios. To look at the 
effect of dispersion of within-industry capital intensity on within-industry wage dispersion I 
run the following regression:
kstd( log w)jt =  a  +  jstd(\og — )jt +  e#  (3.2)
std(log j  )jt is the employment-weighted log standard deviation of equipment/labor. This 
regression is weighted with weights proportional to the number of observations that are used 
to  calculate std(log j) j t  in each industry-year cell.
Table 3.5 shows the results of estimation of equation 3.2 using the March CPS and the 
DWS. The results that refer to the CPS, Table 3.5 row one and two, show that there is a 
positive association between capital intensity dispersion and wage dispersion within industries 
(column three). Wage and capital intensity dispersion axe negatively associated across industry 
(column two). This indicates that the industries with the higher wage dispersion are not the 
same as those with the higher capital intensity dispersion. Column four, however, shows that 
within industry, the increase in capital intensity dispersion is associated with the increase in 
wage dispersion.
The same pattern is present in DWS data. The results appear to be stronger but less 
precise than those obtained on CPS data. Table 3.5 row three shows the results of estimation 
of equation 3.2 on the five DWS waves. The correlation between within-industry capital
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Sample Coefficient on within-industry standard No. obs. 
deviation of equipment/labor ratios
CPS 1970-1992 -0.029* -0.043* 0.113* 0.064* 184
(0.016) (0.014) (0.041) (0.019)
CPS 1984-1992 -0.042* -0.046* 0.098* 0.048* 72
(0.025) (0.026) (0.028) (0.025)
DWS 1984-1992 0.196* 0.077* 0.479* 0.209 40
(0.052) (0.049) (0.142) (0.164)
Time effects No Yes No Yes
Industry effects No No Yes Yes
Notes: Weighted regression. Industries considered are mining, durable manufacturing, non-durable 
manufacturing, transport and utilities, wholesale trade, retail trade, finance, other services.
Table 3.5: OLS regression of the standard deviation of wages on the standard deviation of 
equipment/labor ratios
intensity dispersion and within-industry post-displacement wage dispersion is positive both 
across industries (column two) and within industries (column three). However, the trend of 
within-industry wage dispersion is mostly explained by time dummies and is only insignificantly 
positively associated with the concurrent increase in capital intensity dispersion.
3.4 A  T heoretical Interpretation
This section gives an interpretation of the evidence presented earlier. According to the ev­
idence, the increase in capital intensity dispersion across firms is related to wage dispersion 
across workers.
In this section, I present a model of residual wage inequality based on the increasing 
variance of firms’ capital intensities. Contrary to most previous models of residual wage 
inequality, this model is not based on the rising rewards of unobservable abilities. I suggest
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that the variance in the distribution of the demand for skills has increased over time. By 
the variance of the demand for skills I mean the variance of equipment capital investment 
across firms. In the next section, I will review some of the existing evidence that supports this 
hypothesis.
I build a search and matching model with identical workers and two types of jobs. Firms 
are ex-ante identical but ex post they differ in their optimal equipment capital investment. 
Firms sink their capital before searching for workers and the matching is random. As the 
relative price of equipment decreases over time, the dispersion of capital/labor ratios across 
firms increases. This force generates wage dispersion across identical workers as job changers 
and new entrants are matched to an increasing dispersed distribution of jobs.
The model is related to the literature on inter-industry wage differentials and in particular 
to the more recent theoretical developments that explain wage dispersion among equivalent 
workers in a search framework. In many of these models, firms are assumed to have differences 
in job-creation costs and wage dispersion is a consequence of cost dispersion. In both Pissarides 
(1994) and Acemoglu (2001), firms have different job-creation costs. The focus in Pissarides 
(1994) is on modelling on-the-job search. My model is close to Acemoglu (2001). His model 
focuses on the effect of unemployment insurance and minimum wages on the composition of 
jobs. Like in that model, I assume that firms are ex-ante identical but they set up different 
types of jobs ex post. Unlike Acemoglu (2001), I focus on the effect of a decreasing price of 
equipment capital on firms’ capital choices and on wage inequality.
This paper is also finked to the recent literature that looks directly at the changes in the 
variance of the distribution of demand of skills. Acemoglu (1999) builds a model where the 
increase in the relative supply of skills changes firms’ investment decisions. When there are 
few skilled workers and the productivity gap between the skilled and unskilled is limited, firms
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create one type of job (one single level of k) and pool across all types of workers. When the 
supply of skilled workers rises or their relative productivity increases, firms tend to differentiate 
the types of jobs they offer. Some firms invest in more capital than others and target only 
skilled workers. That model, like mine, implies an increasing variance in equipment/labor 
ratios across firms. In that model the increasing dispersion of capital is due to the increase in 
the relative supply or the relative productivity of skills. In my model, the increasing dispersion 
of capital is due to the decline in the relative price of equipment.
3 .4 .1  C hanges in  th e  D istr ib u tio n  o f  D em an d  and  Su p p ly  o f  Skills
The increase over time in the average demand for skills has been put forth in numerous papers. 
The most popular reasons are skill-biased technical change and trade with developing countries. 
However, skill-biased technical change or organizational changes at the firm level may have 
also increased the variance of the demand for skills. The clearest exposition of this thesis is in 
Acemoglu (1999). In the same paper Acemoglu provides a summary of some of the evidence on 
the increased variance in the composition of jobs. Such evidence comes from different sources.
Murnane and Levy (1996) and Cappelli and Wilk (1997) study the changes in firm re­
cruitment practices. Evidence of more selective practices and more accurate screening at 
recruitment level axe interpreted as signs of a changing composition of jobs. Sicherman (1991) 
provides evidence of better matching of firms and workers. Evidence from the PSID shows that 
more workers have the exact amount of education required for their job. The higher efficiency 
of the match could be due to a wider variety of jobs offered. Constructing industry-occupation 
cells and ranking them according to their average wage, Acemoglu (1999) shows that there is 
a shift of employment towards the lower and the higher ranking cells. Constantine and Neu- 
mark (1994) show that the distribution of on-the-job training has become more unequal. Since
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on-the-job training is correlated with high wages and capital investment, this evidence can be 
interpreted as a more unequal distribution of capital investment. Finally, Caselli (1999) shows 
some direct evidence of more unequal distribution of capital/labor ratios across industries. He 
reports a sharp increase in the capital/labor ratio difference between the 90th and 10th most 
capital-intensive industries.
3 .4 .2  T h e  M od el
In this model, there are identical workers matched to two different types of jobs. Firms are 
ex-ante identical but ex post they create two different types of jobs. Jobs differ in their 
job-creation costs (structure capital) and their equipment capital investment. Firms rent a 
site (structure capital) and immediately after renting a site, before meeting workers, they 
decide how much equipment capital to install. Equipment capital is irreversible, i.e. when the 
relationship ends, it becomes obsolete. Equipment capital is optimized but structure capital is 
fixed. Both types of capital are sunk when the vacancy is opened, expenditure on structure is 
incurred immediately, expenditure on equipment only when the match takes place. This avoids 
the ’’hold up” problem. The driving force behind the increasing dispersion of equipment/labor 
ratios across firms is the decline in the relative price of equipment capital. As the cost of 
equipment capital decreases, ’’good” firms which use a lot of equipment capital increase their 
optimal capital choice more than ’’bad” firms. Since labor markets are not competitive and 
rents are split by Nash bargaining, the increasing dispersion of capital intensities implies an 
increasing dispersion of wages across identical workers.
The economy is constituted of a mass 1 of risk neutral workers and a larger mass of risk 
neutral firms. The production technology is:
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Y = (Yf + -yYf)i
where Y& and Yg are the intermediate inputs. Since the intermediate inputs are sold in com­
petitive markets their prices are:
Pb =  Y r ' Y 1-? and p3 = - y Y ^ Y 1^
Firms can be inactive, vacant or filled. Ex-ante identical firms can choose either one of the two 
types of intermediate goods (or jobs), the good job g or the bad job 6 . There is free entry of 
firms: a t every point in time, some inactive firms open a vacancy renting a site at price cg if it 
is a ’’good” firm and c& if it is a ’’bad” firm. After opening a vacancy and before meeting the 
workers, firms have to make their irreversible capital choices kg and kb. The cost of installing 
equipment capital is incurred only at matching. Production takes place in the form of a match 
one firm-one worker. A worker matched with a firm with capital kj with j  = g,b produces:
y j{k,l) = k ) - a (3.3)
Matching is random. Workers have the probability (j) of matching with a ’’good” firm and 
(1  — <j>) of matching with a bad firm. (f> =  ^  is the proportion of vacant ’’good” firms among all 
vacancies. As in the basic search and matching models, vacant firms meet unemployed workers 
at the rate q(0), unemployed workers meet vacant firms at the rate 6q{6) where 6 =  -  is market
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tightness. Both firms and workers discount the future at rate r. Quits into unemployment to 
look for another job take place at rate A. The rate of quits into unemployment is exogenous.
In a competitive labor market, ’’good” jobs and ”bad” jobs cannot coexist as workers are
identical. In a search model, ’’good” and ’’bad” jobs can co-exist. Since capital costs are sunk
before workers are met, capital remains idle until a match is formed. In equilibrium, ’’good” 
jobs will have to recover the bigger costs incurred at the beginning with higher flow profits. 
I solve the model in steady state only and I present the relevant Bellman equations. The 
discounted value of being unemployed is :
rU =  0q(0)[4>E(kg) +  (1 -  <f>)E(kb) -  U] (3.4)
An unemployed worker meets a good firm with probability 0q(6)<f> where 0q(0) is the flow 
probability of meeting a vacant firm and (f> is the proportion of good firms among the vacancies. 
When the match takes place and both the worker and the firm accept the job, the worker gains 
E(kg) or E(kb) and he loses U. For simplicity’s sake, I assume there are no unemployment 
benefits. The value of being employed in a good firm E(kg) is:
rE(k,)  = w(kg) - \ ( E ( k g) - U )  (3.5)
The value of being employed in a bad firm is:
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rE(kb) =  w(kb) -  A(E(kb) -  U) (3.6)
where w(kj) is the wage rate for a worker in firm j  = g,b and A is the exogenous rate of quits. 
The value of a vacant firm V (kj) for j  = g,b is:
rV(kj)  =  q m j f r j )  -  Ckj -  V(kj)} (3.7)
where q(0) is the flow probability of meeting an unemployed worker. When the match occurs 
and both the firm and the worker do not turn it down, the firm gains the value of a  filled firm 
J (k j ), incurs in the cost of equipment capital Ckj  and loses V(kj).  The value of a firm j  =  g,b 
matched with a worker is:
rJ(kj)  =  Pjk)~a -  w{kj) -  X[J(kj) -  V(kj)] (3.8)
When jobs are destroyed at the exogenous rate A, firms exit the market. The zero profit 
condition for a firm j  = g,b is:
V{kj ) = cj  (3.9)
as the cost of renting a site is cj. Notice that ’’good” and ’’bad” firms face exogenously different
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rental costs Cj. The crucial ingredient of this model, as described above, is that firms are 
different in their capital mix. The driving force of this model is the declining relative cost of 
equipment capital. The declining cost of equipment capital C  favors ’’good” firms which have 
a high ratio equipment/structure and makes them increase their capital choice kg. As long 
as there are search frictions, there will be rents in the labor market. Rents will be split with 
Nash bargaining. Wages in good firms w(kg) will be set such that:
(1 -  0)(E(kg) - V )  = p(J(kg) -  V{kg)) (3.10)
in bad firms:
(1 -  P)(E(kb) - U )  = 0(J(kb) -  V(kb)) (3.11)
Equipment capital does not appear in the sharing equation as it is sunk at the moment of 
bargaining and if the workers leave the relationship, equipment capital has to be scrapped. 
Unemployment in steady state will be given by:
u = A +  0q(0)
(3.12)
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з .4 .3  T h e  S tea d y  S ta te  E quilibrium
The equilibrium is given by capital choices kg and kb, prices pg and Pb, unemployment rate
и, proportion of good firms <f> in the vacancy pool, market tightness ft and wages w (kg) and 
w (kb) such that:
1) for all kj : kj =  argmaxfc/ V(kj)  for j  =  g, b.
2) for all kj, kj satisfies V(kj)  =  Cj for j  = g,b.
3) all value functions J(k j) ,V (kj) , U, E (k j) are satisfied for j  =  g, b.
4) u  satisfies steady state equation 3.12.
5) wages are given by 3.10 and 3.11.
In equilibrium, both "good” and ’’bad” jobs meet workers at the same rate and workers 
accept both types of vacancies. Therefore Yb =  (1 — u)<j)k\~a and Yg =  (1 — u )(l — <j>)kg~a. 
Prices are given by:
pg = ((1 -  4>Yk£-a)p +  (3.13)
n  =  ((i -  (3.14)
Wages are set from 3.10, substituting 3.5, 3.8:
w(kj) = /3(pjkj~a -  rcj) +  (1 -  /?) rU  (3.15)
and from 3.10, 3.8 and 3.9:
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rl> = +  Ck9) +  Q  + Ckb)] (3.16)
The optimal capacity kj in equilibrium comes from V'(kj) =  0 where V(kj) is obtained 
using 3.7, 3.8 and 3.15. The two equations that determine capital choice when firms take both 
prices and wages for given are therefore:
V \ k g) = Q ( 0 )(r +  A)(r +  g(0)) \pg(l -  a)kQa -  C\ =  0 (3.17)
and
v ’^ ) = ( r + A ) (r ; g W ) M 1 -  -  c i = o (3.i8)
In these two equations, the first term indicates the marginal benefit of one more unit of 
capital while the second term indicates the marginal cost. The crucial result of the model 
comes from the two equations above. When the relative price of equipment capital C  falls, 
equipment investment of good firms kg grows more than kb. Firms with higher creation costs 
Cj command higher output prices pj. Since in equilibrium p g > pb, from equations 3.18 and 
3.17 we obtain that kg > kb, and 6(k^ kb) > o.
The equilibrium in the ”good” job market and in the ’’bad” job market is given at the 
crossing of the ’’job creation curve” JCj  (which is obtained combining equation 3.7, 3.8 and 
3.9) and the wage equation 3.15 in each market. We have two equilibrium loci, one where the
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’’job creation curve” JCg meets the wage setting curve w(kg) (equation 3.15) and the other 
where JCb meets w(kb). The two equilibrium loci that together with 3.17 and 3.18 (with 3.13 
and 3.16 substituted in) define the equilibrium 0 and <j> are:
(1 -  0)(pjk)-a -  rU) =  [r ( r + ^ )+ A ) -  M c j  +  (r +  A)C% (3.19)
for j  =  6, g.
This model is particularly appealing as it gives a formula for within-group wage inequality 
that can be tested with the data used in the empirical part. Within-group wage inequality 
(using 3.15 and 3.19 for j  = b,g) in this model is given by:
w(kg) -  w(kb) =  (r  +  +  (r +  A)C(kg -  kb) (3.20)
Q \y )
In this equation, the optimal capacity kj comes from equations 3.17 and 3.18 and (3 = \-  Wage 
differences across identical workers are related to the differences in structure costs cg — cb, and 
capital investment kg — kb. They are also related to the job changing rate A and to the average 
duration of a vacancy q(0).
3 .4 .4  B ack  o f  th e  E nvelope C alcu lation
To have an idea of the importance of capital/labor ratios in explaining increasing wage differ­
entials, I calibrate equation 3.20. I assume some values for the parameters of equation 3.20 
over the period 1970-1992 : interest rate r  =  0.06, the job changing rate A =  0.2. As an esti­
mate of the matching function q(fl) for the US, I take the values suggested in Blanchard and
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Diamond (1989): q(tf) =  (^)a with a  =  0.4. The unemployment to  vacancy ratio J  is strongly 
anti-cyclical but on average, during the period 1970-1992, J  =  2.5. For C(kg — kb) I take the 
90-10 log differential of equipment/labor ratios across firms calculated on Compustat data; 
this value increased by 0.32 log points over the period. For (cg — Cb) I take the 90-10 log differ­
ential of structure/labor ratios across firms. This value increased by 0.10 log points over the 
period. Calibration of equation 3.20 implies that within-group wage inequality, w(kg) — w(kb) 
(90-10 log differential of the residual distribution), has increased by roughly 0.08 log points 
over the period 1970-1992 due to the increasing dispersion of capital/labor ratios across firms. 
Calculations from the March CPS show that the actual 90-10 log differential of within-group 
wage inequality increased by 0.26 log points from 1970 to 1992 in the US. This means that the
mechanism that acts through the increasing dispersion of firm capital/labor ratios can account
for a little less than one third of the total increase in within-group wage inequality.
A caveat regarding this rough calibration is the fact that the results are very sensitive to 
the assumptions about capital. If capital is assumed to be a creation cost as in Acemoglu 
(2001), within-group wage inequality is given by:
(i \ a  \ (r + \)r (kg -  kb) /001>kw(kg) -  w(kb) = ---------^ -------  (3.21)
where now kj is total capital i.e. equipment plus structure. Calculation on Compustat shows 
that the 90-10 log differential of total capital/labor ratios increased by 0.28 log points from 
1970 to 1992. Calibration of equation 3.21 shows that the increase in dispersion of capital/labor 
ratios can explain only about 1/30 of the total increase in wage inequality.
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3.5 C onclusions
In this paper I document the increasing cross-firm dispersion of equipment capital/labor ratios 
in the US labor market using Compustat data. The increase takes place both between and 
within industries. I match Compustat data on equipment capital intensity to CPS and DWS 
data on individual wages at the industry-year level. A 1% percent increase in industry capital 
intensity is associated with a 0.11% increase in the average weekly wage in the CPS and 
to a 0.13% increase in the Displaced Workers Survey. More importantly for the purpose of 
this paper, the increase in the capital intensity variance across firms appears to be positively 
associated with the increasing wage variance across workers. The correlation holds within 
industries even after controlling for time effects.
To explain these empirical regularities, I adopt a search and matching model where identical 
workers are matched to two types of firms. Firms differ in their optimal composition of 
capital between equipment and structure. In response to the decline in the relative price 
of equipment capital, the distribution of capital/labor ratios becomes more dispersed across 
firms. Residual wage inequality increases as identical workers are randomly matched to an 
increasingly dispersed distribution of capital/labor ratios. Simple calibration of the model 
indicates that the dispersion of capital/labor ratios can account for up to one third of the 
total increase in within-group wage inequality.
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Chapter 4
Earnings Instability of Job Stayers 
and Job Changers
4.1 Introduction
Many studies have written about the rising wage inequality in the US and the UK. Since the 
work of Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) many other papers have focussed on another aspect of 
the widening wage distribution: the growth of earnings instability or the increasing variance 
of the transitory component of earnings. Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) have documented the 
large growth of earnings instability in the US since the end of the ‘70s and have claimed that 
the increase in the variance of the transitory component of earnings has been an important 
contributor to the recent rise in overall earnings inequality.
Earnings instability is related to within-group wage inequality. The rising returns to ed­
ucation and experience (between-group inequality) must reflect an increase in the variance of 
the permanent component of earnings, as education and experience are permanent individual 
characteristics. The increase in within-group (or residual) wage inequality, however, could be
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due to either increased returns to unobserved persistent abilities or a rise in the transitory 
year-to-year earnings variance. An increase in the returns to unobserved ability implies a 
permanent effect on earnings inequality, as innate ability is considered a permanent individ­
ual characteristic. An increase in year-to-year earnings variance has only temporary welfare 
consequences.
The distinction between permanent earnings inequality and transitory earnings instability 
is important because it will inform on the causes of the increase in wage inequality. If the cross- 
sectional increase in inequality is associated with an increase in the permanent component of 
individual earnings, then the causes of inequality must be something that permanently increase 
the relative earnings of the highly paid. If the association is mainly with earnings instability, 
then the causes of inequality are something that increase individual earnings volatility but 
nobody earns systematically more. The implications for individual long-term welfare of an 
increase in transitory instability are much less serious than an increase in the variance of the 
permanent component of earnings.
This paper documents the different effect on job stayers and job changers of the increasing 
variance of transitory wage shocks. In the empirical part, I decompose individual wages in their 
permanent and transitory component and study the different pattern of earnings instability 
for job stayers and job changers. In the theoretical part, I explain the different experience of 
job stayers and job changers in the framework of a standard search and matching model with 
on-the-job search.
After the initial attempt of Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994), nobody else in the earnings 
instability literature has looked at the differences between job stayers and job changers. In 
the empirical part of this paper, I decompose the rise in wage inequality into a permanent 
and a transitory part. I first use the full PSID sample and confirm the common result in
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the literature about the rise in earnings instability. I then consider separately a balanced 
sample of job stayers and a balanced sample of job changers. I find that job stayers are hardly 
affected by any significant rise in earnings instability. The rise in the transitory variance of 
earnings is mostly due to job changers. To check the robustness of the results, I provide some 
comparisons using different definitions of job stayer and job changer and different models of 
transitory/permanent decomposition.
The empirical part of this paper is related to the many studies that, after Gottschalk and 
Moffitt (1994), have focussed on evaluating the relative contribution of the permanent and 
transitory part of earnings to the increase in the total variance of earnings. The literature 
has followed two complementary approaches. Gottschalk and Moffitt (1995 and 2002), Haider
(2001), Baker and Solon (2003) and Dickens (2000) have modelled the persistent and transitory 
components of earnings in different countries. Buchinsky and Hunt (1996) and Gittleman 
and Joyce (1996) have looked at year-to-year mobility rates across quantiles of the earnings 
distribution. The results of the literature on the US indicate an equal increase in the variance 
of the permanent (observed and unobserved skills) and transitory components (Gottschalk and 
Moffitt 1994; Katz and Autor 1999; Haider 2001). Consistent with that, mobility rates are 
stable or slightly declining over time.1 Results on the UK indicate a more pronounced increase 
in the variance of the permanent component and declining mobility rates (Dickens 2000). In 
the course of the empirical exercise I will provide some comparisons of my results with the 
previous US literature.
buchinsky and Hunt find declining mobility rates but they use the NLSY and therefore only one cohort 
of young workers. The results axe not entirely comparable with those obtained on the PSID (Gottschalk and 
Moffitt 1994) or the March-March matched CPS files (Gittleman and Joyce 1996).
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4 .1 .1  M otiva tion
Differences in earnings instability across stayers and changers may inform on the sources 
of the increase in the transitory component of earnings. The distinction between changers 
and stayers is important because they have different earnings dynamics. Different events are 
associated with the permanent and transitory component of earnings. Promotions within 
the job typically lead to permanent gains. Displacement has a permanent and a transitory 
component. After the initial wage loss, displaced workers gradually catch up over time until 
they reach a permanently lower wage level (Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan 1993). Temporary 
layoffs, overtime and performance pay typically lead to transitory variations. If the increased 
wage volatility affects only job changers, this means that the sources of volatility are to be 
found in between-job changes. If job stayers do not experience an increased wage volatility, 
this may suggest that the increase in inequality among job stayers is of a permanent nature 
and stayers are insulated from the increasing variance of transitory wage shocks.
A recent paper looks at transitory shocks to the wages of job stayers from the point of view 
of the provision of insurance within the firm. Using an Italian employer-employee matched 
dataset, Guiso, Pistaferri and Schivardi (2002) find that job stayers are well insulated from 
transitory shocks to the firm profits. They allow workers’ wages to respond to both permanent 
and transitory shocks to the firm and find that firms provide full insurance to transitory shocks 
and partial insurance to permanent shocks. Their results are obviously valid only for stayers. 
My results on PSID data seem to be consistent with theirs.
The distinction between different patterns of instability for changers and stayers is also 
relevant in the context of different theories of wage inequality and unemployment. One of the 
recent theories of unemployment refer explicitly to the evidence on rising earnings instability.
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This theory has clear implications about earnings instability of job stayers and job changers 
that have not been verified with the empirical evidence. The increase in ’’turbulence” in 
the labor market is at the basis of the Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) theory of the different 
evolution of unemployment in the US and EU. The only evidence of increased ” turbulence” 
in the labor market is the evidence of rising earnings instability reported in Gottschalk and 
Moffitt (1994). Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) model instability in the labor market as the 
probability of skill depreciation for workers who separate from an employment relationship. In 
their view, an increase in turbulence is equivalent to an increase in the average skill depreciation 
after job loss. They claim that the increase in European unemployment is a consequence of the 
interaction of more turbulence and generous unemployment benefits. The rise in turbulence 
increases the fraction of unemployed workers entitled to high unemployment benefits, this 
raises the reservation wage and causes unemployment. The results in Ljungqvist and Sargent 
(1998) depend on the assumption that the increase in earnings instability is only limited to 
involuntary layoffs. Den Haan, Haefke and Ramey (2002) show that the same mechanism of 
Ljungqvist and Sargent, applied to a matching model, does not work if voluntary quits axe 
subject to the same probability of skill loss.
In the wage inequality literature, the causes of the increase in earnings instability are 
not yet well understood. The evidence on the rising variance of the temporary component 
of earnings is at odds with models of within-group wage inequality that rely exclusively on 
ex-ante differences in unobserved permanent ability. If within-group wage inequality were 
due only to the rising returns to unobserved ability, this would be reflected only in the rise 
of the permanent variance of individual earnings with no effect on the transitory variance. 
Violante (2002) builds a model of residual wage inequality with the purpose of reconciling the 
theory with the evidence that increasing residual wage inequality reflects increased earnings
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instability. Unlike previous models of residual wage inequality, his model is not based on ex- 
ante differences in ability. In his model the increase in residual wage inequality (and earnings 
instability) is due to an acceleration in technical change that reduces workers’ capacity to 
transfer skills from old to new machines. In this model the increase in earnings instability is 
common across stayers and changers. The evidence presented in this paper regarding earnings 
instability of job stayers and job changers sheds further light on the possible sources of the 
increase in instability.
4 .1 .2  O verview  o f  th e  T h eory
In the theoretical part of this paper I illustrate the mechanism that may insulate job stayers 
from the increase in earnings instability. I use a search and matching model with on-the-job 
search by Pissarides (2000). Although the original model was intended to study unemployment, 
I use it to describe differences in transitory wage inequality across stayers and changers in the 
face of an increase in the overall variance of transitory shocks. The model has two appealing 
properties: the first is that individuals are ex-ante identical and wages are affected only by 
transitory shocks and not by permanent differences across individuals, the second is that 
wages of job stayers and job changers are different. These two characteristics make the model 
appropriate to study the distribution of the transitory component of wages separately across 
stayers and changers when the overall distribution of the transitory shocks is subject to a 
mean-preserving spread. This model has nothing to say about the variance of the permanent 
component of earnings.
In the model, identical individuals are matched to jobs with different transitory produc­
tivities. In every instant each job is hit at the Poisson rate A by a transitory productivity 
shock x  G(x). This shock is transitory since it arrives at the Poisson rate A and every
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x ' is independent from the previous x. Wages are affected by the transitory shock because 
they are renegotiated after the realization of the shock. In a search and matching model with 
on-the-job search, both the unemployed and part of the employed search for new jobs. Wages 
of on-the-job seekers and non-seekers are different since there is perfect information and on- 
the-job seekers must compensate the firm in anticipation of the likely event of job change. 
On-the-job seekers are job changers with a probability given by the matching function. All 
non-seekers and those seekers who do not find a new match are job stayers.
A mean-preserving spread of the distribution G(x) formalizes an increase in the variance 
of the transitory component of wages, i.e. the increase in overall earnings instability. The 
mean-preserving spread has the effect of increasing the range of productivities over which 
workers seek on the job, and reducing the range of productivities over which workers decide 
not to seek and stay in the same job. As a result, the variance of wages across job changers 
is increased after the mean-preserving spread. However, the effect on the variance across job 
stayers is ambiguous. The ambiguity for job stayers comes from the fact that although the 
total proportion of employed job stayers is reduced, their composition between non-seekers 
and seekers who did not find a job may change. While non-seekers have a lower wage variance 
after the mean-preserving spread, job seekers have a higher variance.
The model illustrates the evidence shown in the empirical part of the paper that indicates 
that the increase in earnings instability affects changers rather than stayers. This model is 
based on the increase in the number of job seekers following a mean-preserving spread of 
the distribution of transitory productivity shocks. This is of course only one of the possible 
explanations of the difference between stayers and changers in terms of wage instability, the 
other being internal labor markets that protect the wages of ’’insiders” from transitory shocks.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 I describe the data and the sample
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of job stayers and job changers. Section 3 illustrates the statistical model and the estimation 
technique. In section 4 I discuss the results. Section 5 presents a simple model to interpret 
the evidence and section 6 provides the conclusion.
4.2 W age D ata o f Job Stayers and Job Changers
The objective of the empirical exercise is to quantify the relative importance of permanent and 
transitory shocks to earnings of job stayers and job changers. In particular the aim is to verify 
whether the increase in earnings instability affects stayers and changers in the same fashion. 
To do so I proceed in three steps. First, I split the full sample of individuals into job stayers 
and job changers. Second, I fit a statistical model of the permanent and transitory component 
of earnings to the full sample of individuals, disregarding the difference between job stayers 
and job changers. Third, I fit the same model separately on a sample of job stayers and on a 
sample of job changers. I compare the results obtained on job stayers and on job changers to 
the results obtained on the full sample.
4 .2 .1  Sam ple S election
The data source is the PSID, a longitudinal survey which follows a sample of US households. 
Approximately 5,000 households were interviewed in the initial year of the survey, including 
a core sample of about 3,000 households and a supplementary low-income (SEO) sample of 
around 2,000 households. At the interview date each year, the head of household is asked 
about a n n u a l  labor earnings and hours worked in the previous year. I use data from 1970 to 
1992. The earnings information therefore applies to years 1969 to 1991. I restrict the sample 
to male heads of household between the age of 20 and 59 who are not students or self employed 
at the time of the survey. To control for outliers, I exclude those who worked less than 520
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hours and those who worked more than 5096 hours. I also exclude those whose earnings are 
top coded and those whose nominal wage is less than half the national minimum wage. The 
SEO sample is excluded. This selection process gives a final sample of 37,699 individual/year 
observations. In the course of this paper, I use log real hourly wages. The hourly wage is 
defined as the ratio of annual labor earnings to hours of work deflated by the CPI. The real 
wage is expressed in terms of 1991 dollars.
4 .2 .2  D efin itio n  o f  Stayers and  C hangers
Identifying a job separation in the PSID is a difficult task since the survey does not contain 
employers’ codes. Typically, in addition to the question on the ”current employment status”, 
two questions are used: one asking the number of "months with the current employer”, the 
other asking the "reason for separation from previous employer” . I identify a separation on 
the basis of the information on tenure with the current employer. In the section where I check 
the robustness of my results, I also use a definition of job change on the basis of the ’’reason 
for separation” question.
The question regarding tenure in the PSID underwent numerous changes in the course of 
twenty years.2 From 1970 to 1975 the question regarding tenure with the current employer is 
expressed in years brackets. In 1976-77 and between 1981 and 1992 tenure with the current 
employer is expressed in months. In 1978 the question was asked only to those under age 45. In 
1979 and 1980 the information regarding tenure is missing. Furthermore, in 1984 there was a 
change in the tenure question. Until 1983 workers were asked how long they had been working 
for the present employer. After 1983 the question asked the total time they had been working 
for the current employer, implying that workers with more than one spell of employment with
2 See the Appendix in Polsky (1999) for the exact wording of the question over time.
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the same employer would respond differently before and after 1983. According to Gottschalk 
and Moffitt (1999), this change in the question does not affect their results on job separations.
A job changer is everybody with less than one year of tenure before 1976. The change in 
the measurement of tenure in 1976 requires a change in the definition of job changers. After 
1976 a job changer is defined if ’’months with current employer” at the time of the interview 
is less than twelve. All individuals who are unemployed in the current year are classified as 
job changers.
A job stayer is the residual definition. Anybody with recorded job tenure of more than one 
year before 1976 is a job stayer. After 1976 a job changer is defined if ’’months with current 
employer” at the time of the interview is more than twelve. A job stayer is required to be 
employed in the current year.
It must be made clear that identifying the effects of job change on earnings in the PSID 
is complicated by the fact that earnings are measured on an annual basis. The change in 
earnings for job changers cannot be exactly measured since the earnings during the year of the 
job change are a mixture of the earnings from the old and the new job. Although this issue is 
obviously very important in a cross-sectional study of the effects of job change on earnings, it 
should be less relevant in a time series study that compares the effects over time.
In Figure 4-1 in the Appendix, I plot the job changers and the job stayers as a proportion 
of the total sample. The information regarding tenure is missing in 1978, 1979 and 1980, 
therefore job changers and job stayers are not defined in those years. The proportion of job 
changers (unemployed and those with less than 12 month of tenure) is rather stable around 
18% of the sample during the course of the panel.
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4 .2 .3  T h e  Sam ples o f  Job  Stayers and  Job  C hangers
To identify the effect of shocks on job stayers I build two balanced samples of stayers at the 
beginning and at the end of the period. I divide the PSID in two periods: 1970-1980 and 
1981-1992. Job stayers are defined over the periods 1970-1977 and 1981-1992 since there is no 
information on tenure from 1978 to 1980. A stayer is anybody who satisfies the definition of 
stayer for all years in the period 1970-1977 or 1981-1992. There are 412 stayers in the years 
1970-1977 and 359 stayers in the years 1981-1992.
The choice of a balanced sample is due to the fact that the identification of the permanent 
and transitory component of income requires the use of longitudinal data. To identify the 
effects of a permanent or a transitory wage shock on job stayers we must consider stayers 
throughout 1970-1977 and throughout 1981-1992. The choice of two separate balanced samples 
is due to sample size considerations and to the fact that the information on job tenure is 
interrupted between 1978 and 1980.
The same reasoning applies to job changers. I construct two balanced samples of job 
changers between 1970-1977 and between 1981-1992. A changer in each of the two balanced 
samples is anybody who has positive hourly wages in each year and has been classified as a job 
changer at least once during that period. There are 269 job changers in the period 1970-1977 
and 321 job changers in the period 1981-1992.
4 .2 .4  D escr ip tiv e  S ta tistics
Table 4.1 in the Appendix shows the descriptive statistics for the full sample of individuals, 
the changers in each year t, the stayers in each year t and the two balanced samples of stayers 
and changers in 1970-1977 and 1981-1992. The cross-sectional log wage variance of the full 
sample increases by around 10 points between 1970 and 1992. The increase is concentrated
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in the 1980s and the log variance reaches its peak in 1992, the last year of the sample. These 
numbers and the timing of the increase are broadly consistent with the results reported in 
Katz and Autor (1999) on the CPS.
The different pattern of the log variance of wages of job stayers and job changers are shown 
in Figure 4 - 2  in the Appendix. In Figure 4 - 2 ,  I plot the variance of log real hourly wages for 
the whole sample, the stayers and the changers. The log wage variance across stayers goes 
from 0 . 1 8  in 1 9 7 0  to 0 . 2 6  in 1 9 9 2 .  The log wage variance across changers goes from 0 . 2 2  in 
1 9 7 0  to 0 . 3 4  in 1 9 9 2 .  The timing of the increase is common across stayers and c h a n g e r s ,  the 
extent of the increase is different: job stayers see an increase in the log variance of wages of 
around 8  points from 1 9 7 0  to 1 9 9 2 ,  job changers an increase of 1 2  points.
Changers and stayers also differ across observable characteristics such as age and education 
(not reported in Table 4.1). Stayers are on average older and more educated than changers. 
The mean age across stayers is 37.7 years and the percentage of stayers with some college is 
24.4%. The mean age across changers is 32.8 years, the percentage of changers with some 
college is 19.9%. These differences probably reflect the fact that the definition of changers also 
includes the unemployed.
Finally the last four columns of Table 4.1 in the Appendix show the descriptive statistics 
of the two balanced panels of job changers and of job stayers. In the following two paragraphs, 
I compare the wage statistics of the balanced samples of job stayers (changers) to the sample 
of all job stayers (changers). I claim that the balanced samples of stayers (changers) are 
sufficiently s i m i l a r  to the full samples of job stayers (changers).
The two balanced panels of stayers are a restricted sample of individuals who have tenure 
of more than 12 months in all years from 1970 to 1977 and from 1981 to 1992. There are 412 
stayers in the years 1970-1977 and 359 stayers in the years 1981-1992. The log wage variance
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across the 412 stayers of the balanced panel goes from 0.134 in 1970 to 0.149 in 1977. The log 
wage variance in the sample of all stayers in t goes form 0.187 in 1970 to 0.202 in 1977. The log 
variance of wages in the balanced sample of stayers is unsurprisingly lower than in the sample 
of all stayers, the extent of the increase is similar. The same comparison can be made between 
the 359 job stayers of the balanced panel 1981-1992 and the full sample of stayers in the same 
period. The log wage variance across the full sample of stayers goes form 0.198 in 1981 to 
0.260 in 1992. The log wage variance across the 359 stayers of the balanced panel 1981-1992 
goes from 0.144 in 1981 to 0.155 in 1992. The lowest and the highest wage variance in the 
balanced sample of stayers is 0.136 in 1982 and 0.165 in 1990. The variance of log wages across 
the 359 stayers in the balanced sample is lower than in the full sample. Although the extent 
of the increase in the log variance of wages is also lower than in the full sample of stayers, it 
is still a sizeable 3 log points (or about 21%) from the value of 0.136 in 1982 to 0.165 in 1990.
The two balanced samples of job changers include those individuals who have been classified 
as job changers at least once in the period 1970-1977 or 1981-1992. There are 269 job changers 
in the years 1970-1977 and 321 job changers in the years 1981-1992. The log wage variance 
across the 269 job changers in the balanced sample goes from 0.187 in 1970 to 0.188 in 1977. 
The log wage variance across the full sample of changers goes form 0.226 in 1970 to 0.220 in 
1977. Like in the case of job stayers, the wage variance in the balanced sample is lower than in 
the full sample of changers. However, the pattern of the log wage variance is similarly stable 
during the period 1970-1977 in both samples. In the period 1981-1992, the log wage variance 
across the 321 job changers of the balanced sample increases from 0.177 in 1981 to 0.236 in 
1992 or 33%. Similarly the log wage variance in the full sample of changers increases by 28%, 
from 0.270 in 1970 to 0.346 in 1992.
I will base my conclusions on earnings instability of stayers on the results obtained on
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the 412 stayers in the balanced panel 1970-1977 and on the 359 stayers in the balanced panel 
1981-1992. The same reasoning applies to job changers. The results on earnings instability of 
job changers are based on the balanced samples of 269 job changers in 1970-1977 and of 312 
job changers in 1981-1992. The balanced panels of stayers (changers) are two very selected 
samples of individuals. However I argue that they still maintain a sufficient similarity with the 
broader sample of stayers (changers) and that this selection is necessary to assess the effect of 
permanent and transitory shocks to wages of job stayers and job changers.
4.3 S tatistical M odel
I start by running the following first-stage regression:
wn = a t -1- X itPt +  yit (4.1)
wn denotes the log hourly wage for individual i at time t. a t is a set of year dummies 
to control for fluctuations in aggregate wages. Xu  contains a quadratic in experience. The 
parameter vector (3t is allowed to change by year since the returns to experience have increased 
during the sample period, yu is the residual from which I identify the permanent and transitory 
component.
I estimate one of the most popular models of permanent/transitory variance decomposition. 
This model has been estimated by Gottshalk and Moffitt (1995 and 2002) on PSID data and by 
Dickens (2000) on UK data. The model allows for an individual effect fj,it and for a transitory 
shock vu. The two components are orthogonal to each other and are allowed to vary by time 
with the respective loading factors (j>t and 7T*:
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Vit =  +  7 HVit ( 4 . 2 )
liit is a Random Walk fiit = fiit_x +  rjit with initial variance and rjit iid(0, <rj).3 The
individual effect is modelled as a Random Walk to allow for non-stationarity of wages. The 
individual effect will also capture individual permanent characteristics such as ” ability” and 
education. The time-varying loading factor <f)t will reflect the c h a n g i n g  market returns to edu­
cation and unobserved skills, vu is an AR(1) process: vu =  pvu-i +  eu where tu *** *id{0, crj) 
is white noise. The AR(1) process is the most appropriate model of the autocovariance struc­
ture of wages which shows a large drop at the first lag and then a decline at a geometric rate.4 
vu will also incorporate measurement error in wages, but this fact should not be of immediate 
concern unless the importance of measurement error were changing over time.
The entries of the theoretical covariance matrix are:
var(yit) =  +  to%) +  7if ^
cov(yiu yu-8) =  +  (* -  «)<*?] +  n n - a f f  jZTjp
Since I am mostly interested in the long run changes in earnings instability, I smooth the time 
d u m m i e s  0t , Trt to third order polynomials in time:
3/xit could be made vary by age to reflect life-cycle effects in the wage variance. For simplicity purposes I 
prefer this specification.
4 The sample covariance structure of wages in the PSID has been studied by many in the literature. The 
covariance structure of wages in this sample is similar to the one obtained by Gottshalk and Moffitt (1995) and 
Haider (2001) and is available upon request.
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3 3
<j>t =  1 +  ^ 2 <f>j(t -  1 )j  and 7rt =  1 +  7Tj(t -  1 )j
j=i j —l
I estimate this model both on the full unbalanced panel of individuals and separately on the 
two balanced panels of job stayers and job changers.
4.3.1 Estim ation
I fit the sample covariance structure of log (residual) hourly wages to the covariance structure 
implied by model 4.2 using a minimum distance estimator. The basic unit of data for each 
individual is the vector of estimated mean-zero residuals from regression 4.1:
Vi =
(  ^  \  
y n
\  ViT j
(4.3)
where T  is the total length of the panel. For the full sample panel of individuals T  = 23. 
The full sample of individuals constitutes an unbalanced panel therefore some entries of the 
vector 4.3 are missing for some individuals in some years.
The empirical covariance matrix of log residual wages is given by: C  =  > where
n is the number of individuals. Since the panel is unbalanced, not all individuals contribute 
to each entry of C. To keep this into account, I define for each individual i a vector di of 
dimension (T x 1) of indicator variables. Each indicator variable is equal 1 if yn is non missing 
and 0 otherwise. I  =  2 ”=1 did{ is the denominator of C.
150
Chapter 4. Earnings Instability of Job Stayers and Job Changers
In the paper I estimate a model of C. Let m  be the vector of the distinct elements of C  
which contains T (T  +  l) /2  elements. To estimate the model in equation 4.2 I minimize:
mm[m — — f(b)]
where A  is the identity matrix and f(b) is the theoretical covariance matrix implied by model
4.2. Under some general conditions the estimator b has asymptotic distribution y/N(b — b ) ~  
N ( 0, fl). The variance matrix f2 =  (G,G)~1G,VG(G'G)~1 can be estimated with the empirical 
counterpart of the gradient matrix G — and of V  = [m — f(b)][m — f(b)]'.
I estimate the model 4.2 on the full sample and then separately on the two balanced panels 
of stayers and changers. Stayers and changers are defined in the periods 1970-1977 and 1981- 
1992. Therefore T=8 for the period between 1970 and 1977 and T=12 for the period between 
1981 and 1992. The two panels of stayers and changers are balanced therefore in this case the 
covariance matrix is simply C  =  .
4 .4  R esults
Table 4.2 shows the results of estimating model 4.2 on the full unbalanced sample of individuals 
from 1970 to 1992. Figure 4-3 shows the log variance of the residuals of the first-stage equation
4.1 and the fit of the model. The results of the variance decomposition are plotted in Figure 
4-4. The largest component is the permanent component but the relative contribution of 
the two components changes over time. The permanent component seems to decline in the 
1970s in correspondence with the declining education premium. Consistent with the previous 
literature on the PSID, the rise in the permanent component accounts for most of the rising 
wage inequality in the 1980s. The transitory component increases first in the 1970s and again
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in the 1990s. The results on the transitory component of earnings are also in line with most 
of the literature on PSID data. Haider (2001) uses PSID data from 1967-1991 and finds an 
increasing transitory component in the 1970s and flat transitory component in the 1980s. 
Gottschalk and Moffitt (2002) use PSID data from 1970-1995 and find that the transitory 
component rises in the late 1980s. Heathcote et al. (2003) use PSID data from 1967-1995 and 
find a rising transitory component in the 1970s and in the 1990s, a flat transitory component 
in the 1980s.
In Table 4 .3 ,1 show the results of model 4.2 estimated on the two balanced panels of stayers. 
In Figure 4-5 I group together the pictures of the model fit and of the variance decomposition 
for both sample of stayers. On the top part of Figure 4-5 I put the two pictures of the log 
variance of the residual wages for stayers. On the bottom part of the same figure I put the 
variance decomposition results. The log variance of residual wages across stayers is lower than 
in the full sample, as was clear already from the raw statistics of Table 4.1, yet it increases 
over time. The two bottom pictures of Figure 4-5 show the crucial empirical finding of the 
paper. The variance decomposition results for the stayers show that most of the total variance 
is accounted for by the permanent component and that the transitory component contributes 
virtually nothing to the increase in wage inequality across this group.
Table 4.4 in the Appendix shows the results of model 4.2 estimated on the two balanced 
panels of changers. The two bottom panels of Figure 4-6 show the variance decomposition 
results for changers. The vertical axis are scaled in the same way in Figure 4-6 and 4-5 
to facilitate the comparison between stayers and changers. The results show that both the 
variance of the permanent and of the transitory part of earnings increased across job changers. 
The difference in the results of Figure 4-6 and 4-5 show that the increasing earnings instability 
found in the full sample (Figure 4-4) is mostly due to job changers.
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4.4.1 R obustness Check: Stayers
In Table 4.5 in the Appendix, I verify the robustness of the results on earnings instability of 
job stayers along three dimensions. I compare two different definitions of stayers, two different 
models of earnings instability and four different wage measures. I now proceed to explain the 
terminology used in Table 4.5.
’’Stayer Definition 1” in Table 4.5 is the definition used in this paper based on the ’’months 
with current employer” question and described above. ’’Stayer Definition 2” is the definition of 
job stayer based on the "reason for separation from previous employer” question. According to 
this definition, anybody who is currently employed and did not give any reason for separation 
from the previous employer is recorded as a job stayer. ’’Stayer Definition 2” does not require 
a  valid value of tenure with the current employer. The question ’’reason for separation from 
previous employer” is available every year of the sample therefore the two balanced samples 
of stayers cover the years 1970-1980 and 1981-1992. When defined according to definition 
2, the balanced samples of stayers contain 342 individuals in the period 1970-1980 and 586 
individuals in the period 1981-1992.
’’Unit Root Model” in Table 4.5 corresponds to the model 4.2 explained above. ’’Stationary 
Model” in Table 4.5 substitutes the random walk term in model 4.2 with a time-invariant 
individual fixed effect. ’’Stationary Model” indicates a model of the following form:
Vit =  <f>tVi +  n v u  +  Tt r}it (4.4)
Hi is an individual time-invariant effect with variance cr£ and with time-varying loading factor 
<f>t. Like in model 4.2, the individual fixed effect will capture individual permanent characteris-
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tics such as ’’ability” and education, but it will not allow for non-mean-reverting shocks. The 
time-varying loading factor <f>t will reflect the changing market return to education and unob­
served skills. Like in model 4.2, vn is an AR(1) process: vn =  pvn-i -He# where tn iid(0, a^) 
is white noise. rjit iid(0, cr )^ is a purely transitory term with the associated loading factor
r t. In this model measurement error in wages will be captured by rjit.
The robustness check considers different wage measures and different samples. ’’Hourly 
Wage Residuals” in Table 4.5 corresponds to the benchmark measure used in tables 4.2 and
4.3. Log hourly wages are purged of year and experience effects with the first-stage regression 
4.1. ’’Hourly Wage Residuals (2)” considers the residuals of a regression of wages on a quadratic 
in experience, year dummies and 1 digit industry*year dummies. This purges the transitory 
variance from fluctuations in industry-specific wages. In this case, the first-stage regression 4.1 
becomes: Wijt =  Xn(3 +  a* +  ipjt +  yn where the subscript j  indicates the industry, a* indicates 
year dummies and ipjt indicates a set of interactions 1 digit industry *year. ’’Hourly Wage 
Residuals (3)” includes the low-income SEO sample. Finally ’’Annual Earnings Residuals” 
are included with the intent of avoiding the problem of measurement error in hours. ’’Hourly 
Wage Residuals (3)” and ’’Annual Earnings Residuals” are both residuals from the first-stage 
equation 4.1.
Table 4.5 reports the transitory variance calculated on the two balanced panels of stayers for
every combination ’’model-stayer definition-wage measure”. For simplicity only the transitory
variance is reported. The reported values correspond to a simple average of the estimated
transitory variance during the period. For example the values for the benchmark combination
’’Unit Root Model-Stayer Definition 1-Hourly Wage Residuals” correspond to the average of
the transitory variance plotted in the two bottom charts of Figure 4-5. For ’’Unit Root Model”
2
the reported values are the average of over the period of interest, for ’’Stationary Model”
154
Chapter 4. Earnings Instability of Job Stayers and Job Changers
the reported values are the average of t \ l t*.
Eight out of sixteen of the possible cases in Table 4.5 report a decreasing or a stable value 
in the average transitory variance for stayers between the periods 1970-77 and 1980-92. The 
remaining eight cases in Table 4.5 report an increase in the average transitory variance for 
stayers. Four out of the eight cases of rising transitory variance indicate a very mild increase 
of less or equal to 0.002 points. Four out of the eight cases of rising transitory variance are 
concentrated in the ’’Stationary Model-Stayer Definition 2” bottom right corner of Table 4.5. 
The ’’Stationary Model” tends to estimate a higher transitory variance rather than the ’’Unit 
Root Model” and a bigger increase over time. The stayers defined according to definition 2 
tend to have a larger estimated increase in the transitory variance. Finally when the transitory 
variance for stayers is calculated using annual earnings rather than hourly wages, it appears to 
increase in four cases out of four. Apart from the case of annual earnings where the evidence 
seem to indicate an increase in earnings instability for stayers too, I view the results in Table 
4.5 as evidence of stable or very mild increase in earnings instability for stayers.
4.4.2 R obustness Check: Changers
In Table 4.6 in the Appendix, I verify the robustness of the results on earnings instability of 
job changers. I use the same method as for job stayers.
’’Changer Definition 1” is the definition based on the ’’months with current employer” 
question and described above. ’’Changer Definition 2” is the definition based on the ’’reason 
for separation from previous employer” question. According to definition 2, anybody who is 
currently unemployed or has given any reason for separation form the previous employer is 
considered as a job changer. As in the case of stayers, ’’Unit Root Model” refers to equation
4.2 in the text, ’’Stationary Model” refers to equation 4.4. The wage measures used are the
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same as for job stayers.
The results in Table 4.6 indicate an increase of the transitory variance of wages for job 
changers in all cases except for three.
4.5 T he M odel
I interpret the evidence shown in the previous section in a search and matching model with 
on-the-job search by Pissarides (2000). I argue that Pissarides’ model can be fruitfully used 
to understand the different effects of an increase in the transitory variance of earnings on 
job stayers and job changers. This model provides different wage equations for stayers and 
changers and implies that wages are affected by transitory shocks. These characteristics make 
it a useful model to look at the different effects that an increase in the overall variance of 
transitory shocks may have on wages of job stayers and job changers.
The novelty introduced in this paper is the application of Pissarides’ model to the study of 
earnings instability. I will look at the effects of a mean-preserving spread of the distribution 
of transitory shocks on the cross-sectional variance of wages of job stayers and job changers. 
The recent literature provides some models of the increase in earnings instability. Violante
(2002) explains the increase in earnings instability on the basis of an acceleration of technical 
change and reduced transferability of skills. Aghion, Howitt and Violante (2002) underline the 
role of the interaction of faster technological change and ’’random” adaptability to the new 
technologies. In this paper, I assume the increase in the overall variance of the transitory part 
of wages and focus on the differences across stayers and changers.
In the empirical part of this paper, I underlined the differences in earnings instability across 
job stayers and job changers. I claim that the increase in the cross-sectional variance of wages
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for changers is due to increases in both the variance of the permanent and the transitory 
part. For job stayers, most of the increase is explained by the increase in the variance of 
the permanent part of individual wages and very little by the increase in the variance of the 
transitory part. The following model considers ex-ante identical individuals and therefore 
disregards differences in permanent characteristics while focussing on wage differences due to 
transitory shocks. The model provides a rationale for the different evolution of the transitory 
variance of wages across job stayers and job changers.
I shall now briefly explain the main lines of Pissarides’ on-the-job search model. The model 
is in continuous time. Workers are ex-ante identical with productivity p. Job seekers and jobs 
are matched via a matching function. Jobs have productivity px where p is the constant 
productivity and x  is the idiosyncratic one. Jobs are created at maximum productivity px 
with x  = l. The match is hit by an idiosyncratic productivity shock x  G(x) with x  G [0,1] 
at Poisson rate A. This shock is transitory: the shock a/ is independent of the previous x. At 
every point in time jobs are therefore distinguished by their transitory productivity x.
In a matching model with on-the-job search, both unemployed and part of the employed 
search for jobs. Since there is perfect information, when the worker is searching on the job, the 
firm is aware of it and the Nash bargaining that determines the wage takes that into account. 
This implies that wages for on-the-job seekers and non-seekers are different. Wages are affected 
by the transitory shock x  because, after realization of the shock r ,  the wage is renegotiated 
and the surplus is split by Nash bargaining. The rate at which unemployed and employed job 
seekers move into new jobs is derived from a matching function m  — m(v, u + e) where u  is 
the unemployed, e the employed job seekers, and v the number of vacancies. Jobs arrive to 
each searching worker, employed and unemployed, at the rate 0q(0), where q(9) =  m (l, 3iJ £) 
and 0 = is the ratio of vacancies to job seekers.
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The optimal policy can be characterized by two reservation rules. There is a reservation 
productivity R  such that jobs x  < R  are destroyed. There is a second reservation productivity 
S  such that workers in jobs R  < x  < S  seek a new job. Workers in jobs S  < x  < 1 do not 
search. The expected returns of the employed worker when he searches on the job (s) and 
when he does not (ns)are respectively:
rW *(x) =  w*(x) -<j  + \  f1 max(Wns(s), W a(s))dG(s) +  AG(R)U -
J r
-  XWa(x) + 0q(0)[Wna{ 1) -  W a(x)]
r W ^ ix )  =  wna(x) + X f 1 max(Wna(s), W a(s))dG(s) +  XG(R)U -  A r “ (i)
J r
Job seekers and non-seekers have different wages w8(x) and wna(x). When x  < R  jobs are 
destroyed and workers get the value of unemployment U. The difference between W a(x) and 
W na{x) is the cost of search <r and the capital gain the job seeker enjoys when he changes job: 
0q(0)[Wna( 1) — W a(x)] where 0q{0) is the rate at which job seekers find a new match, and 
W na{ 1) is the value of the new job as jobs are always created at maximum productivity x  =  1. 
The flow value of unemployment is:
rU = z + 0q(0)[Wn8( l ) - U ]
where z  is the unemployment benefit.
The value of a filled job is also different if the worker is searching or not:
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t J s ( x )  =  px — wa(x) +  A f  max(Jna(s), J a(s))dG(s) — [A +  9q(9)]Ja(x) (4.5)
J r
r J na(x) =  px  — wna(x) + A f  max(Jna(s), J 9(s))dG(s) — \ J na(x) (4.6)
J r
When the worker is searching, J 8{x) contains an additional probability that the job is destroyed 
given by the probability that the job seeker finds a new match: 9q(9). The flow value of a 
vacancy is:
rV  = -p c  + q{9)[Jns( l ) - V ]
and the zero-profit or free entry condition is V  =  0.
Wages are set by Nash rule to share the surplus of a match. Therefore for job seekers and 
non-seekers i = s, ns:
Knowing the value for workers and firms of vacant and filled jobs, substituting in the Nash 
rule, we find the wage equation for seekers and non-seekers:
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w 8 ( x )  =  (1 — (5 )(z  +  <j ) +  (3 p x  (4.7)
and
w n s ( x )  =  (1 — /3 ) z  +  (3 p (x  +  c9) (4.8)
When the worker quits to take another job, the return of the firm drops from J(x) to zero. 
The return from the new job to the worker is W n8( 1) since new jobs are created at the 
maximum productivity x  =  1. The Nash rule implies that the worker has to compensate the 
firm for this asymmetry in the returns. Therefore the wage for non-seekers is always higher 
than for job seekers, at given productivity x, w n s ( x )  > w a ( x ) .  This can be proven rewriting
w n 3 ( x )  — w a ( x )  = (1 — /3 )(j@ -ppc0  — a) and noticing that j ^ f i p c 9  is in equilibrium the expected
return from search.
The evolution of the number of employed job seekers e is:
^  =  A(1 -  u) \G(S) -  G(R)] -  Ae -  0q(0)e (4.9)
a t
where the first term on the RHS is the sum of new entry and re-entry in the range [/?, S], 
following the arrival of a productivity shock. The job-to-job number of quits is given by 
6q(9)e. The evolution of unemployment is given by:
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Ail
—  =  A(1 — u)G(R) — 0q(0)u (4.10)
I now look at the effect of increasing the variance of transitory shocks on the wages of
job changers and stayers. The increase in the transitory component of wages is modelled as a 
mean-preserving spread of G(x). I take a parametric change in the productivity distribution 
and solve the model with x(h) = x  +  h(x — x). I consider the effect of a marginal dh at h =  0.
An equilibrium in this model is a value of S, R, market tightness 0, a wage w(x) and 
unemployment u. To find the reservation rule S, write the value to a worker of a job re, when 
he is searching on the job and when he is not, W a(x) and W ns(x). S  is such that W'na(5)
=  W S(S). The job creation condition is given by «/™(l) and the zero profit condition V  = 0.
The job reservation productivity is R  such that J 8(R) = 0, this determines the job destruction 
condition. The equation that determines 5, the job creation condition, and the job destruction 
condition take respectively the following form:
(1 + h ) ( S - R )  (3 c
r  +  A +  9q(9) 1 -  /3 q(0) p9q(9)
(4.11)
(l +  h ) ( l - f l ) ( l - / ? )  c
r +  A q(9) +
p(3c9 — (1 — /?)<7 
p(r +  A)
(4.12)
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(l +  h)R-Hx + A(R,e,<r,h) =  (4.13)
P
where A(i2,9, <r, h) =  A max(J™(s), J 9(s))dG(s) is the option value of the job with 3 3  <  0, 
352 <  0 and 3 3  > 0. Equation 4.11 is obtained combining combining 4.5 and 4.6 with 4.7 and 
4.8 and substituting x  =  x  +  h(x — x). Equation 4.12 is obtained from 4.6 calculated in x  = 1 
and V  = 0  and equation 4.11. Equation 4.13 is obtained from J S(R) =  0 .
The job creation condition 4.12 is negatively sloped in the space R, 6. The last term on 
the RHS of equation 4.12 is the gain from search going to the firm. The expected productivity 
gain from job creation (LHS of equation 4.12) minus the gain from search must be equal to 
the average creation cost. The mean-preserving spread h shifts the job creation curve out. 
The intuition is that the mean-preserving spread makes productivities above the mean better 
and productivities below the mean worse. Workers and firms do not consider productivities 
below R , therefore the benefits from productivities above the mean outweight the costs from 
productivities below the mean.
The job destruction curve 4.13 implies that the reservation productivity net of the option 
value of the job is equal to total workers’ costs. The job destruction curve 4.13 is upward sloping 
in the space R, 9. A higher 9 reduces the option value of the job because higher 9 implies higher 
job destruction since a searching worker is more likely to find a job and quit. A higher 9 also 
increases the expected returns from search and therefore more search is undertaken and a job 
is more likely to be destroyed. This also reduces the option value of a job. The total differential
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of equation 4.13 can be written:
d A .d R  _  _ dA dAdd , A- A\
( + dR) M - x - R - d h ~ d e d h   ^ ^
The mean-preserving spread has three effects on R: it increases R  directly if x  > R, it 
increases R  through market tightness 0, it decreases R  by increasing the option value of a job. 
The reason ^  > 0 is the same as before, the truncation of the productivity distribution at 
R. Substituting the total differential of equation 4.12 into 4.14, we obtain that ^  >  0 and
# > ° -
The total differential of equation 4.11 with respect to h at h =  0 gives:
dS dR . 0  n r  +  A1 i (X ~ v ) (r  + A)<r dB
dh ~  dh ~  - { S ~ R) + [l T 0 c i l+ n e m ) +   ]dh
Knowing that ^  >  0 and > 0 and assuming S  — R  small, the result of a mean-preserving 
spread is ^  ^  > 0 and jjjr > 0. This means that the range of productivities over which
workers search on the job is larger and the range of productivities over which they do not search 
is smaller. A mean-preserving spread makes the gap between S  and R  larger because it in­
creases 9 and therefore increases the expected rewards from search. The intuition is again that 
the mean-preserving spread makes productivities above the mean better and productivities 
below the mean worse, but workers and firms do not consider productivities below R.
The effects of the mean-preserving spread > 0 and ^  > 0) on the level of unem­
ployment u =  x&(Ry+6q(6] 3X6 ambiguous. At given unemployment both the job destruction 
rate, AG(R), and the job creation rate, 0 q (6 ) j^ ,  are higher. The effect on u in steady state
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depends on the parameters.
We now look at the implications for the variance of wages of changers and stayers. On-the- 
job seekers (s) are changers with probability Bq(0). Job stayers are all the non-seekers (ns) 
plus those seekers (s) who did not change job. From equation 4.9, the number of employed 
job seekers in steady state is given by:
. A [G (5)-G (fl)]
A + 9q(9) K
Note that e is the steady state number of job seekers already net of the changers. The changers 
go from a job with productivity in [i?, S] to a job with productivity x  =  1 because all vacancies 
enjoy maximum productivity. We look at wages of stayers and changers before the change. 
The proportion of employed job changers in steady state is therefore given by ♦ The 
proportion of employed job stayers is given by: 1 — =  (1 — +  T^u* This is
the sum of non-seekers net of the changers plus the seekers who did not find a job.
The effect of the mean-preserving spread > 0 and ^  ^  >  0) on the number of job
seekers, e, on the number of quits, e0q(9), and on the fraction of employed job seekers is 
ambiguous. The ambiguity of the effect on comes from the fact that job seekers search on 
a wider range [i2, <5], but more workers find a match and leave the job seekers’ pool to become 
non-seekers. The effect on the job-to-job quit rate is positive.
The wages of employed seekers and non-seekers are given by:
wa(x) =  (1 — /?)(£ +  cr) +  (3px for x  E (i£, S)
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wn8(x) =  (1 — /3)z +  (3p(x +  c6) for x  € (S',1)
Taking now the variance of the wages for stayers and changers:
r a r l t ^ i ) )  =  ( j z r £ )  0 Y v a r ( x  | R < x < S )  (4.15)
var(w8tayers(x)) = ( l  — — ———^ P2p2var(x I x  > S) + (4.16)\  1 — u 1 — u )
+  ^  6 ^  (32p2var(x \ R < x  < S)
The conditional variance of a random variable increases as the support over which the 
variance is taken becomes larger. It is therefore clear that the variance of wages across job 
changers increases after the mean-preserving spread, as both the job-to-job quit rate, ,
and the conditional variance, var(x \ R  < x  < S), increase. The results for job stayers are
ambiguous since the effect of the mean-preserving spread on both the proportion of employed 
non-seekers, 1 — and the proportion of employed seekers who did not find a job,
is in principle ambiguous. The conditional variance var(x \ x  > S) decreases. The 
ambiguity for job stayers comes from the fact that although the total proportion of employed 
job stayers is reduced, their composition between non-seekers and seekers who did not find 
a job may change. While non-seekers have a lower wage variance after the mean-preserving 
spread, seekers have a higher variance.
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4 .5 .1  T h e  Link b etw een  th e  T heory  and  th e  E vid en ce
A few comments are in order on the relationship between the theory and the empirical evidence. 
First of all, this theory has nothing to say about the permanent component of wages since 
individuals are identical and wages differ only because of the different realizations of the 
transitory shock x. Equations 4.16 and 4.15 in the model indicate the cross-sectional variance 
of wages across stayers and changers. They are the theoretical counterpart of the transitory 
variance of wages shown in the bottom lines of the two lower charts of Figure 4-5 for job stayers 
and of Figure 4-6 for job changers.
Secondly, the assumption of the model is that the productivity shock x  is drawn form 
the general distribution G(x) at the Poisson rate A < oo, i.e. there are periods without 
shocks. Wages need a certain degree of persistence, in fact, if wages were continuously reset, 
nobody would search. However, the shock x  in the model is really transitory because eventually 
everybody draws a shock x  from the same distribution G(x), and every shock x ' is independent 
from the previous shock x. Equations 4.16 and 4.15 indicate the cross-sectional variance of
1.1.d. wages. In the empirical part, the benchmark equation 4.2 models the transitory part 
of wages as an AR(1) process. In equation 4.4, I model the transitory part of wages as an
1.1.d. process. Therefore it can be argued that the correspondence between the cross-sectional 
variance of the transitory part of wages in the theory and in the empirical part is not perfect. 
However, I am interested in the comparative statics of the transitory variance of wages with 
respect to a mean-preserving spread whatever the process that drives the transitory shock.
Finally, the correspondence between the definition of changers (stayers) used in the em­
pirical part and the one implied by the theory is also not perfect. In the empirical part, I 
define as job changers those who have less than 12 months of tenure with the current em­
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ployer or are unemployed and I take their wage in the same year. However, wages in the 
PSID refer to the previous year and are likely to be a mix of the old and new job’s wages. In 
the theory part, I exclude the unemployed from the definition of changers and I consider the 
cross-sectional wage variance of changers before the change because after the change all wages 
are identical with x  =  1. Furthermore, equations 4.16 and 4.15 in the theory part indicate 
the cross-sectional variance across all stayers and changers. In the empirical part, Figure 4-5 
and 4-6 show the transitory wage variance across a balanced sample of stayers and changers. 
However, I argued in the empirical section that the balanced sample of stayers (changers) has 
similar characteristics to the sample of all stayers (changers).
4.6 C onclusions
In this paper, I use the PSID to decompose the rise in wage inequality into permanent and 
transitory shocks. I show that the increase in the variance of transitory shocks, also known as 
earnings instability, is mostly restricted to job changers. Job stayers hardly suffer any increase 
in earnings instability over time. I verify the robustness of the results using two different 
models of earnings dynamics, two different definitions of job stayers and four different wage 
measures.
A simple search and matching model with on-the-job search provides an interpretation of 
the evidence. An increase in the variance of transitory shocks to earnings increases the range 
of productivities over which workers search on the job. The wage variance across job changers 
increases as worker search over a wider range of productivities. The direction of the change in 
the wage variance across job stayers is ambiguous and depends on their composition between 
non-seekers and seekers who did not find a job.
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4 .7  A ppendix: Tables
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Balanced Sample Balanced Sample 
Year Full Sample Changers Stayers Changers Stayers
Variance Obs. Variance Obs. Variance Obs. Variance Obs. Variance Obs.
log(w) log(w) log(w) log(w) log(w)
1970 0.197 1257 0.226 182 0.187 1075 0.187 269 0.134 412
1971 0.221 1310 0.257 222 0.205 1088 0.154 269 0.137 412
1972 0.217 1371 0.222 228 0.202 1143 0.158 269 0.143 412
1973 0.213 1434 0.225 261 0.194 1173 0.174 269 0.142 412
1974 0.212 1500 0.226 283 0.192 1217 0.166 269 0.142 412
1975 0.201 1555 0.223 359 0.177 1196 0.180 269 0.130 412
1976 0.204 1566 0.243 275 0.181 1291 0.169 269 0.138 412
1977 0.219 1601 0.220 299 0.202 1302 0.188 269 0.149 412
1978 0.196 1643 • . • • • • • •
1979 0.209 1689 • • • • • • • •
1980 0.223 1737 • • • . • • .
1981 0.230 1745 0.270 336 0.198 1409 0.177 321 0.144 359
1982 0.240 1734 0.275 352 0.207 1382 0.199 321 0.136 359
1983 0.256 1716 0.342 344 0.209 1372 0.197 321 0.152 359
1984 0.269 1728 0.273 354 0.236 1374 0.202 321 0.150 359
1985 0.260 1714 0.321 285 0.228 1429 0.194 321 0.143 359
1986 0.274 1754 0.331 308 0.234 1446 0.206 321 0.144 359
1987 0.289 1752 0.367 314 0.248 1438 0.213 321 0.161 359
1988 0.280 1767 0.329 352 0.241 1415 0.215 321 0.165 359
1989 0.291 1773 0.303 328 0.260 1445 0.238 321 0.162 359
1990 0.276 1776 0.266 345 0.248 1431 0.236 321 0.165 359
1991 0.291 1793 0.331 304 0.257 1489 0.234 321 0.161 359
1992 0.293 1784 0.346 315 0.260 1469 0.236 321 0.155 359
Notes: The total number of individual/year observations is 37699. Wages are hourly wages computed 
as annual earnings divided by annual hours. Wages are expressed in 1991 dollars.
Table 4.1: PSID Sample Descriptive Statistics
Permanent Component Transitory Component
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
01 -0.077 (0.001) 7Tl 0.038 (0.001)
02 0.006 (0.000) 7T2 -0.003 (0.000)
03 -0.000 (0.000) 7T3 0.000 (0.000)
(Tp 0.143 (0.000) p 0.279 (0.000)
°n 0.012 (0.000) <?e 0.042 (0.000)
Notes: Parameter estimates and standard errors for the benchmark model on the full sample.
Table 4.2: Parameter Estimates
169
Chapter 4. Earnings Instability of Job Stayers and Job Changers
o %stayers a %changers
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Figure 4-1: Proportion of job stayers and job changers.
o full sam ple a stayers
□ changers
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Figure 4-2: Variance of log hourly wages. Job stayers and job changers.
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o log variance of residuals a model fit
.25686 -
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Figure 4-3: Model Fit
o  permanent variance a transitory variance
0  -
1970 1992
year
Figure 4-4: Variance Decomposition.
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Permanent Component Transitory Component
Stayers 1970-1977
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
0 1 0 .0 1 1 (0 .0 0 0 ) 7Tl 0.278 (0.057)
0 2 -0.014 (0 .0 0 0 ) 7r 2 0.184 (0.003)
03 0 .0 0 1 (0 .0 0 0 ) 7T3 -0.041 (0 .0 0 1 )
0.113 (0 .0 0 1 ) P 0.069 (0 .0 0 0 )
Vr, 0 .0 2 0 (0 .0 0 0 ) c r E 0.003 (0 .0 0 0 )
Stayers 1981-1992
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
0 1 -0 .0 2 1 (0 .0 0 0 ) 7Tl -0.078 (0.005)
0 2 0 .0 0 1 (0 .0 0 0 ) 7T2 -0.184 (0 .0 1 2 )
03 -0 .0 0 0 (0 .0 0 0 ) 7T3 0.018 (0 .0 0 1 )
<7M 0124 (0 .0 0 0 ) P 0.501 (0.025)
0.009 (0 .0 0 0 ) ° E 0 .0 0 2 (0 .0 0 0 )
Notes: Parameter estimates and standard errors for the benchmark model on the two balanced panels 
of stayers.
Table 4.3: Parameter Estimates: Stayers
O  log variance of residuals A  model fit O  log variance of residuals A  model fit
.2 5 -
1970
O  permanent variance A  transitory variance
-©
1977
.25
.12
1992
year
O  permanent variance A  transitory variance
0
year
Figure 4-5: Model fit and Variance decomposition: Stayers.
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Permanent Component Transitory Component
Changers 1970-1977
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
* 1 -0 .2 0 2 (0 .0 0 2 ) 7Tl 1.240 (0.151)
0 2 0.042 (0 .0 0 0 ) 7T2 -0.348 (0.041)
03 -0.003 (0 .0 0 0 ) 7T3 0.029 (0.003)
On 0.106 (0 .0 0 0 ) p 0.037 (0.003)
Or, 0.036 (0 .0 0 0 ) Oe 0.005 (0 .0 0 0 )
Changers 1981-1992
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
0 1 -0 .1 0 0 (0 .0 0 2 ) 7Tl 1.034 (0.241)
0 2 0 .0 1 1 (0 .0 0 0 ) 7T2 -0 .2 0 2 (0.044)
03 -0.000 (0 .0 0 0 ) 7T3 0 .0 1 0 (0 .0 0 2 )
On 0117 (0 .0 0 0 ) P -0.092 (0.007)
Or, 0.036 (0 .0 0 0 ) O e 0.004 (0 .0 0 1 )
Notes: Parameter estimates and standard errors for the benchmark model on the two balanced panels 
of changers.
Table 4.4: Parameter Estimates: Changers
O  log variance of residuals A  modal fit O  log variance of residuals A  model fit
.25
.12
1077
year
O  permanent variance A  transitory variance
1977
.25
.12
1902
year
A  transitory varianceO permanent variance
.2
0
year
Figure 4-6: Model fit and Variance decomposition: Changers
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Stayer Definition 1 Stayer Definition 2
Transitory Variance TTansitory Variance
Unit Root Model 1970-1977 1981-1992 1970-1980 1981-1992
Hourly Wage Residuals 0.010 0.007 0.009 0.007
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hourly Wage Residuals (2) 0.012 0.010 0.013 0.010
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Hourly Wage Residuals (3) 0.012 0.009 0.018 0.008
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Annual Earnings Residuals 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.014
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Transitory Variance TTansitory Variance
Stationary Model 1970-1977 1981-1992 1970-1980 1981-1992
Hourly Wage Residuals 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.016
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hourly Wage Residuals (2) 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.019
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Hourly Wage Residuals (3) 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.019
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
Annual Earnings Residuals 0.008 0.010 0.005 0.013
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: ”Stayer Definition 1” uses the question ’’Months with current employer”. ’’Stayer Definition 2” 
uses the question ’’Reason for separation from previous employer”. ’’Unit Root Model” is equation 4.2 
in the text. ’’Stationary Model” is equation 4.4 in the text. ’’Hourly Wage Residuals (2)” considers the 
residuals from an augmented first stage regression W ijt  =  X u (3 +  a* +  tpjt  +  Vit where ip jt  indicates 
a set of interactions 1 digit industry-year. ” Hourly Wage Residuals (3)” includes the low-income SEO 
sample.
Table 4.5: Robustness Analysis: Stayers
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Changer Definition 1 Changer Definition 2
Transitory Variance Transitory Variance
Unit Root Model 1970-1977 1981-1992 1970-1980 1981-1992
Hourly Wage Residuals 0.020 0.021 0.028 0.043
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Hourly Wage Residuals (2) 0.056 0.052 0.033 0.058
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Hourly Wage Residuals (3) 0.038 0.073 0.024 0.049
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Annual Earnings Residuals 0.023 0.036 0.024 0.070
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Transitory Variance Transitory Variance
Stationary Model 1970-1977 1981-1992 1970-1980 1981-1992
Hourly Wage Residuals 0.025 0.030 0.027 0.050
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Hourly Wage Residuals (2) 0.022 0.025 0.031 0.039
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Hourly Wage Residuals (3) 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.057
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Annual Earnings Residuals 0.027 0.039 0.028 0.052
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Notes: ’’Changer Definition 1” uses the question ’’Months with current employer”. ”Changer Definition 
2” uses the question ”Reason for separation from previous employer”. ’’Unit Root Model” is equation 
4.2 in the text. ’’Stationary Model” is equation 4.4 in the text. "Hourly Wage Residuals (2)” considers 
the residuals from an augmented first stage regression Wijt = Xit/3+at+iftjt +Vit where ijjjt indicates 
a set of interactions 1 digit industry-year. "Hourly Wage Residuals (3)” includes the low-income SEO 
sample.
Table 4.6: Robustness Analysis: Changers
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